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 I 
Voorwoord 
Een graankorrel groeit niet vanzelf uit tot een graangewas: er is een vruchtbare bodem en 
voldoende water, licht en warmte nodig. Bij een doctoraat is het net eender. Graag zou ik hier 
die mensen bedanken die gezorgd hebben voor een vruchtbare bodem en voor water, licht en 
warmte nodig om dit proefschrift tot stand te brengen.  
 
Vooreerst wens ik mijn promotor, Prof. Dr. Paul Gemmel, te bedanken. Hij heeft mij de 
opportuniteit geboden om te doctoreren en mij telkens weer gestimuleerd om op zoek te gaan 
naar de broodnodige kennis om het proefschrift te kunnen voltooien. In de periodes dat het 
onderzoek minder vlot verliep, is hij mij blijven steunen: hij geloofde in de kans op slagen en 
gaf mij vertrouwen in de toekomst. Ook de leden van de begeleidingscommissie ben ik 
dankbaar. Het enthousiasme van Prof. Dr. Deva Rangarajan en zijn verrassende kijk op het 
marketing gebeuren hebben mij geholpen om buiten de lijnen van mijn eigen onderzoek te 
kijken en het geheel in een breder kader te zien. Prof. Dr. Annouk Lievens ben ik dankbaar 
voor haar kritische kijk en haar praktische tips rond het voorbereiden en uitvoeren van 
empirische studies. Hierbij wil ik ook graag Prof. Dr. Roland Van Dierdonk, Prof. Dr. Patrick 
Van Kenhove, en Prof. Dr. Jos Lemmink als leden van de leescommissie bedanken voor hun 
constructieve feedback en waardevolle suggesties. Prof. Dr. Patrick Van Kenhove wil ik in 
het bijzonder bedanken voor zijn hulp toen ik voor het eerst met LISREL werkte en Prof. Dr. 
Jos Lemmink om mij tijdens de QRMB cursus kennis te laten maken met een aantal 
statistische programma’s. Ook het Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen 
verdient hier een bedanking, want dankzij hun financiële ondersteuning heb ik de weg van het 
doctoraat kunnen bewandelen. 
 
Dit doctoraat was niet tot stand gekomen zonder de medewerking van enkele bedrijven in de 
bewakingssector. Dankzij hun interesse in mijn onderzoek en hun steun bij het uitvoeren van 
de empirische studies kon ik de nodige data verzamelen. Binnen elk bedrijf was niet alleen de 
algemene directeur bij het onderzoek betrokken, maar telkens trad een raderwerk van 
personen in werking om dit onderzoek te laten slagen. Graag wil ik dan ook iedereen 
bedanken die zijn steentje heeft bijgedragen. Hierbij wil ik ook alle medewerkers en klanten 
van deze bedrijven bedanken voor het invullen van de vragenlijsten. In het bijzonder gaat 
mijn dank uit naar de heer Joris Vlerick: vanaf de eerste dag was hij sterk geïnteresseerd in 
 II 
het onderzoek. Samen met het team in Drongen heeft hij alles in het werk gesteld om dit 
onderzoek kans op slagen te geven. Via deze aangename samenwerking heb ik veel geleerd 
over de bewakingswereld en daarbuiten. Graag wil ik ook de heer Kris Van den Briel 
bedanken. Na een interview voor mijn licentiaatverhandeling is hij mijn onderzoek van nabij 
blijven opvolgen. Ik kon steeds op hem rekenen voor wijze raad of hulp bij mijn onderzoek.  
 
Aan mijn jaren op de vakgroep beleidsinformatie, operationeel beheer en technologiebeleid 
heb ik mooie herinneringen overgehouden. De collega’s uit mijn bureau, Broos, Dieter, 
Lieven, Rik en Vincent, waren altijd wel in voor een grapje, maar in moeilijke momenten kon 
ik steeds op hun bemoedigende woorden rekenen. Graag wil ik Ann en Frederik bedanken 
voor de vele aangename momenten en ook voor hun hulp met computerproblemen of andere. 
Ook Martine en Wendy wil ik bedanken om mij wegwijs te maken in de administratieve 
procedures en steeds klaar te staan met een helpende hand of een luisterend oor. 
 
Een speciaal woord van dank gaat uit naar mijn ouders: ze hebben mij steeds de vrijheid 
gegeven om mijn eigen keuzes te maken en eens mijn beslissing was genomen, stonden ze 
voor de volle 100% achter mij om die keuze tot een goed einde te brengen. Dankzij hun zorg 
en warmte had ik steeds een thuis waar ik tot rust kon komen. Ook wil ik mijn familie, en 
mijn broer in het bijzonder, bedanken voor de vele fijne momenten en de steun in moeilijke 
tijden.  
 
Naast mijn familie hebben ook mijn vrienden een belangrijke rol gespeeld de voorbije jaren. 
In de vele leuke momenten die we samen hebben beleefd, vond ik de moed om door te zetten. 
Zij hebben gezorgd voor de nodige ontspanning in het weekend zodat ik er tijdens de week 
kon invliegen. Dankzij hun steun heb ik geleerd om in mijzelf te blijven geloven. 
 
Tenslotte is er nog één bijzonder persoon die ik wens te bedanken, mijn vriend Clement. Hij 
is er al bij vanaf mijn eerste jaar als studente aan de universiteit en zonder hem zou ik nooit 
zover geraakt zijn. Zijn onvoorwaardelijke steun en liefde waren noodzakelijk om dit 
doctoraat tot een goed einde te brengen.  
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Samenvatting 
Bij de meeste organisaties maakt de inkoop van diensten een belangrijk deel uit van hun 
huidig budget voor externe aankopen. Door deze groeiende inkooppraktijken wint de 
interactie tussen verkoper en koper aan belang in de dienstensector. Nochtans worden er in de 
academische wereld weinig studies over de inkoop van diensten gewijd aan die interactie 
tussen verkoper en koper en aan de mechanismen om die interactie te beheren in de periode 
na de aankoop. Dit is zeker het geval voor deze diensten die vanuit strategisch oogpunt als 
minder waardevol beschouwd worden, zoals de ondersteunende diensten. Ondersteunende 
diensten zijn die diensten die noodzakelijk zijn voor de dagelijkse werking van het bedrijf om 
het te helpen bij zijn kernactiviteiten. Tijdens de jaren negentig is de uitbesteding van deze 
diensten sterk toegenomen en de meeste bedrijven kopen momenteel ondersteunende diensten 
aan van één of meerdere externe leveranciers: de ondersteunende diensten zijn een belangrijk 
deel van de bedrijfsgerichte dienstensector geworden. Een specifiek kenmerk van 
ondersteunende diensten is dat deze voornamelijk geleverd worden op de bedrijfsterreinen 
van de aankoper. Bijgevolg worden in deze doctoraatsthesis rond ondersteunende diensten 
niet alleen de beheermechanismen van de interactie opgenomen, maar ook het gedrag van het 
dienstverlenende personeel van de externe leverancier.  
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis focust op een specifiek type van ondersteunende diensten: de 
empirische studies vinden plaats in de bewakingssector waarbij de supervisie en bescherming 
van (im-)mobiele goederen en van personen ter waarborging van de veiligheid in publieke 
plaatsen centraal staan. Bewakingsdiensten zijn sterk gereglementeerd door de wet en veel 
bedrijven besteden deze dienst uit, ook in België. De laatste jaren is deze sector sterk gegroeid 
en de meeste organisaties kopen momenteel (een deel van) de bewakingsdiensten extern aan. 
Ondanks de toegenomen handelsactiviteit in de bewakingssector hebben weinig academische 
studies deze specifieke sector onderzocht. Bovendien beschouwen veel bedrijven aangekochte 
bewakingsdiensten, en andere ondersteunende diensten, als te onbelangrijk om er voldoende 
aandacht vanuit het management aan te schenken. 
 
Het doel van deze doctoraatsthesis is het onderzoeken van de interactie tussen een 
dienstverlener en een klantenorganisatie. Meer bepaald wensen we na te gaan hoe de 
performantie in bedrijfsgerichte dienstverlening verhoogd kan worden aan de hand van het 
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gedrag van het dienstverlenende personeel en aan de hand van contractuele en relationele 
beheermechanismen. Gebaseerd op de bovenstaande bevindingen is het doel van deze 
doctoraatsthesis drieledig. Het eerste objectief is het belang van aangekochte diensten en hun 
impact doorheen de bedrijfsketen nagaan. Het tweede objectief is het onderzoeken van de 
beheermechanismen van het dienstverleningsproces bij bedrijven: de interactie tussen 
contractuele en relationele beheermechanismen, hun impact op de performantie en ook hoe 
bepaalde kenmerken van de dienstuitwisseling de beheermechanismen beïnvloeden. 
Aangezien diensten geleverd worden door mensen onderzoeken we tenslotte ook het gedrag 
van het dienstverlenende personeel en hoe verschillende soorten gedrag een invloed 
uitoefenen op de performantie in bedrijfsgerichte dienstverlening.  
 
Om aan deze objectieven te voldoen, hebben we drie empirische onderzoeken en één 
conceptueel onderzoek uitgevoerd. De empirische onderzoeken vonden allen plaats in de 
Belgische bewakingsmarkt. Voor het eerste onderzoeksdoel werd er data verzameld bij 201 
klantenorganisaties van een onderneming die de bewakingsdiensten aankocht van een externe 
leverancier. Voor de tweede doelstelling werd in de conceptuele studie eerst een model voor 
het beheren van het bedrijfsgerichte dienstverleningsproces opgesteld. Om de 
beheermechanismen van het dienstverleningsproces verder te onderzoeken werd er gebruik 
gemaakt van 124 vragenlijsten afgenomen bij klantenorganisaties die bewakingsdiensten 
(deels) extern aankochten. Voor het laatste onderzoeksdoel werd er data verzameld bij 1174 
bewakingsagenten tewerkgesteld bij een Belgische bewakingsleverancier.  
 
De belangrijkste bevindingen voor de drie objectieven zijn:  
 
1. Aangekochte diensten in de bedrijfsketen 
De eerste empirische studie toont aan dat aangekochte diensten een invloed kunnen hebben op 
organisaties die zich verder stroomafwaarts in de bedrijfsketen bevinden. De relatie van de 
externe leverancier met het aankopende bedrijf en de relatie van het aankopende bedrijf met 
zijn klantenorganisaties zijn dus onderling verbonden, ook voor deze aangekochte diensten 
die als minder belangrijk beschouwd worden. De leverancier van ondersteunende diensten 
behoort dus tot het bedrijfsnetwerk van het aankopende bedrijf en deze dienstuitwisseling zou 
daarom ook zorgvuldig beheerd moeten worden.  
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2. Contractuele en relationele beheermechanismen, hun antecedenten en performantie 
Bij het tweede objectief kunnen er drie belangrijke bevindingen genoteerd worden. Ten eerste 
zijn relationele en contractuele beheermechanismen – waarbij die laatste bestaan uit 
contractdetail en contractflexibiliteit – complementen en geen substituten. Contractdetail 
bevordert de ontwikkeling van relationele beheermechanismen, terwijl contractflexibiliteit en 
relationele beheermechanismen beiden positief gerelateerd zijn aan de geleverde 
performantie. Ten tweede hebben specifieke karakteristieken van diensten een invloed op 
bepaalde kenmerken van de dienstuitwisseling, meer bepaald op de specificiteit van de 
investeringen en op onzekerheid. Zo bestaan, door het minder tastbare karakter van diensten, 
transactiespecifieke investeringen niet alleen uit materiële en menselijke factoren, maar 
eveneens uit procesgerichte factoren. Doordat diensten ook meer gericht zijn op mensen 
speelt gedragsonzekerheid een grotere rol in dienstenomgevingen. Ten derde hebben deze 
kenmerken die beïnvloed worden door specifieke dienstenkarakteristieken niet dezelfde 
invloed op de beheermechanismen. Transactiespecifieke investeringen van de leverancier 
(leverancierspecifieke investeringen) zijn positief gerelateerd aan contractdetail, 
contractflexibiliteit en relationele beheermechanismen. Omgevingsonzekerheid vergroot het 
effect van leverancierspecifieke investeringen op contractflexibiliteit. Dit type van 
onzekerheid is ook negatief gerelateerd aan contractdetail, maar is niet gerelateerd aan 
relationele beheermechanismen. Gedragsonzekerheid daarentegen is negatief gerelateerd aan 
zowel contractdetail als relationele beheermechanismen. Dit type van onzekerheid is alleen 
negatief gerelateerd aan contractflexibiliteit bij een laag niveau van klantspecifieke 
investeringen. Transactiespecifieke investeringen van de klant bufferen dus het effect van 
gedragsonzekerheid op contractflexibiliteit. Klantspecifieke investeringen zijn ook positief 
gerelateerd aan de relationele beheermechanismen, maar in tegenstelling tot de 
leverancierspecifieke investeringen zijn klantspecifieke investeringen niet gerelateerd aan 
contractdetail. 
 
3. Gedrag van het dienstverlenende personeel en performantie  
De resultaten van de laatste studie geven aan dat het voorgeschreven (aanbevolen) gedrag van 
het dienstverlenende personeel een positieve invloed heeft op zowel geleverde productiviteit 
als geleverde kwaliteit. Het bijkomende (boven het normale) gedrag van het dienstverlenende 
personeel is een antecedent van het voorgeschreven gedrag. Bijgevolg gaat de impact van het 
bijkomende gedrag op de geleverde kwaliteit volledig via het voorgeschreven gedrag. Het 
bijkomende gedrag heeft daarentegen wel een directe en positieve impact op de geleverde 
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productiviteit: het voorgeschreven gedrag brengt enkel gedeeltelijk de impact van het 
bijkomende gedrag op geleverde productiviteit over. 
 
De belangrijkste focus in deze doctoraatsthesis is business services management: we 
onderzoeken hoe bedrijfsgerichte dienstverleningsprocessen, meer bepaald deze van 
ondersteunende diensten, gemanaged moeten worden om de performantie te verhogen. De 
studies opgenomen in deze doctoraatsthesis bevatten verscheidene waardevolle bijdragen. 
Vanuit een theoretisch standpunt kunnen vier belangrijke bijdragen geformuleerd worden. 
Ten eerste draagt deze doctoraatsthesis bij tot de literatuur rond de bedrijfsketen en de theorie 
van bedrijfsnetwerken door aan te duiden dat niet alleen relaties met leveranciers die een 
vanuit strategisch oogpunt waardevolle dienst leveren in beschouwingen mogen worden 
genomen. Leveranciers die een relatief gezien minder kritische dienst leveren zouden ook 
beschouwd moeten worden als lid van het bedrijfsnetwerk. Ten tweede draagt deze 
doctoraatsthesis bij tot de transactiekostentheorie. De resultaten geven aan dat specifieke 
karakteristieken van diensten een impact hebben op de meest frequent geciteerde 
antecedenten van beheermechanismen voor transacties tussen bedrijven: specifieke 
investeringen omvatten ook procesgerichte factoren en gedragsonzekerheid speelt een grotere 
rol in dienstensectoren. Een derde bijdrage van deze doctoraatsthesis is tot de studie van 
contracten en coördinatiemechanismen. De empirische resultaten staven het complementaire 
karakter van contractuele en relationele beheermechanismen gebaseerd op de 
tweedimensionele structuur van contracten. Ten slotte draagt deze doctoraatsthesis ook bij tot 
de literatuur rond het gedrag van het dienstverlenende personeel door voor de geleverde 
productiviteit de mediërende rol van het voorgeschreven gedrag te verminderen en het belang 
van het bijkomende gedrag te benadrukken.  
 
De onderzoeksresultaten van deze doctoraatsthesis hebben eveneens praktische relevanties. 
Het is noodzakelijk dat het management van ondernemingen belang hecht aan de 
ondersteunende diensten die worden aangekocht van een externe leverancier, vooral rond het 
beheer van deze dienstuitwisselingen en de impact van het dienstverlenende personeel. Een 
geschreven, formele overeenkomst – of contract – zou moeten opgesteld worden tussen de 
leverancier en het aankopende bedrijf en deze overeenkomst zou ook gebruikt moeten worden 
voor het beheer van de interactie tussen koper en verkoper na de aankoop. Afhankelijk van de 
kenmerken van de specifieke dienstuitwisseling, zou er een aangepast niveau van 
contractdetail, contractflexibiliteit en relationele waarden ontwikkeld moeten worden en het 
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voorgeschreven en bijkomende gedrag van het dienstverlenende personeel zou gestimuleerd 
moeten worden, ook door het aankopende bedrijf, om op die manier de performantie van de 
desbetreffende dienstuitwisseling te verhogen. 
Samenvatting 
6 
Summary 
7 
Summary 
The procurement of business services has become a substantial part of the external purchases 
for most organizations.  Because of these increased sourcing practices, the interaction 
between buyer and seller gains in importance in services settings. In the academic world 
however, few studies on service sourcing have investigated this buyer-seller interaction and 
the mechanisms used to govern the exchange in the life after the purchase. This is especially 
true for those services considered less strategically valuable such as support services. Support 
services are those services needed for the day-to-day running of the business to assist the 
company in its core business delivery. The outsourcing of these services has expanded during 
the 1990s and many companies are now purchasing support services from an external 
supplier: support services have become an important part of the business services sector. One 
specific characteristic of support services is that these are mainly delivered at the premises of 
the buying organization. Therefore, in this dissertation on support services exchanges, not 
only the exchange governance mechanisms are incorporated, but also the behaviour of the 
supplier’s frontline employees. 
 
This dissertation focuses on one specific type of support services: the empirical studies are set 
in security services related to the supervision and protection of (im-)mobile goods and of 
persons to assure the security in public places. Security services are highly regulated by law 
and are highly outsourced in business companies, also in Belgium. The sector has been 
growing significantly the past few years and most business organizations purchase (a part of) 
the security services from an external supplier. Despite the increased business activity in the 
security sector, few academic research studies have covered this specific research setting. 
Moreover, buying organizations do not always consider security services, and other support 
services, as important enough to give these services sufficient managerial attention. 
 
The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate the exchange between a service supplier 
and a buying organization. More specifically, we want to examine how the performance in 
business services exchanges can be enhanced by means of frontline employee behaviour and 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms. Based on the above considerations, the 
aim of this dissertation is threefold. Its first objective is to investigate the relevance of 
purchased business services and their impact along the service supply chain. The second 
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objective is to examine the governance mechanisms of business services exchanges: the 
interplay between contractual and relational governance, their impact on performance 
outcomes and how certain features of the service transaction affect the exchange governance 
mechanisms. As services are delivered by frontline employees, the third objective is to 
examine frontline employee behaviour and how different types of employee behaviour 
influence performance outcomes in business services exchanges.  
 
To meet these objectives, we conduct three empirical studies and one conceptual study. The 
empirical studies were set in the Belgian security services market. The first objective is 
achieved based on data collected by 201 business customers of an organization buying 
security services from an external supplier. To meet the second objective, the conceptual 
study proposes a model for business services exchange governance. To investigate exchange 
governance in business services settings more in detail, 124 valid questionnaires from 
business customers buying security services from one or more security services suppliers are 
used. Finally, the third objective involves 1,174 security agents employed at a Belgian 
security services supplier. 
 
The main findings on the three objectives are: 
 
1. Purchased business services in the supply chain   
The first empirical study indicates that purchased business services can influence downstream 
supply chain members. The relationship of the external supplier with the buying organization 
and the relationship of the buying organization with its business customers are interconnected, 
even when purchased services are considered less important. Support services suppliers thus 
belong to the buying organization’s business network and their exchanges should therefore be 
carefully governed. 
 
2. Contractual and relational governance, their antecedents and performance outcomes  
On the second objective, the results reveal three important findings. First, relational 
governance and contractual governance - consisting of contract detail and contract flexibility - 
are complements, and not substitutes. Contract detail facilitates the development of relational 
governance, while contract flexibility and relational governance are both positively related to 
performance outcomes. Second, service characteristics influence certain features of the 
service transaction, i.e. asset specificity and uncertainty. Transaction-specific investments, or 
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asset specificity, do not only consist of physical and human aspects, but also of procedural 
aspects because of the less tangible character of services. Because of the more people-oriented 
character of services, behavioural uncertainty is supposed to play a more profound role in 
services settings. Third, those features of the service transaction influenced by specific service 
characteristics do not affect the exchange governance mechanisms in the same way. 
Transaction specific investments of the supplier (supplier asset specificity) are positively 
related to contract detail, contract flexibility and relational governance. Environmental 
uncertainty enhances the effect of supplier asset specificity on contract flexibility. This type 
of uncertainty is also negatively related to contract detail and is not related to relational 
governance. On the other hand, behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to both contract 
detail and relational governance. This type of uncertainty is only negatively related to contract 
flexibility in case of low buyer asset specificity. Buyer asset specificity, or the transaction-
specific investments of the buyer, thus buffers the effect of behavioural uncertainty on 
contract flexibility. Buyer asset specificity is also positively related to relational governance, 
but in contrast with supplier asset specificity, buyer asset specificity is not related to contract 
detail.  
 
3. Frontline employee behaviour and performance outcomes 
The results of the last study indicate that role-prescribed or in-role behaviour of the frontline 
employee has a positive impact on both performed productivity and performed quality. Extra-
role behaviour of the frontline employee is an antecedent of in-role behaviour. As a 
consequence, in-role behaviour is a full mediator for the impact of extra-role behaviour on 
performed quality. By contrast, extra-role behaviour does have a direct and positive impact on 
performed productivity: in-role behaviour only partially mediates the impact of extra-role 
behaviour on performed productivity. 
 
In this dissertation, the main focus is on business services management: we investigate how 
business services exchanges, and support services exchanges in particular, should be managed 
to enhance performance outcomes. The studies included in this dissertation add several 
valuable contributions. From a theoretical point of view, four major contributions can be 
identified. First, this dissertation contributes to the supply chain literature and business 
network theory by indicating that not only relationships with suppliers delivering strategically 
valuable services should be considered. Organizations supplying business services considered 
less critical such as support services should also be regarded as a member of the business 
Summary 
10 
network. Second, this dissertation makes a contribution to transaction cost theory. The results 
indicate that specific service characteristics have an impact on the most frequently cited 
antecedents of exchange governance in transaction cost theory: asset specificity also relates to 
procedural aspects and behavioural uncertainty plays a more profound role in services. A third 
contribution of this dissertation is on the study of contracting and coordination mechanisms. 
The empirical results support the complementary nature of contractual and relational 
governance based on the two-dimensional structure of contracts. Finally, this dissertation also 
contributes to the literature on frontline employee behaviour by diminishing the mediating 
role of in-role behaviour and stressing the importance of extra-role behaviour in performance 
productivity.  
 
The research results of this dissertation have practical relevance as well. For the management 
in buying organizations, it is important to pay attention to the support services purchased from 
an external supplier, especially to the governance of those exchanges and the impact of 
frontline employees delivering the service. A written, formal agreement or contract should be 
established between supplier and buyer and that agreement should also be used during the 
ongoing interaction in the life after the purchase. Dependent on the features of the specific 
service transaction, an appropriate level of contract detail, contract flexibility and relational 
norms should be developed and in-role and extra-role behaviour of frontline employees 
should be stimulated, also by the buying organization, to enhance the performance outcomes 
of the exchange under consideration.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
In today’s economy, the business services sector continues to grow because of the outsourcing 
story and growing internationalization. The share of services in total purchase volumes has 
increased (Murray and Kotabe, 1999) and employment in business services keeps rising. For 
most organizations, the procurement of business services has become a substantial part of 
their total acquisitions of external resources (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002). As a 
consequence, due to increased sourcing practices, interactions between buying and selling 
organizations gain in importance, especially in business services settings. Knowledge of how 
to govern business services exchanges helps organizations in establishing long-lasting 
relationships with relevant counterparts and thus in creating a competitive advantage. Despite 
the importance of buyer-seller interactions in business services exchanges, few studies on 
service sourcing have investigated the ongoing interaction between buying and supplying 
organizations in the life after the purchase (Wynstra et al., 2006).  There has been a 
considerable amount of research studies on how to govern business relationships, but few 
researchers have integrated the specific characteristics of services into their study. 
Nevertheless, the marketing and purchasing of business services is seen as essentially 
different from the marketing and purchasing of goods (Jackson and Cooper, 1988; Jackson et 
al., 1995). Due to these disparities between services and goods, manufacturing firms and 
business service suppliers can have a deviant preference for alternative governance 
mechanisms (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). Another disparity between goods and services 
exchanges is the higher customer-employee interaction during service delivery (Schneider et 
al., 2005). Frontline employees have a stronger influence on the service exchange and its 
performance outcomes than on the exchange of goods, also in a business-to-business 
environment (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). 
 
The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate the exchange governance between a service 
supplier and a buying organization: we want to examine how the performance of the buyer-
supplier relationship can be enhanced. First, the relevance of exchange governance in services 
settings is explored based on the impact of purchased services along the supply chain. In the 
next step we scan previous research on exchange governance. Based on this overview, we 
investigate alternative governance mechanisms and their impact on performance in business 
services exchanges. The two general types of governance mechanisms, i.e. contract and 
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relation, are incorporated. Contractual governance is a more formal governance strategy, 
while relational governance is more informal. We also investigate the determining factors for 
those governance mechanisms from both an economic and a social perspective. Finally, as 
services are delivered by people, i.e. frontline employees, the behaviour of these employees 
and its impact on performance outcomes are further explored. Different types of frontline 
employee behaviour are investigated: we examine the impact of certain types of extra-role and 
in-role behaviour on performance.  
 
1.01 Theoretical Background 
Several theories or frameworks have been developed to understand and manage the complex 
world of business-to-business interactions and industrial networks. Firms do not operate in 
isolation but must seek to collaborate with other partners to achieve their goals (Batt and 
Purchase, 2004). Certain research studies focus on dyadic relationships between organizations 
to investigate the interaction between buyer and seller, while other authors take a wider 
perspective and place more emphasis on the network system in which a firm operates. These 
research groups both focus on the organizational level, whereas other researchers examine 
buyer-seller interactions from the frontline employees’ point-of-view.  
 
(i)  Buyer-seller interaction 
The transaction cost theory of Williamson (1975; 1979) is among the first approaches to 
explain the governance structure of good or service exchanges between two organizations and 
has become one of the leading perspectives (David and Han, 2004). The focus of transaction 
cost theory is on dyadic relationships (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). The market, the firm 
(vertical integration) and an intermediate form (hybrid) are the main governance mechanisms 
(Williamson, 1991). However, to examine exchange governance, Williamson (1985, pp. xii) 
states that “transaction cost arguments are often best used in conjunction with, rather than to 
the exclusion of, other ways of examining the same phenomena”. In the intermediate 
governance form, interfirm relationships or bilateral governance are considered (Joshi and 
Stump, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). This indicates that transactions between 
external partners can not just be considered as discrete events: the relationship aspect comes 
into play (Dwyer et al., 1987; Pilling et al., 1994). Therefore, transaction cost theory of 
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Williamson (1979) is often complemented with the relational exchange theory of Macneil 
(1980). In his theory, Macneil (1980) describes the governance of exchange relationships in 
terms of the relationship orientation of the exchange partners and the presence and relative 
strength of relational norms (Pilling et al., 1994). Relational norms are those norms that 
develop within a relationship (Macneil, 1983) and are defined as the bilateral expectations 
that exchange partners will act in ways that assist each other during the course of the 
relationship (Joshi and Campbell, 2003). The more emphasis is placed on relational norms by 
the exchange partners, the higher the relational governance of the exchange. 
 
The common goal of the transaction cost theory and the relational exchange theory is to 
understand the operation of governance structures, indicating the complementary nature of 
their interrelationship (Ivens and Blois, 2004). In the relational exchange theory, more 
emphasis is placed on the “soft” features such as the relational norms developed by Macneil 
(1980), while the transaction cost theory focuses more on “hard” features such as economic 
safeguards. When a buying organization purchases business services from an external 
supplier, the main economic governance mechanism used is contractual governance (Cannon 
et al., 2000). Contractual governance emphasizes the use of an explicit, formal, legally-
binding, and written agreement, or contract, to govern interfirm relationships (Lee and 
Cavusgil, 2006). In the research design of this dissertation, we include hard, economic 
aspects, i.e. the contract, as well as soft, more relational aspects, i.e. relational norms, as this 
allows more in-depth insight into the complex structures of exchange governance.   
 
(ii)  Industrial networks 
In the business economy, firms operate within a network of firms. Each firm has direct 
interactions with several partners such as customers or suppliers, but also indirect 
relationships with customer’s customers, supplier’s suppliers, competitors and others.  In 
transaction cost theory, the transaction is defined as a dyadic relationship and relational 
exchange theory also deals with one specific buyer-seller interaction. However, the industrial 
system is made up of many dyadic relations that are more or less interdependent (Johanson 
and Mattsson, 1987): changes in one specific buyer-seller relationship can have an affect on 
other dyads in the network. Therefore, other theoretical frameworks need to be included to 
obtain a more global insight into the governance of a particular exchange between buyer and 
seller.  
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Since the early 1980s, the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group have been 
consistently arguing that industrial research studies should focus more on the ongoing 
interactions between buyer and supplier (Hakansson, 1982; Wynstra et al., 2006). This 
research group was among the first to stress that firms operate in a business network 
consisting of several networks of relationships among firms (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987): 
firms not only have relationships with different parties, these different interactions also 
influence the other relationships within the network.  A business network can thus be defined 
as a set of two or more connected business relationships (the one contingent on the other), in 
which each exchange relation is between business firms (Anderson et al., 1994). While 
developed in manufacturing settings, the network approach has increasingly been used in 
studies of business services (Wynstra et al., 2006). The service supply chain can be 
considered as a specific type of business network, consisting only of those relationships 
between suppliers and buyers needed for the delivery of a particular service. In a service 
supply chain, the focus is on customer-supplier dualities and the bidirectional flow of input 
(information, knowledge, etc.) (Sampson, 2000). Because of this bidirectional flow in service 
supply chains, buyer and supplier interact more frequently and the governance of the business 
service exchange gains in importance. In this dissertation, the IMP theory on business 
networks and the theory of service supply chain are used to put business services exchanges in 
a broader framework and to investigate the relevance of exchange governance for purchased 
business services. 
 
(iii)  Frontline employees 
In services settings, frontline employees play a key role in services exchanges: they deliver 
the services to the customers, i.e. consumers or business organizations. It is generally 
acknowledged that frontline employee behaviour and performance outcomes are linked 
(Schneider et al., 2005), but studies on buyer-seller interactions have focused on how the 
buying organization and the selling organization interact on a firm-to-firm level (Haytko, 
2004), without incorporating the employee perspective. The majority of studies in 
interorganizational exchange have focused on dyadic relationships (Haytko, 2004), without 
addressing the influence of boundary spanners or frontline service employees in the 
relationship (Ferguson et al., 2005). Economic theories of exchange have mainly ignored the 
role of people and their importance in the management of interorganizational relations, 
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although boundary spanners can shape and modify the buyer-seller relationship (Hutt et al., 
2000). In this dissertation, we do not limit our study on business services exchanges to 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms; we also include frontline employees and 
their behaviour to investigate the performance of buyer-seller relationships.   
 
1.02 Research Design 
The general aim of this dissertation is to investigate business services exchanges and how the 
performance of buyer-seller interactions in business services settings can be enhanced. In 
pursuit of this aim, three objectives are distinguished. The first objective is to investigate the 
relevance of purchased business services based on their impact along the supply chain. The 
second objective is to examine the governance mechanism of business services exchanges, 
their determining factors and performance outcomes. Finally, as services are delivered by   
frontline employees, the third objective is to further explore the impact of their behaviour on 
performance.   
 
Based on these objectives, five general research questions are formulated, relating to 
- the impact of purchased business services along the supply chain 
- the determining factors of business services exchange governance  
- the influence of certain determining factors on contractual and relational governance in 
business services exchanges 
- the interplay between contractual and relational governance mechanisms and its impact 
on performance in business services settings 
- the impact of frontline employee behaviour on performance outcomes in business 
services settings 
 
(i)  Research setting 
Despite the growing importance of business services in organizations’ external acquisitions, 
(Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002), research studies in a business services setting are still scarce 
compared to those in consumer settings (Johnston, 2005). Moreover, business exchanges have 
been more frequently investigated in a manufacturing than in a service setting (Brown et al., 
2000). Business services that have been investigated in previous studies on interfirm 
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exchange governance are for example financial or banking services (Ferguson et al., 2005), 
consultancy (Bennett and Robson, 2004), information services (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), 
distribution (Siguaw et al., 1998), and R&D (Carson et al., 2006). These examples illustrate 
that most research studies concentrate on services considered more or less critical for the 
functioning of the buying organization or for the delivery to end-customers. The exchange 
governance of support services, i.e. those services needed for the day-to-day running of the 
business to assist the company in its core business delivery (Wright, 2004), has not yet been 
thoroughly investigated. On the other hand, the phenomenon of outsourcing support services 
is growing rapidly (Abraham and Taylor, 1996) and has expanded during the 1990s (Bröchner 
et al., 2002). Many of these services are now outsourced, franchised or operated under licence 
(Wright, 2004). Support services have become an important part of the business services 
sector (Lehtonen and Salonen, 2005). As more companies are purchasing those services from 
an external supplier, the exchange governance between a support services supplier and a 
buying organization needs to be further investigated. One specific characteristic of support 
services is that these are mainly delivered at the premises of the buying organization 
(Bröchner, 2001). So, when investigating support services exchanges and their performance 
outcomes, the behaviour of frontline employees should also be incorporated. 
 
Support services consist of several kinds of services such as soft services (cleaning, catering, 
green services, waste management), technical services (maintenance, energy management), 
security services, real estate management, and others (Pintelon et al., 2004). In this 
dissertation, we focus on one specific type of support services: security services. There are 
two main reasons for selecting this specific services setting. First, investigating support 
services as a whole is not recommended. In the current business environment, the scope of 
support services in not uniformly defined, making it difficult for researchers to delineate the 
research setting. Moreover, previous research studies on exchange governance of business 
services also focused on one particular type of services (cf. supra), mainly because differences 
in characteristics of the transaction among business services, and also support services, make 
it difficult to aggregate several types of service exchanges.  Second, private security services 
are strictly regulated by law in most European countries, especially in Belgium (Weber, 
2002). This allows us to clearly define which kinds of service delivery will be incorporated in 
the research study (cf. infra). Previous studies also indicate that security services are highly 
outsourced in business companies (Bröchner et al., 2002) and specifically in Belgian 
organizations (Pintelon et al., 2004). The private security sector has been growing 
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significantly in the European Union over the past 10 to 15 years and private security 
companies are increasingly taking on roles previously performed in-house (Weber, 2002). As 
a result, most business organizations purchase (a part of) the security services from an 
external supplier. Therefore, this type of support services is suitable for our research’s 
purpose.  
 
In Belgium, private security services are regulated by the ‘Law regulating the Private and 
Special Security’ of April 10th 1990 and by further details in Royal decrees, Ministerial 
decrees and Circulars. The law regulations cover several areas of security services of which 
the most important (based on turnover in 2003) (CoESS, 2004) are supervision and protection 
of (im-)mobile goods (72.21%), supervision and protection of transport of valuables (cash in 
transit) (13.10%), and conception, installation and maintenance of alarm systems and alarm 
centres (5.31%). In this dissertation, we focus on supervision and protection of (im-)mobile 
goods. We also include supervision and control of persons in view of the assurance of the 
security in public place (3.61% of the turnover in 2003) (CoESS, 2004), because this study is 
set in a services environment in which employee-customer interaction plays a role. The past 
five years, both turnover and number of people employed in the security services sector in 
Belgium have increased (De Clerck, 2003). Since 2001, more than 50% of the turnover has 
been generated by two security companies in Belgium.  
 
(ii)  Research studies 
Based on the general aim and research questions, four studies were performed. Figure 1 gives 
an overview of those studies and how these are related to each other.  The first study is an 
empirical study based on quantitative data and has a more exploratory design. The second 
study is a conceptual study with a descriptive research design incorporating results of 
previous research studies. The last two studies, study 3 and study 4, are empirical studies 
based on quantitative data and have a conclusive design.  
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Figure I-1: Overview of research studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first study (Chapter 2), the sourcing of business services is looked at from a supply 
chain perspective. From the service supply chain view, the organization buying a particular 
business service also delivers a particular good or service to its customers. While previous 
research studies have stated that relationships with suppliers delivering strategically valuable 
products or services can be an important source of competitive value (Ritter et al., 2004), it 
was unclear whether or not support services could affect downstream supply chain members. 
When support services do influence end-customers, the support services supplier becomes 
part of the buying organization’s network. As a consequence, the exchanges with the support 
services supplier should be more closely governed: support service exchange governance 
gains in importance.  In this study, we investigate the influence of security services delivered 
to a buying organization on the buying organization’s customers. The respondents for this 
study are the customers of one particular organization buying security services from a major 
security services supplier in Belgium.  
This study will give us an answer on the first research question:  
RQ1:  What is the impact of purchased business services on downstream supply chain 
members? 
 
In the second study (Chapter 3), we give an overview of previous research studies 
investigating contractual and/or relational governance mechanisms in manufacturing or 
services settings. Based on the empirical results of these previous studies and taking into 
account the transaction cost theory of Williamson (1975; 1979) and the relational exchange 
theory of Macneil (1980), we develop a model indicating how economic and social related 
antecedents influence exchange governance in business services settings. In this study, we 
 
Buying Organization Business Customer 
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Services 
Supplier 
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also pay attention to the specific characteristics of business services. We indicate how specific 
service characteristics influence certain features of the service transaction and the relationship 
between those features and the different exchange governance mechanisms.  
This study will give us an answer on the second research question: 
RQ2:  Which features of the service transaction have an influence on business 
services exchange governance? 
 
In the third study (Chapter 4), exchange governance mechanisms in the security services 
sector are investigated more in detail. The respondents for this study are the buying 
organizations of several major security services suppliers in Belgium. Within this study we 
focus on two main research questions. First, we investigate how contractual and relational 
governance are interrelated and how both governance mechanisms have an influence on the 
performance of the buyer-seller interaction. Second, a number of features of the service 
transaction as determined in the second study are also incorporated. We especially focus on 
those features that are affected by specific service characteristics, i.e. asset specificity and 
uncertainty.  We investigate how these antecedents influence contractual and relational 
governance of the security services exchanges.  
This study will give us an answer on the third and fourth research question: 
RQ3:  How do certain features of the service transaction influence contractual and 
relational governance? 
RQ4:  How are contractual and relational governance related to performance in 
business services settings?  
 
In the fourth study (Chapter 5), the impact of frontline employee behaviour on the 
performance outcomes is taken into account. The performance of a buyer-seller relationship in 
services settings is not only dependent on the governance of the exchange, but also on the 
service delivery by frontline employees. In a services setting, three types of frontline 
employee behaviour are identified: service delivery behaviour, internal influence behaviour, 
and external representation behaviour (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). These types of 
behaviour can be considered as relatively more in-role or more extra-role behaviour. We 
investigate how these different types of employee behaviour are related to the performed 
productivity and quality by the employee. The respondents of this study are the security 
agents of one major security services supplier in Belgium.  
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This study will give us an answer on the fifth research question: 
RQ5:  How does frontline employee behaviour influence performance outcomes in a 
business services setting? 
 
In the last chapter (Chapter 6), the results of the four studies are discussed. For each of the 
five research questions formulated, we give an answer based on the results. Next, we describe 
some limitations of this dissertation and we also provide several opportunities for future 
research. In conclusion, a number of managerial implications are formulated.  
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2.01 Abstract 
Supply chain management and business networks have gained increased attention in services 
settings. The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of purchased services by a 
service provider on the satisfaction of downstream supply chain members, i.e. end-users. The 
focus is on transaction-specific satisfaction as it provides in-depth information on specific 
satisfaction elements. To test the propositions, one business service provider purchasing a 
service from a supplier is selected. Data are collected by sending a web survey to the service 
provider’s business customers. PLS is used to analyze the data as transaction-specific 
satisfaction is considered as a formative construct. PLS analyses indicate that the elements 
determining satisfaction with the supplier’s service and those determining satisfaction with 
the service provider’s service differ. Moreover, transaction-specific satisfaction of end-users 
with the supplier’s service is positively related to transaction-specific satisfaction of end-users 
with the service provider’s service. Furthermore, the strength of that relationship is influenced 
by the importance attached to the supplier’s service by end-users. Two principal conclusions 
can be drawn: the position of the customer in the supply chain influences how the service 
delivery is evaluated and the relevance of service supply chains and business networks is 
confirmed. The relationships between supplier and provider and between provider and end-
user are interconnected. The strength of that relationship interconnectedness is influenced by 
importance attached to the purchased service. Future research is needed to extend the findings 
of this study to other services settings.  
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2.02 Introduction 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) has become an important way of enhancing competitive 
advantage and organizational performance in the domestic and global market place (Li et al., 
2006). The increased attention paid to SCM in literature is an illustration of this effect 
(Zsidisin et al., 2000). In services, SCM also gains in importance because of evolutions such 
as outsourcing (Li et al., 2006). These extended supply chains have significant service 
components that need to be explored further (Roth and Menor, 2003a). While the service 
supply chain has been recognized as an intriguing research area (Roth and Menor, 2003b), 
research in SCM has been centered on manufacturing industries (Zsidisin et al., 2000) and 
only few service industries have been investigated in SCM research (Ellram et al., 2004; 
Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998). 
 
SCM has been defined as the integration of business processes from end customers through 
original suppliers that provides products, services and information that add value for 
customers (Cooper et al., 1997, pp. 1). With the growing importance of the service sector in 
our economies, the notion of service supply chain has obtained a more prominent role in 
contemporary operations management research (Akkermans and Vos, 2003). SCM in services 
deals rather with customer-supplier dyadic relationships than with the unidirectional 
movement of physical goods (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006; Sampson, 2000). To 
understand the nature of these interfirm relationships, greater attention for the larger networks 
in which relationships exist is required (Wathne and Heide, 2004). However, still little is 
known on the impact of purchased business services along the supply chain and particularly 
on the influence on downstream supply chain members and their satisfaction. The importance 
of the supply chain vision in purchasing business services has been stressed by Stanley and 
Wisner (2001). In their research study, they investigated the link between external suppliers, 
internal customers and the quality delivered to external customers (Stanley and Wisner, 
2001). However, as suggested by Dean and Kiu (2002), the impact of purchased business 
services on end-users should be further explored. 
 
The service supply chain indicates that service providers have relationships with other service 
firms that contribute to satisfying the customer (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006), as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The dependence of each firm’s performance on the activities and 
performance of other firms has also been stressed by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing 
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(IMP) Group (e.g., Batt and Purchase, 2004; Wilkinson and Young, 2002). As such, research 
studies should move from dyadic business relationships to triads and business networks 
(Anderson et al., 1994). The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of services 
delivered to a service provider on the satisfaction of downstream supply chain members, i.e. 
the service provider’s customers or end-users. This research study is set in a business services 
setting with end-users being firms, and not consumers, as service management research today 
should re-orientate itself towards business-to-business services (Johnston, 2005). More 
specifically, we focus on the support services setting, an important part of the business 
services sector (Lehtonen and Salonen, 2005). Support services can be distinguished from 
other business services by an essential characteristic: they are delivered on the premises of the 
buying firm, i.e. the service provider (Bröchner, 2001 cited in Lehtonen and Salonen, 2005), 
thus making interaction between the support services supplier and the end-user more likely.  
 
Figure II-1: Service supply chain 
a
 
 
 
First, as we want to investigate the impact of purchased services on the satisfaction of 
downstream supply chain members, the satisfaction construct is discussed more in detail. 
Afterwards, propositions on the impact of purchased services are developed. The research 
method used to test the propositions is presented next. Based on PLS analyses, the research 
findings are reported. Finally, the main contributions of the paper are discussed. 
 
(i) Transaction-specific satisfaction 
In a business-to-business context, satisfaction can be defined as a positive affective state 
resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another firm 
                                                 
a
 Based on Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons (2006) 
Service Supplier 
(Security Services) 
Service Provider 
(Exhibition Services) 
End-User 
(Exhibitor) 
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(Geyskens et al., 1999). Previous research has indicated that satisfaction is related to loyalty 
(Lam et al., 2004), relationship continuity and enhancement (Selnes, 1998), and other 
behavioural intentions (Bolton et al., 2003). In a buyer-supplier channel system, buyer 
satisfaction is determined by supplier performance (Yilmaz et al., 2004) and forms an 
important indicator to assess the strength of current relationships with business customers 
(Rossomme, 2003). Two general conceptualizations of satisfaction exist in literature: 
transaction-specific satisfaction and overall satisfaction (Lam et al., 2004). Transaction-
specific satisfaction relates to the customer’s satisfaction with a discrete service encounter 
(Bitner and Hubbert, 1994, pp. 76-77) and thus refers to a particular exchange between buyer 
and seller, or an episode (Hakansson, 1982). Exchanges between two parties can lead to the 
build-up of long-term relations. Reactions to a particular exchange or episode are conditioned 
by the overall relationship existing between the two companies (Hakansson, 1982). Overall 
satisfaction, the second general conceptualization of satisfaction, refers to the customer’s 
overall satisfaction with the organization based on all encounters and experiences with that 
particular organization (Bitner and Hubbert, 1994, pp. 76-77). The experiences gained in 
particular episodes aggregates to a total experience (Hakansson, 1982). Previous research has 
indicated that transaction-specific satisfaction and overall satisfaction are perceived 
differently by customers and thus can be empirically distinguished from each other (Jones and 
Suh, 2000). 
 
In this research, we focus on transaction-specific satisfaction as this provides specific 
diagnostic information (Lam et al., 2004). Transaction-specific satisfaction depends on 
specific attributes of the service encounter and the related supplier performance (Shankar et 
al., 2003). Thus, transaction-specific satisfaction provides more in-depth information on the 
satisfaction elements responsible for the impact of purchased services along the supply chain. 
Previous research has included certain satisfaction elements, i.e. dimensions of customer 
satisfaction (Homburg and Rudolph, 2001), to better measure the varying experiences and 
perceptions of different customers (Rossomme, 2003). Relevant satisfaction elements of 
transaction-specific satisfaction in a business services setting are selected based on business, 
services and marketing literature. Especially the research of Homburg and Rudolph (2001), 
indicating a number of relevant satisfaction elements in a business manufacturing setting, is of 
interest here.  
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In services settings, reliability of the supplier plays a significant role: the majority of research 
studies confirm that reliability is the most critical aspect of service delivery (Zeithaml, 2000). 
A service supplier is reliable if the promised performance is delivered dependably and 
accurately (Schneider and White, 2004). According to Homburg and Rudolph (2001), 
reliability is also a facet of a satisfaction element in manufacturing processes. Next to 
reliability, other satisfaction elements will play a role. Because of the customer-supplier 
duality in service supply chains (Sampson, 2000), a second satisfaction element consists of 
the supplier’s accessibility and ability to contact the supplier. These are a necessity to make 
timely and accurate communication between supplier and customer possible. Another 
important satisfaction element in industrial marketing is complaint handling (Homburg and 
Rudolph, 2001). A quick resolution to service failure is an important way to create satisfied 
and loyal customers (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006). The interaction with the 
supplier’s field and internal staff also plays a significant role (Homburg and Rudolph, 2001). 
Based on service profit chain and satisfaction mirror (Heskett et al., 1997), the attitude and 
behaviour of frontline service employees can have a “spillover” effect on customers’ 
evaluation of the service delivered. Consequently, the interaction between service provider’s 
personnel and customers has received increasing attention. The interaction with supplier 
personnel consists of technical skills, or personnel’s expertise and knowledge, and 
interpersonal skills, or direct contact with the customers (Westbrook and Peterson, 1998). As 
such, based on business, services, and marketing literature, five satisfaction elements for 
transaction-specific satisfaction are incorporated in this study: reliability of the service 
supplier, accessibility and ability to contact the service supplier, complaint handling, supplier 
personnel’s expertise and contact between supplier personnel and customer.   
 
(ii) Impact of purchased business services 
In general, business relationships are part of a network of relationships and thus 
interconnected (Ritter, 2000): if firm A supplies firm B and firm B supplies firm C, then 
interaction in either of the two relationships affects the other, sometimes marginally but often 
substantially (Hakansson and Ford, 2002). In the purchasing environment more emphasis has 
been placed on that interaction along the supply chain (Stanley and Wisner, 2001): decisions 
at one stage of the service supply chain can impact later (or earlier) stages of the chain 
(Sampson, 2000). As in manufacturing processes, it is not good enough to be ‘locally optimal’ 
in a service supply chain; each element of the supply chain should take into account players 
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up or down the chain (Sampson, 2000). Following the “garbage in, garbage out” principle, 
effective management of supplier quality is a critical element of quality management (Garvin, 
1987). The research of Stanley and Wisner (2001) indicates that purchased supplies have an 
impact on the satisfaction of external customers, through internal service quality. As 
customers consider service providers responsible for the work of chosen suppliers (Sampson, 
2000), service providers are also judged on the performance of those suppliers. As such, the 
relationship between service provider and end-user is influenced by the relationship between 
supplier and service provider. Based on the typology of Ritter (2000), we can speak of an 
assistance effect: through the existence of the relationship between supplier and service 
provider, the relationship between service provider and end-user is supported. Consequently, 
we propose that the service delivered by the supplier will have a positive impact on end-user’s 
satisfaction. We assume that the end-users’ satisfaction with the service provider’s service 
will be influenced by the end-users’ satisfaction with the supplier’s service (Figure 2). 
Therefore, we propose: 
P1:  Transaction-specific satisfaction of end-users with the supplier’s service is 
positively related to transaction-specific satisfaction of end-users with the 
service provider’s service.  
 
Figure II-2: Research framework 
 
 
Based on the firm’s value net (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), Ritter and colleagues 
(2004) state that relationships with suppliers can be an important source of competitive 
advantage when strategically valuable products or services are supplied. Other researchers 
also state that the criticality of or importance attached to a purchased service should be 
considered (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006). Blumberg (1998) suggests that not only 
Transaction-specific 
satisfaction with 
supplier’s service 
Transaction-specific 
satisfaction with 
service provider’s 
service 
P1 
Importance attached to 
supplier’s service 
P2 
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the importance of the service to the buying organization but also the importance attached to 
the service by end-users should be incorporated. The purchasing decision and supplier’s 
evaluation by the service provider should take into account whether or not end-users are 
affected by the outcome of the supplier’s service delivery (Blumberg, 1998). Since 
considering a service as low or high in importance is a relative viewpoint (Fitzsimmons and 
Fitzsimmons, 2006), the end-users’ opinion on importance of purchased service can differ. 
We propose that if end-users consider the supplier’s service as high in importance, end-users’ 
satisfaction with supplier’s service will have a stronger effect on end-users’ satisfaction with 
service provider’s service than when end-users consider that service as low in importance 
(Figure 2). Therefore, we propose: 
P2:  The positive relationship between transaction-specific satisfaction of end-user 
with the supplier’s service and with the service provider’s service will be 
enhanced with increasing levels of importance attached by the end-user to the 
supplier’s service (positive moderating effect).  
 
2.03 Research Method 
(i) Sample selection and data collection 
This research study is set in a business services setting with end-users being firms, and not 
consumers. Because of possible effect of business specific variables, we chose to limit our 
investigation to end-users of one service provider (Selnes, 1998), consistent with prior 
research in customer satisfaction (Lam et al., 2004; Shankar et al., 2003). To obtain our 
research goal, we selected a service provider that clearly communicates to its end-users that a 
certain support service is delivered by an external supplier. Support services cover a broad 
variety of services including domestic services such as security services (Lehtonen and 
Salonen, 2005).  
The chosen service provider offers exhibition space to its business customers: the service 
delivered encompasses everything needed to organize an exhibition such as location, parking 
lots, cash points, administrative services etc. The delivered service also incorporates security 
services that are purchased from an external supplier. The exhibitors are considered the end-
users of both the exhibition space provided and the purchased security services (Figure 1). 
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The data was collected by a web survey. The service provider gave us a database containing 
the email addresses of those exhibitors which had contributed to one or more exhibitions 
during the last quarter of 2003. During the first quarter of 2004, an invitation to fill out the 
questionnaire was sent using a personalized email to increase response rate. The survey was 
sent in two waves. Of the 1074 emails sent, 201 exhibitors filled out a questionnaire, 
indicating an overall response rate of 18.72%. The questionnaires were analyzed 
anonymously.  
 
(ii) Measurement development 
Because of limited space available and respondents’ lack of time, including several items to 
measure each of the constructs is not a viable alternative. Each satisfaction element of the 
transaction-specific satisfaction constructs is measured by one item, which is a reasonable 
compromise between the use of a full scale and the use of one primitive single item for 
measuring transaction-specific satisfaction (Homburg and Rudolph, 2001). Next to the 
transaction-specific satisfaction elements based on literature, one additional satisfaction 
element for end-user’s satisfaction with the supplier is added, that is visibility. Interviews 
with the management of the service provider involved in the study revealed that visibility of 
the security agents to the end-users is of vital importance. Because of intangibility of the 
security services delivered, physical presence and visibility of a security agent is an important 
aspect of the delivered service for end-users (Blumberg, 1998).  
Next to the transaction-specific satisfaction elements, overall satisfaction with the supplier’s 
service (security service) and overall satisfaction with the business service (exhibition space 
provided) are also included in the survey. These are included to assess the validity of the 
related transaction-specific satisfaction constructs (cf. infra). The two overall satisfaction 
constructs and the importance attached by the end-user to the purchased security services are 
each assessed by one single item. In this research study, overall satisfaction is considered one-
dimensional and directly accessible, and thus easy to express, for the respondent (Selnes, 
1998). Possible sources of overall satisfaction are already included in the satisfaction elements 
of transaction-specific satisfaction and thus can not be part of the overall satisfaction construct 
itself (Selnes, 1998). For each statement, the respondents are asked to indicate their level of 
agreement on a seven-point rating scale, ranging from 1 “completely unsatisfied”, to 7 
“completely satisfied”. The measurement items are illustrated in the appendix (Appendix A). 
In the survey, the sections approach is used to obtain a logical sequence of questioning: the 
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questions related to a particular service –either security or exhibition services- are grouped 
(Burns and Bush, 1998). Within each group of questions, the satisfaction elements are put on 
top as we want the respondent to think about the different aspects of the service (satisfaction 
elements) first, without being influenced by the general feeling of satisfaction (De Pelsmacker 
and Van Kenhove, 2002).  
 
2.04 Research Findings 
To assess construct validity and test the propositions, Partial Least Squares (PLS) appeared 
the most appropriate technique based on the properties of the data at hand. PLS makes no 
distributional assumptions (Chin, 1998) and it offers an alternative for incorporating 
formative as well as reflective indicators in one model (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 
2001). The program used for these analyses is SmartPLS Version 2.0.M2 developed by the 
Institute of Operations Management and Organization of the University of Hamburg 
(Germany). While PLS is the most appropriate technique for testing the propositions based on 
the data at hand, this statistical technique also has a number of disadvantages compared to 
other structural equation techniques. PLS is not covariance-based but variance-based and 
focuses more on prediction than on causality. Moreover, the measurement error can not be 
modelled in PLS. Other important limitations of PLS are that no proper overall goodness-of-
fit measures exist for the models estimated (Hulland, 1999) and that the PLS procedure 
represents a certain bias in obtaining parameter estimates. This bias tends to manifest itself in 
higher estimates for component loadings and lower estimates at the structural level (Chin, 
1998). PLS also estimates both factor loadings (i.e. measurement model) and structural paths 
(i.e. structural model) simultaneously (Chin, 1998). We therefore follow a two-step approach 
based on Hulland (1999). First, the measurement model is evaluated to assess the construct 
validity of the two transaction-specific satisfaction constructs. Then, the impact of end-users’ 
satisfaction with the purchased service on end-users’ satisfaction with the business service is 
assessed by evaluating the structural model (testing of propositions).  
 
(i) Assessing construct validity 
The satisfaction elements of transaction-specific satisfaction are conceptualized as formative 
(causal) rather than reflective indicators, as transaction-specific satisfaction is the result from 
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satisfaction with specific elements of the service encounter (Shankar et al., 2003). This is 
consistent with the research of Homburg and Rudolph (2001) in which the satisfaction 
elements have an impact on (or cause) the higher-order construct of satisfaction. Because of 
the formative structure of the transaction-specific satisfaction constructs, traditional validity 
assessments can not be used (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Observed correlations 
among the construct’s measures may not be meaningful (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 
2001) and as a consequence, assessment of item reliability and convergent validity become 
irrelevant (Hulland, 1999). Alternative methods to statistically assess the validity of formative 
constructs exist: linking the formative construct to another construct measured by means of 
reflective indicators and theoretically related to the formative construct (Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer, 2001). Previous research has indicated that transaction-specific satisfaction is an 
antecedent of overall satisfaction (Jones and Suh, 2000; Shankar et al., 2003): satisfaction 
with the last transaction will have a direct influence on overall satisfaction with the service 
(Parasuraman et al., 1994). Thus, the transaction-specific satisfaction construct can be 
considered as valid if it significantly enhances overall satisfaction and if the indicator 
coefficients of the transaction-specific satisfaction construct are significantly different from 
zero (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). As discussed above, satisfaction elements are 
used as indicators of transaction-specific satisfaction. Indicator coefficients which are not 
significantly different from zero, can not be considered valid measures. These contain 
information perceived redundant by the respondent, have high correlations with other 
indicators or are perceived irrelevant for the particular satisfaction construct and should 
therefore be excluded from the model (Bollen and Lennox, 1991; Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer, 2001). 
 
First, construct validity of transaction-specific satisfaction of the end-user with the supplier’s 
service is assessed. PLS analysis indicates that transaction-specific satisfaction with the 
supplier’s service significantly enhances overall satisfaction with that supplier’s service 
(=0.78; p<0.001). The explained variance (R²) of overall satisfaction with the supplier’s 
service is 0.60. However, not all satisfaction elements have an indicator coefficient 
significantly different from zero (p>0.10). These indicators (satisfaction elements) should be 
deleted from the model before the propositions can be tested. Satisfaction elements such as 
reliability of the service supplier (t=0.80), complaint handling (t=0.97) and supplier 
personnel’s expertise (t=0.47) are not significantly related to transaction-specific satisfaction 
with the supplier’s service. On the other hand, the PLS analysis indicates that transaction-
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specific satisfaction with the supplier’s service is caused by accessibility and ability to contact 
the service supplier (t=2.55), visibility of the supplier’s personnel (i.e. security agents) 
(t=2.06) and contact between supplier personnel and customer (t=1.68). These three 
satisfaction elements are retained to test the propositions. 
 
Next, construct validity of transaction-specific satisfaction of the end-user with the service 
delivered by the service provider is assessed. Based on PLS analysis, transaction-specific 
satisfaction with the service provider’s service significantly enhances overall satisfaction with 
that service (=0.81; p<0.001). The explained variance of overall satisfaction with the service 
provider’s service is 0.66. As in the previous assessment, not all indicator coefficients of the 
satisfaction elements are significantly different from zero (p>0.10). Accessibility and ability 
to contact the service provider (t=0.74) and contact between provider’s personnel and 
customer (t=1.20) are not significantly related to transaction-specific satisfaction with the 
service provider’s service. These satisfaction elements will be deleted before the propositions 
are tested. The other three satisfaction elements, reliability of the service provider (t=2.10), 
complaint handling (t=2.30) and expertise of the provider’s personnel (t=2.64), are relevant 
formative indicators of transaction-specific satisfaction with the service provider’s service. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Homburg and Rudolph (2001). In their 
research, the most important elements determining satisfaction in business manufacturing 
settings are satisfaction with order handling (incorporating reliability), satisfaction with 
complaint handling, and satisfaction with salespeople (incorporating knowledge and expertise 
of frontline personnel) (Homburg and Rudolph, 2001). The results also clearly illustrate 
discriminant validity of the two transaction-specific satisfaction constructs: the satisfaction 
elements determining satisfaction with the service provider’s service and those determining 
satisfaction with the supplier’s service are completely opposite to each other.  
 
(ii) Testing of propositions 
After validity assessment of the two transaction-specific satisfaction constructs, the impact of 
end-users’ satisfaction with the supplier’s service on the end-users’ satisfaction with the 
service provider’s service can be assessed. To assess the structural model, only those 
satisfaction elements that are significantly related to one of the transaction-specific 
satisfaction constructs are incorporated in the model (cf. supra). The correlation matrix 
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illustrated in Table 1 includes the relevant satisfaction elements for each transaction-specific 
satisfaction construct and the two overall satisfaction constructs. 
 
To evaluate the propositions, the model is assessed in PLS using bootstrapping to test the 
statistical significance of the path coefficient between the two transaction-specific satisfaction 
constructs (Chin, 1998). The objective of PLS is to maximise variance explained, rather than 
fit, therefore no overall goodness-of-fit measures are available (Hulland, 1999). Prediction-
orientated measures such as R² (variance explained) of endogenous constructs (Chin, 1998) 
are used to evaluate the structural model.  
 
Table II-1: Correlation matrix 
a
 
Transaction-specific satisfaction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
with supplier's service
1. accessibility of supplier 1.00
2. contact with supplier's personnel 0.58
***
1.00
3. visibility of supplier's personnel 0.69
***
0.52
***
1.00
with service provider's service
4. reliability of provider 0.40
***
0.22
**
0.38
***
1.00
5. complaint handling 0.31
***
0.12
†
0.33
***
0.62
***
1.00
6. expertise of provider's personnel 0.30
***
0.24
**
0.31
***
0.64
***
0.59
***
1.00
Overall satisfaction
7. with supplier's service 0.68
***
0.72
***
0.64
***
0.30
***
0.28
***
0.35
***
1.00
8. with service provider's service 0.40
***
0.28
***
0.37
***
0.70
***
0.70
***
0.69
***
0.37
***
1.00
Mean 4.66 4.75 4.93 5.54 5.77 5.29 4.83 5.70
s.d. 1.02 1.12 1.19 1.05 0.91 1.29 1.11 0.82
 
 
The impact of transaction-specific satisfaction with the supplier’s service on transaction-
specific satisfaction with the service provider’s service is assessed (P1). The PLS regression 
reveals that the path coefficient of the proposed relationship is 0.39 and significant at the 
0.001 level (t=4.74). The R² of transaction-specific satisfaction with the service provider’s 
service is 0.15. Thus, we find support for P1: end-users’ satisfaction with the service 
provider’s service is in part explained by the delivery of the supplier’s service.  
 
A methodology to investigate moderating effects in PLS has been assessed by Monte Carlo 
simulations (Chin et al., 2003). However, this methodology has only been tested for 
                                                 
a
 
***
 p<0.001; 
**
  p<0.01; 
*  
p<0.05; 
†
 p<0.10 
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constructs with reflective indicators, and not yet for constructs with formative indicators 
(Chin et al., 2003). Lack of a methodology to investigate moderating effects in PLS using 
formative indicators, the group comparison technique is used. Based on previous research 
testing moderating effects in PLS (Avolio, Howell, Sosik, 1999), the sample is split into two 
subsamples based on the importance attached by end-users to the supplier’s service delivery: 
the first subsample is composed of data with a lower than the 6.00 median score (n=65) and 
the second subsample of data with a higher than the 6.00 median score (n=51). The second 
proposition (P2) can be assessed by comparing these two groups: if importance attached to the 
supplier’s service by end-users increases, the impact of end-users’ satisfaction with the 
supplier’s service on the end-users’ satisfaction with the service provider’s service should 
increase. In the first group, considering the security services delivered not very important, the 
path coefficient of the proposed relationship is 0.30 (t=2.45) and the R² of transaction-specific 
satisfaction with the service provider’s service is 0.09. In the second group, considering the 
security services delivered as very important, the path coefficient of the proposed relationship 
is 0.46 (t=3.74) and the R² is 0.22. These results indicate that, when the importance attached 
to the supplier’s service increases, the strength of the relation between satisfaction with the 
supplied service and satisfaction with the provided service as well as the variance explained 
of satisfaction with the service provider’s service expand. Based on the formula suggested by 
Chin (Keil et al., 2000), the results reveal a significant increase in path coefficient between 
the first group (not very important) and the second group (very important) (t=11.60). 
Consequently, we find support for P2: importance attached to the supplier’s service has a 
positive moderating effect. 
 
2.05 Discussion 
This research study contributes to the literature on supply chain management and the larger 
network within which service providers operate. The relevance of the service supply chain 
and the effect of purchased services on downstream supply chain members are confirmed in 
this research study. The results indicate that services purchased from a supplier by a service 
provider influence downstream supply chain members and their satisfaction with the service 
provider. As such, this study empirically confirms relationship interconnectedness in a service 
supply chain setting. Cross-relational tasks, simultaneous management of several 
relationships and management of interconnections among relations, have been largely 
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neglected in literature (Ritter et al., 2004). This study underlines the importance of such cross-
relational tasks and stresses the need for future research on this topic to enhance managing 
and being managed within a business network. Moreover, the supply chain vision for business 
services and the relationship interconnectedness hold even when the purchased services are 
considered less important by the downstream supply chain members. Thus, not only 
strategically valuable services should be incorporated when dealing with business networks. 
Also supplied services considered less important have an impact across the supply chain and 
should be considered when managing business networks.  
 
In this research study, the focus is on external purchased support services to illustrate 
relationship interconnectedness and the impact of support services along the supply chain. 
However, not all business organizations purchase support services from an external supplier: 
support services –even security services- can be delivered internally. The link between 
satisfaction with support services and satisfaction with the core business delivery found in this 
research study could also be valid for the internal support services supplier. As a 
consequence, support services delivery – irrespective of its internal or external supplier – 
should be governed carefully because of its possible impact on the end-users’ satisfaction with 
the service delivered.  
 
This research study also contributes to the literature on customer satisfaction and its relevant 
determinants. Previous research revealed that the focus and placement of the customer in the 
supply chain can influence the way in which the delivered service is evaluated (Zsidisin et al., 
2000). Dependent on the position in the supply chain, other satisfaction elements play a role 
in evaluating the service delivered. The validation of the transaction-specific satisfaction 
constructs illustrates this statement. In this study, the relevant satisfaction elements for the 
business service, purchased and consumed by the end-user, show great resemblance with the 
relevant satisfaction elements in business manufacturing settings (Homburg and Rudolph, 
2001): reliability, complaint handling and expertise are related to core service elements. 
However, the relevant satisfaction elements for the supplier’s service, consumed but not 
purchased by the end-user, are different. From the end-users’ view, this supplier has a more 
upstream position in the supply chain than the service provider. The end-user has almost no 
direct contact with the supplier and might also have less knowledge on the service to be 
delivered. Consequently, the quality of the supplier’s service in terms of reliability, expertise, 
and complaint handling might be harder to judge for the end-user. Therefore, the end-user will 
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look for other, more ‘tangible’ (easier to judge) evidence of the quality delivered (Berry and 
Bendapudi, 2003) such as the visibility of the security agents and the direct contact with the 
agents. These indicators can be observed directly by the end-user and are thus easier to 
evaluate. Because of the impact of purchased services along the supply chain and relationship 
interconnectedness, the service provider purchasing these services should be aware of these 
additional indicators of quality. 
 
In this research study, several opportunities for further research are revealed. Research should 
not be limited to individual dyadic relationship between firms. Relationship 
interconnectedness and the larger network in which relationships exist should be further 
explored. Especially more emphasis should be placed on the development of measurement 
instruments which indicate the impact of relationship interconnectedness and its scope. 
Moreover, not only key business services or strategically valuable services should be 
investigated as services considered less important might also affect downstream supply chain 
members. Future research is needed to explore and generalize the findings and gain in-depth 
understanding on service supply chains. In this research study, the impact along the supply 
chain was empirically tested for security services purchased by a service provider. For other 
purchased services, the relevant satisfaction elements can differ: for example, visibility of 
frontline employees to end-users could have less impact in other services settings. Future 
research could provide more insight into the causal indicators (or satisfaction elements) of 
transaction-specific satisfaction for business services. From the viewpoint of end-users, the 
discrepancy in satisfaction elements between services purchased from a service provider and 
those delivered to the service provider by a supplier should be further explored. Moreover, 
certain limitations of this study like the one-item measures for satisfaction elements and 
overall satisfaction should be dealt with in future research. We have also noted that the 
statistical technique used, PLS, has certain limitations.  
 
Managerial implications for both the service provider and the service supplier can be deduced. 
First, the results indicate that service providers should pay more attention to services 
purchased from a supplier and to that supplier’s selection and evaluation, even when these 
services are considered less strategically valuable. In the service supply chain, decisions at 
one stage can impact later stages of the supply chain (Sampson, 2000): service providers are 
considered responsible for the work of chosen suppliers and for choosing other suppliers 
when necessary. Management practices such as quality assessments or relationship 
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governance mechanisms can help the service provider to better manage upstream supply 
relationships and thus increase the satisfaction of downstream supply chain members. 
Business service providers should also be aware of relationship interconnectedness and the 
impact of the network in which the relationships exist. Changes in the interaction with the 
supplier can have an effect on other relationships in the network and thus also on the end-user. 
Moreover, the service provider should enable and encourage the supplier to deliver the service 
requested by the end-user. For example, in this study the service provider should enable the 
security agents to take up a position with high visibility to the end-users. To ensure this high 
visibility, the provider’s premises might need to be adjusted. The results of this study also 
indicate some managerial implications for the service supplier. The service supplier should 
not only pay attention to the requests of the buyer, but also to the needs of the end-user in 
order to enhance customer satisfaction. Based on Berry and Bendapudi (2003), the service 
supplier should provide “evidence” to the end-user on the quality of the service delivered. In 
this study, certain measures to enhance visibility of the security agent are already taken by the 
service supplier: for example, wearing a uniform is obligatory. Some additional actions to 
perform evidence management can still be taken. Based on the relevant satisfaction elements 
of the service supplier, these measures should be mainly related to human research 
management. Hiring the right people and providing regular training are needed to assure and 
enhance accessibility and interpersonal skills of the security agents.  
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Chapter III. How to Govern Business Services 
Exchanges: Contractual and Relational Issues 
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3.01 Abstract 
With firms concentrating on core competencies, more emphasis has been placed on 
outsourcing and the dealing with external sourcing agents. This has lead to a stronger 
academic focus on buyer-seller exchanges and the corresponding mechanisms for governing 
these exchanges. This paper gives an overview of previous research investigating the 
exchange governance phenomenon based on transaction cost theory or cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. The results reveal that few research studies have 
investigated the overall picture of exchange governance, including both contractual and 
relational governance and taking into account antecedents as well as performance outcomes of 
the governance mechanisms involved. Moreover, despite the service-dominant logic shift, 
limited attention is given to specific service characteristics and their impact on exchange 
governance. In this paper, we attempt to meld economic and social related antecedents into a 
model with regard to exchange governance in business services settings. Contractual and 
relational governance issues and their impact on performance outcomes are also considered. 
The resulting model indicates that to efficiently govern business services exchanges, more 
emphasis should be placed on behavioural uncertainty, human and process asset specificity 
and contractual governance. We conclude the paper by discussing several directions for future 
research. 
 
3.02 Introduction 
In today’s turbulent marketplace, firms are increasingly concentrating on their core 
competencies to remain competitive. Consequently, these firms resort to outsourcing those 
activities that fall outside their own domain of expertise. Because of the increased need for 
dealing with suppliers and other external sourcing agents, a strong focus on buyer-seller 
exchanges and the corresponding mechanisms for governing these exchanges has emerged. 
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Governance refers to the formal and informal rules of exchange between partners (Griffith 
and Myers, 2005; Nickerson et al., 2001; Wathne and Heide, 2004). In general, two types of 
governance strategies (Griffith and Myers, 2005) have been studied: economic governance 
strategies such as contracts (Lusch and Brown, 1996) and relational governance strategies 
such as relational norms (Heide and John, 1992). While initial research on buyer-seller 
relationships mainly treated these exchanges as discrete transactions and not as ongoing 
relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987), subsequent studies have placed more emphasis on 
relationship-based rather than transaction-based marketing perspectives (Sharma and Pillai, 
2003). While both these perspectives have their merits, Griffith and Myers (2005) suggest that 
further research is needed to provide an in-depth and extensive understanding of buyer-seller 
exchange governance mechanisms and the relationship between these governance strategies.  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the governance mechanisms in buyer-seller 
exchanges, the relationship between these mechanisms and the corresponding impact of these 
governance mechanisms on the performance of the relationship. In particular, we focus on 
business exchanges in a services context. We do this for the following reasons. The service 
sector continues to grow in our economies and the biggest challenge in marketing today is re-
orienting the focus on services (Vargo and Lusch, 2004), especially in business-to-business 
settings (Johnston, 2005). This recent shift towards a more service-centred view has 
intensified the need for research on exchange governance and governance of business services 
exchanges. Because of different issues and success factors in service industries, we simply do 
not know whether findings from previous studies in manufacturing settings extend to the 
service sector (Judge and Dooley, 2006). First, exchange governance and its performance 
implications might be different in services compared to manufacturing settings. Because of 
the intangible nature of services, the writing of contracts is more challenging (Fitzsimmons 
and Fitzsimmons, 2006) and relational structures such as relational norms will necessarily 
emerge (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Second, the findings of previous research indicate that 
manufacturing and services firms seem to respond differently to determinants of exchange 
governance such as asset specificity and uncertainty (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). As 
services tend to be more people-oriented, knowledge and experience will play a more 
fundamental role than goods in service exchanges (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Moreover, 
because of the intangible nature of services, evaluation of the services being delivered is more 
difficult as these are not subject to close scrutiny (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006). 
Third, current research has not completely investigated the overall picture of exchange 
Chapter III 
 49 
governance, including both social and economic antecedents, contractual and relational 
aspects, and performance consequences. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the 
impact of specific service characteristics. Consequently, the governance of business 
exchanges requires further investigation, especially in a business services setting.  
 
In this paper, we address the concerns stated above by proposing a model that identifies the 
process by which firms use contractual and relational governance to manage relationships 
between buying organizations and service suppliers. Antecedent factors that influence the 
type of governance mechanisms used and the subsequent impact of these governance 
mechanisms on performance outcomes of the buyer-seller relationships in business services 
settings are identified. The model with the incorporated constructs and their interrelationships 
is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure III-1: Business services exchange governance 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following section of the paper is devoted to further discuss the theoretical background of 
the shift from transaction to relational exchange in business-to-business services exchanges. 
Governance mechanisms for these business exchanges are subsequently discussed. We then 
propose a model based on these governance mechanisms and incorporate relevant antecedents 
and consequences of these governance mechanisms in business services settings. Finally, 
theoretical and practical implications of the paper are discussed, along with directions for 
future research. 
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3.03 Theoretical Background 
(i) From transaction to relational exchange  
Ever since the work by Williamson (1979; 1985) on the governance of transactions, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has become one of the leading perspectives in the field of 
management and the study of organizations (David and Han, 2004). The focus of TCE is on 
transactions and especially on their analysis and how efficiency can be achieved. The central 
claim is to handle transactions in such a way as to minimize the costs involved in carrying 
them out (David and Han, 2004). A transaction is defined by Williamson (1985) as the 
transfer of a good or a service between separated units. Transactions are the units of exchange 
(Williamson, 1991) and are characterized by transaction-specific attributes on which the 
choice between different forms of alternate governance modes depends. These attributes 
include asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (cf. Williamson, 1985). These 
transaction-specific attributes in turn are related to the two main assumptions of human 
behaviour in TCE (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997): bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality assumes that decision makers have limited rationality because of 
constraints on their cognitive capabilities. While decision makers may be willing to act 
rationally, limited information processing and communication causes bounded rationality 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Due to the presence of uncertainty, bounded rationality plays a 
more profound role in the exchange setting. The second assumed human behaviour in TCE, 
opportunism, supposes that decision makers may be seeking to serve their self-interest: “self-
interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985). This relates to behaviours such as lying, 
cheating or other forms of violating the agreement.  The extent to which specific assets 
support the transaction causes opportunism-related behavioural problems because of the 
increased safeguarding problem (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
 
The ‘discriminating alignment hypothesis’ of TCE states that transactions which differ in 
attributes are aligned with appropriate governance mechanisms, i.e. those structures which 
minimize the associated transaction costs (Williamson, 1991). Whether economic agents will 
rely on a particular form of governance depends on the attributes of the transactions to be 
realized and the associated transaction costs (Aubert et al., 1996). The governance 
mechanisms in TCE are originally limited to two alternate forms: market governance and 
hierarchy. Market governance relates to a market-based exchange with the market as 
governance mechanism. Market transactions are characterized by legal, formal terms and hard 
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bargaining (David and Han, 2004). Hierarchy relates to internal organization or vertical 
integration with the firm as governance mechanism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
 
Previous research on business exchanges has been mainly founded on unilateral approaches to 
buyer-seller relationships such as market or hierarchy (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Nevertheless, 
over the past two decades, marketing has been transitioning from a transaction focus to more 
of a relationship focus (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) and the findings from previous research 
indicate that TCE only provides limited guidance concerning suitable exchange governance 
for interfirm relationships (Pilling et al., 1994). As a result, intermediate modes of governance 
– distinct from the traditional modes of market and hierarchy – have been proposed (Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995). Such governance modes have been termed as hybrids (Williamson, 
1991) and their strategic importance is growing (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). In today’s 
business world, the concern is no longer the unilateral governance of transactions, but the 
bilateral governance of relational exchanges (Joshi and Stump, 1999). In hybrids or bilateral 
governance modes, the exchange partners’ identity gains in importance because replacing the 
other entails considerable costs (David and Han, 2004). As a result, the exchange partners will 
work together to restrain opportunism (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
 
Because of the shift from unilateral governance of transactions towards the bilateral 
governance of relational exchanges, researchers (e.g., Brown et al., 2000) have combined the 
principles of TCE (Williamson, 1985), the principles of Relational Exchange Theory (RET) 
(Macneil, 1980), and relational governance to better understand buyer-seller interchange. RET 
mainly focuses on exchange relationships with significant levels of relational behaviour 
between the exchange partners (Pilling et al., 1994). Consequently, the unit of analysis is no 
longer the transaction itself, but the relationship established between supplier and buyer, 
based on the transactions taking place. 
 
(ii) Governance of exchange 
In general, two types of governance strategies (Griffith and Myers, 2005) have been studied: 
economic governance strategies such as contracts (Lusch and Brown, 1996) and relational 
governance strategies such as relational norms (Haugland and Reve, 1993; Heide and John, 
1992). Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000) focused on legal contracts and relational norms 
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as the two common governance mechanisms used as building blocks for complex structures 
of governance. 
 
Contractual governance is considered a formal, legal and economic governance strategy 
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Lusch and Brown, 1996). This governance mechanism is defined as 
the degree to which the formal contract is currently established in existing business exchanges 
(Ferguson et al., 2005). It tends to depend more heavily on the principles of contract law 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996), although the impact of inter-firm contractual law regulation on 
governance mechanisms is not part of this research (see Arrighetti et al., 1997). In this 
research, contractual governance refers to explicit, formal, and usually written contracts. 
Contracts are detailed, binding legal agreements that specify the obligations and roles of both 
parties in the relationship. As such, contracts can be considered as substitutes for formal 
governance mechanisms of hierarchy or integration in business exchanges (Ferguson et al., 
2005; Gundlach and Achrol, 1993; Heide, 1994; Lusch and Brown, 1996). Several researchers 
have delineated the importance of examining contracts (Brown et al., 2006; Lusch and Brown, 
1996) and suggest that if contracts are misused, performance outcomes and behavioural 
relations among buyers and sellers may be harmed. 
 
Relational governance is defined as the strength of the social norms present in the exchange 
and has often been referred to as relationalism (Ferguson et al., 2005). Relationalism points 
not only to the relationship orientation of the exchange partners, but also to the emphasis 
placed by them on exchange behaviours or norms as indicators of closeness in buyer-seller 
relationships (Macneil, 1980). Relational norms are defined as the bilateral expectations that 
exchange partners will act in ways that assist each other during the course of the relationship 
(Joshi and Campbell, 2003). As such, relational governance can be considered rather informal 
and social, compared to contractual governance (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh (1987) introduced Macneil’s (1980) relational contract theory and its behavioural 
concepts into the marketing literature on buyer-seller relationships.  Ever since, it is generally 
accepted that interfirm activities can be managed using relational elements or norms (Weitz 
and Jap, 1995; Zhang et al., 2003). The importance of relational norms in business services 
settings has been illustrated by Paulin, Perrien, and Ferguson (1997). Recently, relational 
governance strategies such as relational norms have drawn increased academic and 
managerial focus (Griffith and Myers, 2005).  
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Both contractual and relational governance are included in this paper as the interesting 
questions about these governance mechanisms have less to do with their single effect than 
with their interaction effect (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). There have been studies on the 
antecedents of contractual and/or relational governance (e.g. Claro et al., 2003; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002), the interaction between both governance mechanisms (e.g. Lusch and Brown, 
1996) and its impact on performance (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Styles and Ambler, 
2003). Table 1 gives an overview of empirical studies on exchange governance and the 
incorporated constructs. This table illustrates that still little is known on the overall picture 
taking into account both contractual and relational governance and their determinants and 
outcomes, especially in business services settings. Therefore, a model incorporating relevant 
antecedents and consequences of the contractual and relational governance interplay is 
developed to gain more in-depth understanding of exchange governance in a business services 
context.   
    
3.04 Model of Governance Mechanisms 
In this research, we look at the interplay between contractual and relational governance and 
their antecedents and outcomes in business services exchanges. We assume that the exchange 
partners are already involved in the relationship, past the awareness phase and before the 
dissolution phase (Dwyer et al., 1987) and that they are not interacting on a discrete or one-
time basis. The performance of the relationship during the exploration, expansion, and 
commitment phase (Dwyer et al., 1987) will determine whether or not both parties are willing 
to continue or enhance the relationship. The model as illustrated in Figure 1 proposes 
relationships between antecedents and governance mechanisms and between these governance 
mechanisms and outcomes. This is the traditional way in which channel behaviour is 
presented (Lusch and Brown, 1996). However, when interfirm relationships are considered as 
a developmental process in a longitudinal sense (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), performance 
outcomes can cause feedback and have a recursive relationship with relational or contractual 
governance. The governance of the exchange can also have a recursive relationship with 
certain antecedents. Therefore, we note that this model is a partial model and can not 
represent all possible antecedents and consequences of exchange governance in business 
services settings. In this research, the governance of business services exchanges is discussed 
at a certain stage in the buyer-seller relationship: the contract has been established ex ante and  
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Table III-1: Overview of constructs used in the literature on exchange governance 
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a
 B: Buyer is respondent; S: Supplier is respondent 
b
 AS: Asset Specificity; Gen: General asset specificity; SAS: Supplier Asset Specificity; BAS: Buyer Asset 
Specificity; UNC: Uncertainty; Gen: General uncertainty; ENV: Environmental Uncertainty; BEH: Behavioural 
Uncertainty; CG: Contractual Governance; RG: Relational Governance; Trust: Trust; Perf: Performance 
c
 Can: Canada; Fra: France; Ger: Germany; Mex: Mexico; Net: The Netherlands; Nor: Norway; Swe: Sweden 
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relational governance is still developing. The exchange partners have invested in the 
establishment of the contract and the current execution of the commitments made will 
determine the agreement’s renewal, expansion or dissolution in the future. 
 
(i) Governance mechanisms and their performance outcomes 
Buyer-seller exchanges in business services markets are governed through both formal and 
informal agreements (Ivens, 2005). The use of contracting for service delivery is extensive 
and rising (Dean and Kiu, 2002). Explicit, written contracts between buyer and seller are 
established in the commitment stage (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and formally state how 
parties to the contract should behave over time (Lusch and Brown, 1996). During the 
execution of the contract, the content of the contract mainly remains unchanged until the next 
negotiation phase (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Relational governance emerges from the 
values and agreed-upon processes found in the relationship and further develops within the 
relationship (Macneil, 1980; 1983). Thus, at a certain point in an interfirm exchange, the 
formal agreement or contract has been established ex ante and the informal agreement or 
relational governance continues to develop over time.    
 
Interaction between contractual and relational governance. The interaction between 
contractual and relational governance and how both governance mechanisms relate to 
performance have been investigated in previous research. Based on these results, two schools 
of thought can be distinguished (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Wuyts and Geykens, 2005): the 
substitution and the complementarity view.  
 
The complementarity view argues that contracting methods and relational issues are supposed 
to complement each other and thus should be considered simultaneously (Möllering, 2002). 
This school of thought is based on the idea that contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of 
informal agreements such as relational governance (Lazzarini et al., 2004). Contractual 
specifications are even presumed to increase the occurrence of relational behaviour between 
the exchange partners. Based on TCE and contract theory, the established contract limits the 
possibilities for opportunistic behaviour (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Explicit contracts formally 
state how parties to the contract should behave over time (Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
Moreover, the punishments specified in the contract reduce the short-time gains of 
opportunistic behaviour and heighten the gains from cooperative behaviour (Poppo and 
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Zenger, 2002). In a business service exchange, Ivens (2005) states that more formal and 
detailed contracts between buyer and seller increase the likelihood that relational behaviour is 
performed. Thus, according to the complementarity view, contracts reduce the gains of short-
term opportunism through incentives or punishments, thereby increasing the value of 
honouring more informal dealings such as relational governance (Lazzarini et al., 2004; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Several researchers (Eriksson and Sharma, 2003; Wathne and 
Heide, 2004) state that contracts are only partly helpful and that the development of relational 
governance is even a necessity.  
 
Nonetheless, in accordance with the substitution view (Lazzarini et al., 2004), certain social 
scientists claim that contracts may be detrimental to the development of relational behaviour 
(Woolthuis et al., 2005). This school of thought indicates that the presence of one governance 
mechanism may hinder or even preclude the emergence of the other (Paswan et al., 1998; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002): the existence of a contract in a relationship may undermine the 
development of relational norms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Macaulay, 1963). Two reasons for 
the negative relationship between contract and relational governance (Gundlach and Achrol, 
1993) are mentioned (Woolthuis et al., 2005). The first reason states that drawing up a 
contract is interpreted as a sign of distrust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). However, the research 
of Roxenhall and Ghauri (2004) demonstrates that contracts are mostly drawn up for 
establishing business relationships, thus confirming the willingness of both parties to engage 
in the exchange. Moreover, business services exchanges are often provided in the form of 
long-term relationships (Ivens, 2005) indicating the relational orientation of both parties. The 
second reason states that the active use of the contract may evoke opportunism and thus 
hinder the development of relational behaviour (Woolthuis et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
Roxenhall and Ghauri (2004) claim that contracts are merely established to determine the 
business relationships and are hardly ever established to prove what was agreed upon or to 
enforce the agreement.  
 
Empirical research in business services exchanges has disconfirmed the substitution view 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002), while the complementarity of contracts and relational governance 
has not been disconfirmed (Bennett and Robson, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Therefore, 
the complementarity of contractual and relational governances is assumed in business services 
exchanges and thus, we posit a positive link between contractual and relational governance.  
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In a longitudinal sense, recursive relationships between relational governance and formal 
contracts may emerge. In a subsequent negotiation phase, relational behaviour may promote 
the refinement of the formal contract to complement its adaptive limits (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). However, in this paper, the focus is on the governance of the current exchange, 
excluding the subsequent negotiation between buyer and seller.  
 
Performance outcomes of exchange governance. Considering relational and contractual 
governance as complements indicates that the combined use of both governance mechanisms 
provides more efficient outcomes than the use of either governance mechanism in isolation 
(Lazzarini et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). When both governance mechanisms are 
used simultaneously, advantage can be taken of their differential impacts to enhance their 
individual outcomes (Brown et al., 2000; Weitz and Jap, 1995). Based on the 
complementarity view (Lazzarini et al., 2004), contractual and relational governance are each 
assumed to have a positive impact on performance outcomes, also in a business services 
setting (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). While the positive influence of relational governance on 
performance has been frequently assessed and confirmed (e.g. Bello et al., 2003; Ferguson et 
al., 2005), the positive link between contractual governance and performance outcomes has 
been challenged by certain researchers. They state that exchange performance might decrease 
when detailed contracts are used and relational governance is not well developed (Cannon et 
al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 2005). Nonetheless, Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach (2000) had 
mentioned certain advantages of contractual governance: they pointed out that careful contract 
negotiation serves as a foundation for and consequently act as a complement to relational 
governance. However, those research studies did not investigate possible positive effects of 
the ex ante established contract on the development of relational governance. We propose that 
the establishment of a detailed contract ex ante enhances the development of relational 
governance in business services settings. Thus, when the interfirm exchange is governed by a 
detailed contract, low levels of relational governance, and the supposed negative impact of 
contractual governance on performance, can not occur. This is supported in the study of 
Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron (2005) in which a significant positive effect between 
contractual governance and performance was found in stead of the supposed negative 
relationship for business clients in commercial banking. Because of the barriers against 
opportunistic behaviour created by the contract, performance outcomes of the exchange will 
be enhanced (Judge and Dooley, 2006). Moreover, a written contract makes the intangible 
service more tangible, facilitating the management of the required service delivery and thus 
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resulting in a higher performance. Therefore, in a business services setting, both contractual 
and relational governance will be positively related to performance outcomes. 
 
(ii) Antecedents of governance mechanisms 
Based on Griffith and Myers (2005), both social and economic governance mechanisms 
should be incorporated to investigate buyer-seller exchanges. Accordingly, antecedents from 
both the sociological and economic perspective should be included when investigating 
exchange governance. In the governance of exchange relationships, non-economic factors – 
primarily represented by trust – are complementary to economic factors (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). TCE indicates three economic factors: frequency, asset specificity, and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). Frequency refers to a recurring instead of an occasional or 
one-time transaction. Previous research has devoted limited attention to the frequency 
attribute (David and Han, 2004; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). As we assume that the 
exchange partners are not interacting on a discrete or one-time basis, frequency is not further 
considered.  
 
Previous research suggests that the impact of transaction attributes on governance modes or 
performance outcomes is not always straightforward (Bello et al., 2003). A first explanation 
could be the diverse definition and operationalization of these attributes (David and Han, 
2004). Moreover, the conceptualization of a construct in manufacturing settings might be 
inadequate for services settings (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). A second explanation could 
be the different response of manufacturing and services firms to certain transaction-specific 
attributes (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Murray and Kotabe, 1999). Compared to 
manufacturing settings, emphasis should be more on people and less on tangible aspects of 
the delivery in business services settings.  
 
Asset specificity. Asset specificity is defined by Williamson (1991) as the degree to which the 
assets used in support of the transaction can be redeployed to alternative uses without 
sacrifice of productive value. Asset specificity is considered the most important transaction 
attribute by Williamson (1985) and is the most frequently considered attribute in empirical 
research dealing with TCE (David and Han, 2004). Several research studies (Fink et al., 2006; 
Heide and John, 1990; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) also use asset specificity as a proxy for 
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organizational dependence defined as the degree of external control of the organization 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
Asset specificity exists in a number of specific dimensions (Williamson, 1975) of which 
physical and human specificity most frequently occur (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Physical 
asset specificity refers to assets for which the specificity is attributable to physical features 
(Williamson, 1985) and incorporates customized machinery, tools and equipment (Heide and 
John, 1990). Given the shift towards a service-dominant logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) and 
the focus on business services exchanges, physical asset specificity appears less relevant in 
the business-to-business services world. Based on the intangible nature of services and the 
increased importance of process and knowledge, we focus on business process asset 
specificity which incorporates both human and procedural asset specificity (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). Human asset specificity relates to the learning-by-doing concept or the 
chronic problems of moving human assets (Williamson, 1985). It deals with the degree to 
which skills, knowledge, training and experience of the personnel are specific to the 
requirements of the other firm (Claro et al., 2003; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Walker and 
Poppo, 1991; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Procedural asset specificity relates to the 
extent to which a firm’s workflow and processes are customized in line with the requirements 
of the other party (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). The process to deliver maintenance 
services to a particular buyer organization can for example be adjusted to that customer’s 
specific machinery and its specific location at the customer’s premises. However, the explicit 
use of procedural asset specificity is limited in research studies on exchange governance in 
business settings. Nonetheless, it is considered as a powerful form of transaction-specific 
assets in service firms (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
  
Transaction specific investments can be made by either the buyer or the seller (Heide and 
John, 1990). While most studies incorporate only one of these types of asset specificity (Claro 
et al., 2003; Heide and John, 1992), both TCE theory and empirical results indicate the 
relevance of both in the governance of interfirm exchanges (Stump and Heide, 1996; 
Williamson, 1983). Specific investments made by the supplier are referred to as supplier asset 
specificity, while specific investments made by the buyer are referred to as buyer asset 
specificity or reciprocal investments. First, the impact of supplier asset specificity on 
exchange governance is discussed; afterwards, reciprocal investments are considered.    
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The theory of TCE suggests that as asset specificity increases, hybrids and hierarchies are 
preferred over markets and at high levels of asset specificity, hierarchy becomes the preferred 
governance mechanism (David and Han, 2004). Put differently, a higher degree of asset 
specificity requires greater safeguards included in the exchange to guard against opportunistic 
behaviour. As a result, the exchange governance should move away from the market towards 
more specialized forms of governance because these minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 
1985). Contracts – as substitutes for hierarchy (Heide, 1994) – have been established ex ante 
and can be considered as the first safeguard against opportunism. The higher the asset 
specificity, the more complex the established contracts (Dyer, 1997) and the more long-term 
contracts will be preferred (Aubert et al., 1996; Joskow, 1987). Complex contracts containing 
remedies for anticipated contingencies are crafted to better safeguard the investor of specific 
investments against opportunism (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). When asset specificity increases, 
transaction costs are presumed to increase (Williamson, 1985), but by establishing more 
complex contracts certain costs associated with asset specificity will be attenuated (Dyer, 
1997). For example, more complex contracts eliminate or at least attenuate the bargaining 
over profits from transaction-specific assets (Dyer, 1997). Past and future transaction-specific 
assets and their safeguarding difficulties are anticipated in the ex ante established contract by 
creating a detailed contract and specifying clearly the roles and obligations of each party (in 
the absence of environmental uncertainty – cf. infra), as confirmed by the research of Poppo 
and Zenger (2002).  
 
A number of researchers (e.g. Claro et al., 2003; Heide and John, 1990) have investigated the 
impact of supplier asset specificity on relational governance, but without incorporating 
contractual governance and its effect on relational governance. They assume a positive 
relationship between asset specificity and relational governance based on TCE theory: asset 
specificity increases switching costs and thus, relational governance is enhanced as a 
safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. However, to investigate the impact of supplier 
asset specificity on exchange governance, other safeguards against opportunism like 
contractual governance and its interplay with relational governance were not incorporated in 
their research design. Consequently, the impact of supplier asset specificity on relational 
governance in the presence of an ex ante established contract has not yet been thoroughly 
investigated. Based on TCE theory, we posit that contracts are established ex ante as a 
safeguard against opportunistic behaviour caused by supplier asset specificity. However, 
because of limited information processing and bounded rationality in TCE theory, additional 
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mechanisms such as relational governance might be needed to safeguard further past and 
future investments. Therefore, we posit that supplier asset specificity affects both contractual 
and relational governance (in the absence of environmental uncertainty – cf. infra). 
 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is the second most analyzed transaction-specific attribute (David 
and Han, 2004). In TCE, uncertainty is mostly related to environmental or behavioural aspects 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Environmental uncertainty is also referred to as external 
uncertainty, while behavioural uncertainty is sometimes called internal uncertainty (Cannon et 
al., 2000). The research overview of David and Han (2004) reveals that the most common 
form of uncertainty is environmental uncertainty, while behavioural uncertainty is less 
frequently investigated. Environmental uncertainty is defined as unanticipated changes in 
relevant factors surrounding the exchange (Noordewier et al., 1990). This type of uncertainty 
mainly refers to the unpredictability of the environment or the inability to predict changes in 
the external environment (Joshi and Stump, 1999). The operationalization of environmental 
uncertainty is not uniform across research studies as several types of unpredictability can be 
incorporated. Market conditions, such as price and demand (Pilling et al., 1994), and 
technology (Heide and John, 1992; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) are the most frequently 
occurring (David and Han, 2004). Behavioural uncertainty is defined by Williamson (1985) as 
arising from problems related to monitoring the performance of exchange partners. This type 
of uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of the exchange partner’s behaviour. Conform to 
this definition, behavioural uncertainty is most often operationalized as the degree of 
difficulty associated with assessing the performance of transaction partners (Anderson, 1985; 
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Behavioural uncertainty encompasses the difficulty to evaluate 
the service delivered, to determine product or service standards, and to render objective 
assessments (Cannon et al., 2000).  
 
Empirical results of previous research indicated that environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty can have opposite effects on the governance of business services exchanges 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In business services settings, behavioural uncertainty seems to 
have a much stronger influence on exchange governance than in manufacturing settings 
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). Services tend to be more people-oriented (Erramilli and 
Rao, 1993) and are harder to judge on delivery (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006): for 
example, the output of advertising services will be harder to evaluate than the output of OEM 
supplies. Consequently, services firms respond more to the people-oriented component of 
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TCE, i.e. behavioural uncertainty, than manufacturing firms (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003).  
Environmental uncertainty consists of unpredictability of both technology and market 
conditions such as price and demands (David and Han, 2004). As services are less investment 
intensive and require fewer resources (Erramilli and Rao, 1993), services firms are less 
responsive to certain technology-related or material-related uncertainties than manufacturing 
firms (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). For example, the steel-making industry will be very 
responsive to the development of an enhanced steel producing technology. On the other hand, 
services firms could be equally or more responsive to other facets of environmental 
uncertainty such as demand and competition (Brouthers et al., 2002). As services can not be 
inventoried and sold at a later time, increases in demand may also cause increases in service 
firm costs. Furthermore, in services settings such as the cleaning industry, the threat of new 
entrants is typically greater than in manufacturing settings (Brouthers et al., 2002).  
 
According to TCE theory, uncertainty has an impact on exchange governance only in the 
presence of asset specificity: a moderating effect is assumed (David and Han, 2004). In our 
research, set in a business services context, we posit a moderating effect of environmental 
uncertainty on the relationship between asset specificity and exchange governance. However, 
a direct effect of behavioural uncertainty on exchange governance is assumed. Because of the 
high people-oriented character and increased difficulty in assessing the exchange partner’s 
behaviour in business services settings, behavioural uncertainty is proposed to influence 
exchange governance apart from the level of asset specificity.  
 
Despite the numerous empirical studies on TCE theory, possible moderating effects of 
environmental uncertainty on the relationship between asset specificity and governance 
mechanisms has not yet been empirically investigated. According to TCE theory, when asset 
specificity is present to a certain degree, increasing uncertainty renders markets preferable to 
hybrids and hierarchies preferable to both hybrids and markets (David and Han, 2004). 
However, higher levels of environmental uncertainty increase the costs of establishing or 
adapting contractual agreements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997): when high environmental 
uncertainty is present, it is hard to determine ex ante how to react on unforeseen changes. 
Moreover, the study of Pilling, Crosby and Jackson (1994) indicates that environmental 
uncertainty increases the ex ante costs of developing an exchange relationship and specifying 
the roles of each exchange partner. As a consequence, due to increased environmental 
uncertainty, it will be harder to stipulate ex ante detailed and specific roles and obligations for 
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each exchange partner. Furthermore, faced with environmental uncertainty, the exchange 
partners may prefer to remain flexible in the relationship and as such resist governance 
mechanisms that result in greater contractual governance (Gundlach and Achrol, 1993). Thus, 
we posit that contractual governance will be a less effective mean to safeguard against past 
and future specific investments and to deal with opportunism caused by asset specificity in 
highly uncertain environments. Therefore, environmental uncertainty will have a negative 
moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset specificity and contractual 
governance.  
 
As contractual governance is not a sufficient governance mechanism to protect against 
opportunism caused by asset specificity in highly uncertain environments, other governance 
mechanisms should be developed as safeguard. The research of Cannon, Achrol, and 
Gundlach (2000) indicated that, when uncertainty is high, contractual governance is not 
sufficient: relational governance should be enhanced to protect against opportunism. If 
relational governance is established, adaptations to changes in the environment can be carried 
out more readily (Heide and John, 1990) and efficiencies for both exchange partners are 
enhanced (Claro et al., 2003). Therefore, we posit that environmental uncertainty has a 
positive moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset specificity and relational 
governance: in settings with high environmental uncertainty, supplier asset specificity has a 
more profound impact on relational governance. 
 
In business services exchanges, behavioural uncertainty will be more important than in 
manufacturing settings because of the relatively more people-oriented and less tangible 
character of services (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). Material goods can be inspected upon 
delivery, but this opportunity does not exist for purchased services: how does one for example 
know if the supplier of plant security is being effective (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 
2006). More problems related to monitoring the exchange partner’s performance will arise in 
services settings because of their intangibility, simultaneity and people-oriented character 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Consequently, behavioural uncertainty will have a more profound 
impact in business services exchanges than in manufacturing settings (Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003).  
 
Few researchers have investigated the impact of behavioural uncertainty on exchange 
governance (David and Han, 2004). Moreover, no researcher, except for Poppo and Zenger 
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(2002), has incorporated both contractual and relational governance to assess the impact of 
behavioural uncertainty on exchange governance. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) state that 
behavioural uncertainty causes ex ante information asymmetry because of the inability to 
determine a party’s true characteristics prior to the exchange. Therefore, with high 
behavioural uncertainty it might be harder to determine ex ante which monitoring practices 
should be incorporated in the contract or to stipulate ex ante detailed and specific roles and 
obligations for each exchange partner, especially in business services exchanges. Although 
the research study of Poppo and Zenger (2002) initially indicated a positive relationship 
between behavioural uncertainty and contractual governance, further detailed analyses 
revealed a negative impact of behavioural uncertainty on contractual governance when other 
factors were taken into account.  
 
Behavioural uncertainty also causes ex-post difficulties because of information asymmetry 
regarding task performance (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). When behavioural uncertainty 
increases and performance of the exchange partner is hard to evaluate, relational governance 
is difficult to develop (Heide and Miner, 1992). Based on Heide and Miner (1992), the 
following argument can be developed. Behavioural uncertainty makes it unclear whether a 
bad service performance is caused by the other party or whether the cause is beyond the other 
party’s control. If you give the other party the benefit of the doubt, the road to exploitation is 
open. If you consider it a fault of the other party, a spiral of joint retaliation is created. In 
either way, behavioural uncertainty has a negative impact on relational governance in 
business services (Eriksson and Sharma, 2003). Based on the above arguments, this type of 
uncertainty has a negative impact on exchange governance: we posit a negative relationship 
between behavioural uncertainty and contractual governance and between behavioural 
uncertainty and relational governance in business services exchanges. 
 
Reciprocal investments. Next to supplier asset specificity, specific investments can also be 
made by the other partner to the exchange. In this research, we refer to buyer asset specificity 
or reciprocal investments. Based on TCE theory, reciprocal investments can form a “hostage” 
(Williamson, 1983): these investments serve as a credible commitment in the relationship. 
Based on reciprocal investments, bilateral credible commitments and a mutual reliance 
relation are created (Williamson, 1985) in stead of unilateral dependence (Joshi and Stump, 
1999). Reciprocal investments are supposed to protect the specific investments of the other 
exchange party and consequently tend to lower the need for safeguards against opportunism 
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(Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), due to the credible threat of forfeiture of the hostages (Joshi 
and Stump, 1999).  On the other hand, Heide and John (1990) argue that specific assets do not 
have the characteristics of good “hostages” because these are valued more highly by the giver 
than the taker. Consequently, the effects of supplier and buyer asset specificity are both 
enhancing and not attenuating the need for exchange governance: specific investments of both 
buyer and supplier increase the level of relational governance (Heide and John, 1990). As 
neither exchange party is able to turn to another exchange relationship due to the specific 
investments, both parties are willing to develop relational governance to assure cooperation in 
the future (Joshi and Stump, 1999). The negative influence of reciprocal investments on 
exchange governance has not been empirically confirmed (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), 
whereas the positive influences of both supplier’s and buyer’s specific investments on 
relational governance have been empirically confirmed (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
 
The joint impact of reciprocal investments or buyer asset specificity and supplier asset 
specificity on contractual governance has not yet been empirically investigated. Based on 
TCE theory, we propose that detailed and specific contracts contain remedies for anticipated 
contingencies to safeguard against opportunism caused by supplier asset specificity (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). However, the detailed roles and obligations are established for each party 
to the exchange. Consequently, not only the supplier’s but also the buyer’s specific 
investments made will be protected by the contract. For example, the longer the term of the 
contract, the more the supplier and buyer specific investments will be protected (Joskow, 
1987). Therefore, additional specific investments made by the buyer will not increase 
contractual governance. Thus, reciprocal investments do not influence contractual governance 
but relational governance is enhanced by those investments because neither party is able to 
turn to another exchange relationship (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
 
Trust. Next to the above cited economic factors, several researchers include trust as non-
economic or social factor to explain exchange governance (e.g., Joshi and Stump, 1999). The 
statement of Chiles and McMackin (1996) that the inclusion of trust (sociological perspective) 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the exchange model is empirically confirmed 
in business services exchanges by the research of Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995). In 
business exchange relationships, trust is the firm’s belief that another company will perform 
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm as well as not take unexpected actions 
that would result in negative outcomes for the firm (Anderson and Narus; 1990). This 
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definition captures the behavioural dimension of trust that is of particular importance to 
maintain interorganizational relationships (Aulakh et al., 1996; Zhang et al., 2003). Trust is a 
necessary condition for relational governance (Macneil, 1980) and it has been consistently 
mentioned as a predictor or antecedent of cooperative behaviour between organizations (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994): trust is a necessity for firms to learn that cooperation and relational 
governance will lead to outcomes that exceed what could be achieved if acted solely 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990; Siguaw et al., 1998). In the longitudinal sense, trust can also be 
an outcome of relational governance because of recursive relationships (Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Johnston et al., 2004). Trust has been studied widely in the social exchange literature 
and others (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) and indicated as the most encompassing determinant of 
relational governance (Claro et al., 2003). As our focus is on the governance of the current 
exchange, we also consider trust as a necessary condition for the development of relational 
governance.  
 
Incorporating the sociological perspective in the TCE framework further implies that 
behavioural uncertainty may be reduced by trust in contractual relations (Chiles and 
McMackin, 1996). Based on Zand (1972), Chiles and McMackin (1996) state that the 
existence of trust in a contractual relationship increases accurate, comprehensive and timely 
information exchanges, enhances receptivity to influence by others and relaxes controls on 
others. Consequently, each party has greater certainty as to the performance of the exchange 
partner, decreasing behavioural uncertainty (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Zand, 1972). When 
buyers trust suppliers and perceive them as being capable of delivering competent 
performance, the performance outcomes become more predictable and less uncertain (Gao et 
al., 2005). Thus, trust does not only enhance relational governance, it also decreases the level 
of behavioural uncertainty in business services exchanges.  
 
3.05 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The above arguments and the model as illustrated in Figure 1 give an overview of the effect of 
transaction-specific attributes and trust on contractual and relational governance and the 
impact of these governance mechanisms on performance outcomes in business services 
exchanges. A number of researchers have already empirically tested one or more of these 
relationships. While Table 1 gives an overview of the constructs incorporated in previous 
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research, Table 2 describes the relationships between constructs which have been investigated 
by each research study. The objective of these research studies is to investigate buyer-seller 
relationships with focus on one or both governance mechanisms (contractual, relational) and 
to examine the antecedents, performance outcomes or both. These tables indicate that an 
overall picture, incorporating both economic and social antecedents, contractual and relational 
governance, and their performance outcomes, is rarely considered. Moreover, the 
relationships proposed in the above reasoning and illustrated in the model sometimes deviate 
from the hypothesized relationships in previous research. This divergence is caused by both 
the scope and the focus of this paper: a global picture of exchange governance is investigated 
in the specific business services setting.  Theoretical and managerial implications are 
discussed, along with directions for future research. 
 
(i) Theoretical and management implications 
Despite Macaulay’s (1963) early statement that in most business exchanges, no contracts were 
used, recent research studies indicate that companies still do compose and sign contracts 
(Roxenhall and Ghauri, 2004), even in business services settings (Dean and Kiu, 2002; Ivens, 
2005). Based on the model (Figure 1), contractual governance might impact both directly and 
indirectly performance outcomes. Business services relationships in which a contract has been 
established ex ante can benefit from this action during the term of the contract by increased 
relational governance and enhanced performance outcomes. Consequently, contractual 
governance deserves more attention by both academia and practitioners but, until now, 
contractual governance has been rarely included in research on exchange governance (Table 
2). Due to the intangibility of services, it might be harder to write contracts ex ante in 
business services settings than in manufacturing settings. However, in accordance with the 
complementarity view, governance of business services exchanges should also include written 
specifications as contracts are proposed to influence both relational governance and 
performance outcomes.  
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Table III-2: Overview of the effects investigated in the literature on exchange 
governance 
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The dominant logic shift from goods to services (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) has an impact on 
the antecedents of exchange governance, especially on asset specificity and uncertainty. In 
previous research, asset specificity mainly focused on physical and human asset specificity 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Because of the service-dominant logic and the growth in 
significance of specialized skills and knowledge (Vargo and Lusch, 2004), other aspects of 
asset specificity should be stressed in business services exchange governance. Business 
process asset specificity incorporating both human and procedural asset specificity (Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995) should be considered to determine the best suited governance 
mechanisms in business services settings. As a consequence, physical asset specificity 
becomes less relevant in these settings. Whether or not the exchange partner invests in 
transaction-specific physical assets should not strongly influence the chosen governance 
mechanism. As tangibility amongst services differs, the amount of physical assets needed to 
deliver the service might vary from setting to setting. Like in logistics services, physical 
assets might be more fundamental than in consulting services. However, because of the shift 
towards specialized skills and knowledge, we propose that transaction-specific investments in 
knowledge, skills and processes will have a more profound impact on exchange governance in 
business services settings than transaction-specific physical components. Moreover, today’s 
shift towards a service-dominant logic makes knowledge and processes more relevant than 
physical features (Vargo and Lusch, 2004): goods are no longer the common denominator of 
exchange, but specialized skills and knowledge are. Therefore, even in manufacturing 
settings, business process asset specificity might need to be considered by both academia and 
practitioners. Procedural asset specificity can be of relevance not only in services but also in 
manufacturing settings because it deals with customized organization routines as well (Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995), like for example ordering routines.  
 
Next to the focus on business process asset specificity, the service-dominant logic also causes 
behavioural uncertainty to play a more fundamental role in business services exchanges. The 
intangibility, simultaneity and people-oriented character of services make it harder to control 
and monitor the performance delivered by the exchange partner in services than in 
manufacturing settings (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). 
Consequently, because of the ex ante and ex post information asymmetries caused by 
behavioural uncertainty, the model proposes a direct negative impact on both contractual and 
relational governance. The type of uncertainty most frequently investigated in previous 
research, i.e. environmental uncertainty, is proposed to have only a moderating effect on the 
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relation between asset specificity and exchange governance. When asset specificity is low, 
environmental uncertainty is proposed to have little impact on exchange governance. On the 
other hand, the impact of behavioural uncertainty is proposed to be independent of the level of 
asset specificity. As business services are difficult to judge on delivery, both academia and 
practitioners should give more attention to the impact of behavioural uncertainty on exchange 
governance and how its influence can be reduced in business services settings. Next to the 
proposed effect of trust on behavioural uncertainty, other ways to decrease this type of 
uncertainty should be investigated as this is an essential antecedent of exchange governance in 
business services settings. 
 
(ii) Directions for future research 
The above arguments and model (Figure 1) combined with the results of previous research 
displayed in Table 1 and Table 2 indicate some directions for future research that need to be 
further explored. First, compared to relational governance, few research studies have 
incorporated contractual governance despite the increased use of contracting for service 
delivery (Dean and Kiu, 2002). Those studies that do incorporate contracts in their research 
model all take place in the United States or Canada (Table 1). Previous studies on law and 
regulation have indicated that institutional factors, such as the contract law doctrine 
(Arrighetti et al., 1997) and the degree of stability and consistency in systems of social 
regulation (Lane, 1997), have an influence on preferred strategies for inter-firm contracting 
and the type of buyer-seller cooperation. As these institutional factors differ across countries, 
more research is needed on contractual governance in countries outside the North American 
continent. Moreover, most studies on contractual governance generally consider this construct 
as one-dimensional. Nevertheless, contracting literature suggest two dimensions of contract 
structure: the level of contract specificity (Gainey and Klaas, 2003) and the level of contract 
flexibility (Harris et al., 1998). Therefore, the impact of contractual governance and its 
dimensions should be further explored. When investigating contractual governance, relational 
governance should also be included. While a few researchers do incorporate both governance 
mechanisms to investigate their impact on performance outcomes (Cannon et al., 2000; 
Ferguson et al., 2005), they generally do not incorporate the interrelationship between these 
governance mechanisms. As certain relationships proposed in this paper such as the impact of 
contractual governance on performance or the impact of contractual governance on relational 
governance were not incorporated in previous research studies, this might explain the 
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differing findings between research studies on exchange governance in business settings. 
Future research is needed to clarify the interrelationships between contractual governance, 
relational governance, and performance outcomes in a business services setting. 
    
Second, several researchers have included a certain type of asset specificity in their research 
study on exchange governance, but in recent years asset specificity is rarely included in these 
research studies. Nonetheless, a number of research possibilities are still unexplored. Few 
research studies have investigated the impact of asset specificity on contractual governance 
and to the best of our knowledge no research study has yet investigated the impact of asset 
specificity and environmental uncertainty on contractual governance (Table 2).  As a 
consequence, based on current research, it is empirically unclear whether and how contractual 
governance can safeguard the exchange partners against opportunistic behaviour in a situation 
with either low or high environmental uncertainty. Transaction-specific investments for a 
particular exchange can be made by the supplier or the buyer: theory and empirical results 
indicate the relevance of both supplier and buyer asset specificity. However, only a limited 
number of research studies distinguishes between both types of asset specificity and no 
research study has yet examined whether these have a distinct impact on exchange 
governance, including both contractual and relational governance mechanisms (Table1, 
Table2). For example, the impact of buyer asset specificity on contractual governance has not 
yet been investigated. In this paper we propose an insignificant relationship between these 
constructs but this has not yet been empirically validated. On the other hand, the positive 
impact of buyer asset specificity on relational governance has been empirically confirmed 
(Joshi and Stump, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), though not in the presence of 
contractual governance. Therefore, future research is needed to fully understand the impact of 
specific investments made by the buyer. From a managerial viewpoint it is interesting to 
know how investments of the other party can affect the buyer-supplier relationship and the 
resulting performance outcomes in business services exchanges. When the impact of supplier 
and buyer asset specificity in business services settings is further explored, more emphasis 
should be placed on human and procedural asset specificity in stead of physical aspects 
because of the intangible nature of services.   
 
Third, despite the higher relevance of behavioural uncertainty in business services settings, 
this type of uncertainty has been less frequently investigated. Nonetheless, the 
unpredictability of the exchange partner’s behaviour can put a different complexion on 
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business services exchange governance because of its negative influence on exchange 
governance mechanisms.  While buyer asset specificity or contractual governance can 
enhance the development of relational governance, this increase in relational governance can 
be restricted because of high behavioural uncertainty in the buyer-supplier relationship 
concerned. Thus, when behavioural uncertainty is overlooked in a business services setting, 
implications of certain managerial activities can be assessed quite wrongly.  Future research is 
needed to enhance our understanding of behavioural uncertainty and to investigate how the 
predictability of the exchange partner’s behaviour can be increased. In this paper, we propose 
the level of trust as an important antecedent of behavioural uncertainty but further research is 
needed to investigate how this influence will affect the buyer-supplier relationship and 
resulting performance outcomes in a business services setting. 
 
Finally, previous research studies have used buyer, supplier or dyadic (buyer and supplier) 
data to empirically investigate the hypotheses. The research overview in Table 1 and Table 2 
indicates that research studies with buyer data most frequently occur. These research studies 
incorporate on average more constructs and relationships (included in the tables) than the 
other studies, but studies with buyer data have never taken place outside North America. 
Nonetheless, the tables indicate no differences in results for generally investigated 
relationships based on type of data used: consistent findings, such as the impact of relational 
governance on performance, are confirmed in all groups and rather inconsistent findings, such 
as the impact of environmental uncertainty on relational governance, have erratic results in all 
groups. This supports the statement that buyer and seller share consistent perceptions of the 
exchange relationship, its attributes and performance (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Heide and 
John, 1990; Zaheer et al., 1998), although further research is needed to confirm this statement 
and assure that the possible impact of information bias and error is negligible.  
 
When empirically testing the proposed model, researchers might need to include a number of 
control variables. Some other attributes than those incorporated in the model may have an 
effect on exchange governance and performance outcomes. When these additional variables 
are included in empirical studies testing the proposed relationships, competing explanations 
will be accounted for (Cannon et al., 2000). Possible control variables often suggested by 
previous research are the relationship length between exchange partners (Cannon et al., 2000; 
Claro et al., 2003; Ferguson et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), variables related to 
characteristics of the buying situation such as complexity and importance of the supply 
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(Cannon and Perreault, 1999), and cultural differences between the exchange partners 
(Griffith and Myers, 2005).  
 
The relationships between constructs illustrated in the model (see Figure 1) are proposed to be 
valid at a certain point in time during an interfirm business service exchange: the contract has 
been established ex ante and relational governance continues to develop over time. However, 
recursive relationships between constructs may occur outside the time span of the developed 
model. Thus, further research on interrelations between the factors incorporated in the model 
during the earlier negotiation phase and contract drawing or during the subsequent negotiation 
phase and contract renewal is needed. Table 1 indicates that previous research has mainly 
focused on product exchanges, distribution or export in a business setting. Because of the 
impact of service characteristics on the exchange governance model, other sectors need to be 
further explored. This model should be empirically tested in several business services 
exchanges such as IT outsourcing, professional business services like consulting or 
advertising, business logistics, support services etc. While not proposed in the model, we 
suppose that cross-sectional differences might occur between the relative magnitudes of the 
impact of various factors considered in the model, caused for example by varying institutional 
factors across sectors (Arrighetti et al., 1997). Cross-sectional research investigating the 
proposed relationships and their relevance for a particular sector would further increase the 
knowledge on business services exchange governance.  
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Chapter IV. Dealing with Business Service Transactions 
after the Sourcing Decision: Influence of Contract and 
Uncertainty 
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4.01 Abstract 
Business companies are increasingly dealing with external sourcing agents in today’s 
marketplace. However, few research studies have investigated how purchased business 
services should be governed after the sourcing decision, during the interaction between buyer 
and seller. This research study investigates business service exchange governance after the 
purchase decision: we assess the influence of asset specificity and uncertainty on contractual 
and relational governance and their performance outcomes. The results reveal that contracts 
should not just be used to establish business relationships as these formal agreements do 
impact business services exchanges after the sourcing decision. The two components of 
contractual governance, specificity and flexibility, each have a distinct impact on business 
services exchanges, indicating that both need to be developed carefully when drafting a 
contract. Although formal agreements influence business service exchange governance in the 
life after the purchase, informal mechanisms such as relational governance should not be 
overlooked. The relational norms developed during the buyer-seller interaction complement 
the contractual arrangements made. In business services settings, governance mechanisms are 
more strongly determined by uncertainty related to behavioural than to environmental aspects. 
The identity of the party making transaction-specific investments – buyer or supplier – 
determines whether those investments will be safeguarded by either contractual agreements or 
relational governance. Based on the results, an integrated governance scheme for business 
service transactions is developed.  
 
4.02 Introduction  
In today’s turbulent marketplace, the business services sector continues to grow in our 
economies. Because of developments such as servization of goods and increased outsourcing, 
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the share of services in total purchase volumes has increased (Murray and Kotabe, 1999) and 
employment in business services keeps rising. Service sourcing practices become more 
prevalent and buying organizations are increasingly dealing with suppliers and external 
sourcing agents. Consequently, a strong focus on buyer-seller exchanges and on the 
mechanisms used to govern these exchanges is needed. However, a lot of research has 
concentrated on the initial stages of the purchase process, like selection and contracting. The 
ongoing interactions that take place between buyer and seller after the sourcing decision have 
been less frequently investigated (Wynstra et al., 2006), especially in services settings (Brown 
et al., 2000). 
   
After the sourcing decision, in the life after the purchase, the exchange partners are involved 
in the relationship, past the awareness phase and before dissolution (Dwyer et al., 1987). The 
service deliveries and their performance outcomes in the execution stage determine whether 
or not both parties are willing to continue or enhance the relationship (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994). The establishment of long-term relationships and customer retention is strategically 
important, especially in highly competitive service environments. Therefore, the service 
exchange between buyer and seller in the life after the purchase should be carefully governed. 
Exchange governance refers to formal and informal rules of exchange between buyer and 
seller (Nickerson et al., 2001; Wathne and Heide, 2004) and consists of economic and 
relational governance strategies (Griffith and Myers, 2005). Most research studies on 
exchange governance have focused on manufacturing settings (Brown et al., 2000). More in-
depth research on buyer-seller exchange governance in services settings is needed as the 
governance of business services transactions is different from the governance of business 
manufacturing transactions. First, because of the intangible nature of services, the writing of 
contracts is more challenging (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2006) and relational structures 
such as relational norms will necessarily emerge (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Second, the 
findings of previous research indicate that manufacturing and services firms seem to respond 
differently to determinants of exchange governance such as asset specificity and uncertainty 
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). As services tend to be more people-oriented and have a less 
tangible nature, evaluation of the services being delivered is more difficult (Fitzsimmons and 
Fitzsimmons, 2006), enhancing the uncertainty on outcomes of action. Moreover, in services, 
a higher degree of collaboration is needed in the exchange (Jackson et al., 1995). This means 
that interactive processes between buyer and seller take place and that the buyer can actively 
participate during service production (Kumar, 1999). The ongoing interaction in the life after 
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the purchase is more prevalent in services settings. However, few research studies on service 
sourcing have investigated how the purchased business services should be governed after the 
sourcing decision, during the ongoing interaction processes between buyer and supplier 
(Wynstra et al., 2006).  
 
In this research study, we investigate business services exchange governance after the 
sourcing decision. In general, two types of governance strategies have been studied (Griffith 
and Myers, 2005): contractual and relational governance strategies. These two types of 
governance strategies are generally studied separately rather than within an integrated 
framework (Carson et al., 2006; Luo, 2002). In most of these studies, contractual governance 
is usually considered as an one-dimensional construct, although more recent research shows 
that contractual governance can be better described by two dimensions to study contracts 
(Battigalli and Maggi, 2002) and their interaction with relational governance (Luo, 2002), that 
is contract detail and contract flexibility. To the best of our knowledge, no other research 
study has addressed the economic antecedents that might influence the two-dimensional 
construct of contractual governance. Previous research has indicated that economic 
antecedents, i.e. asset specificity and uncertainty, are influenced by service specific 
characteristics (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). In this research study, we focus on business 
services settings to address this research gap: we investigate the influence of economic 
antecedents on contractual governance (measured by two dimensions) and on relational 
governance and the impact of both on performance outcomes.   
 
The next section of the paper discusses the governance mechanisms for business services 
exchanges and the incorporated antecedents. We then develop hypotheses regarding the 
impact of antecedents and governance mechanisms on performance outcomes. Afterwards, 
the research method and data collection procedure are described. The proposed relationships 
are analyzed using data out of a specific business services setting. Finally, the results are 
discussed, along with some managerial implications and directions for future research.  
 
4.03 Conceptual Background 
Governance of transactions has been the focus of the Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
theory described by Williamson (1979). Transactions are defined as the transfer of a good or a 
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service (Williamson, 1985). Based on transaction-specific attributes, the appropriate 
governance mechanism, i.e. the governance structure which minimizes the associated 
transaction costs, can be determined (Williamson, 1991). The governance mechanisms in 
TCE are originally limited to two alternate forms: market governance with the market as 
governance mechanism and hierarchy or vertical integration with the firm as governance 
mechanism (David and Han, 2004; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Afterwards, intermediate 
modes of governance termed hybrids have been proposed and their strategic importance is 
growing (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). In hybrids or bilateral governance modes, the unit 
of analysis is no longer the transaction itself, but the relationship established between supplier 
and buyer, based on the transactions taking place.  
 
(i) Exchange governance mechanisms 
In general, two types of governance strategies have been studied (Griffith and Myers, 2005): 
economic governance strategies such as contracts (Lusch and Brown, 1996) and relational 
governance strategies such as relational norms (Haugland and Reve, 1993; Heide and John, 
1992). Contracts and relational norms are considered the two common governance 
mechanisms used as building blocks for complex structures of governance (Cannon et al., 
2000). In this research study, both contractual and relational governance are included as the 
interesting questions about these governance mechanisms have less to do with their single 
effect than with their combined effect (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). Each governance 
mechanism has specific advantages and disadvantages and is not simply a substitute for the 
other (Carson et al., 2006). 
 
Contractual governance is considered a formal, legal and economic governance strategy 
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Lusch and Brown, 1996). In this research, contractual governance 
refers to explicit, formal, and usually written contracts. Contracts are binding legal 
agreements that specify the obligations and roles of both parties in the relationship. As such, 
contracts can be considered as substitutes for formal governance mechanisms of hierarchy or 
integration in business exchanges (Ferguson et al., 2005; Gundlach and Achrol, 1993; Heide, 
1994; Lusch and Brown, 1996). Several researchers have delineated the importance of 
examining contracts (Brown et al., 2006; Lusch and Brown, 1996) and suggest that if 
contracts are misused, performance outcomes and behavioural relations among buyers and 
sellers may be harmed. Previous research mainly views contractual governance as one-
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dimensional (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002), causing controversy over the role of contractual 
governance (Luo, 2002). However, contracting theory identifies two dimensions of contract 
structure (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002): the level of contract detail and the level of contract 
flexibility. Contract detail, or contract specificity, can be defined as the extent to which 
contractual agreements are used to specify roles and obligations of the parties with sufficient 
precision and detail (Cannon et al., 2000). Contract flexibility indicates the ability of parties to 
adjust their behaviour or the terms of the agreement in response to changes in the environment 
or to the changing needs of the other party (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999), also referred 
to as modification flexibility. It is the degree to which guidelines and possible solutions for 
handling various unanticipated contingencies are incorporated in the contract (Luo, 2002). 
Contract flexibility does not necessarily contradict or reduce the importance of contract detail: 
high level of contractual governance requires high levels on both dimensions (Luo, 2002). 
 
Relational governance is defined as the strength of the social norms in the exchange and has 
often been referred to as relationalism (Ferguson et al., 2005). Relational norms are defined as 
the bilateral expectations that exchange partners will act in ways that assist each other during 
the course of the relationship (Joshi and Campbell, 2003). As such, relational governance can 
be considered rather informal and social, compared to contractual governance (Achrol and 
Gundlach, 1999). Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) introduced Macneil’s (1980) relational 
contract theory and its behavioural concepts into the marketing literature on buyer-seller 
relationships.  Ever since, it is generally accepted that interfirm activities can be managed 
using relational elements or norms (Weitz and Jap, 1995; Zhang et al., 2003). The importance 
of relational norms in business services settings has been illustrated by Paulin, Perrien, and 
Ferguson (1997).  
 
(ii) Economic antecedents 
Based on TCE theory, relevant economic antecedents relate to asset specificity and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). These transaction-specific attributes will have an influence 
on the appropriate governance mechanism for a particular exchange (Williamson, 1991) and 
are related to two main assumptions of human behaviour in TCE (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997): bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality assumes that decision 
makers have limited rationality because of constraints on their cognitive capabilities. While 
decision makers may be willing to act rationally, limited information processing and 
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communication causes bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Due to the 
presence of uncertainty, bounded rationality plays a more profound role in the exchange 
setting. The second assumed human behaviour in TCE, opportunism, supposes that decision 
makers may be seeking to serve their self-interest: “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1985). This relates to behaviours such as lying, cheating or other forms of 
violating the agreement.  The extent to which specific assets support the transaction causes 
opportunism-related behavioural problems because of the increased safeguarding problem 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
 
Asset specificity is defined by Williamson (1991) as the degree to which the assets used in 
support of the transaction can be redeployed to alternative uses without sacrifice of productive 
value. Transaction specific investments can be made by either the buyer or the seller (Heide 
and John, 1990). While most studies incorporate only one of these types of asset specificity 
(Claro et al., 2003; Heide and John, 1992), both TCE theory (Williamson, 1983) and 
empirical results (Stump and Heide, 1996) indicate the relevance of both in the governance of 
interfirm exchanges. Specific investments made by the supplier are referred to as supplier 
asset specificity, while specific investments made by the buyer are referred to as buyer asset 
specificity. In general, specific investments in physical and/or human aspects are considered 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Physical asset specificity refers to investments in physical 
assets such as equipments and tools, while human asset specificity relates to those 
investments in knowledge and skills of the workforce needed to deliver the required service. 
Because of the intangible nature of services, specific investments in procedural aspects such 
as a firm’s workflow or processes should also be considered (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995).  
 
In TCE, uncertainty is mostly related to environmental or behavioural aspects (Rindfleisch 
and Heide, 1997). Environmental uncertainty is also referred to as external uncertainty, while 
behavioural uncertainty is sometimes called internal uncertainty (Cannon et al., 2000). The 
research overview of David and Han (2004) reveals that the most common form of 
uncertainty studied is environmental uncertainty, while behavioural uncertainty is less 
frequently investigated. However, when behavioural uncertainty is excluded in a particular 
research study, environmental uncertainty can incorrectly capture some of the effects of 
behavioural uncertainty (Carson et al., 2006). Environmental uncertainty refers to the 
unpredictability of the environment or the inability to predict changes in the external 
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environment (Joshi and Stump, 1999). This type of uncertainty relates to unanticipated 
changes in relevant factors surrounding the exchange (Noordewier et al., 1990), with market 
conditions, price (Pilling et al., 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), and technology 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998) as the most frequently occurring (David and 
Han, 2004). Behavioural uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of the exchange partner’s 
behaviour. This type of uncertainty encompasses the difficulty to evaluate the service 
delivered, to determine product or service standards and to render objective assessments 
(Cannon et al., 2000). Because of the relatively more people-oriented and less tangible 
character of services, behavioural uncertainty is supposed to have a more profound impact in 
business services settings than in manufacturing settings (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003).  
 
4.04 Hypotheses 
In this research study, we want to investigate the “life after the purchase” (Wynstra et al., 
2006) for business services exchanges: how should purchased business services be governed 
after the purchase and during the interaction. Buyer-seller exchanges in business services 
markets are governed through both formal and informal agreements (Ivens, 2005) and the use 
of contracting for service delivery is extensive and rising (Dean and Kiu, 2002). Explicit, 
written contracts between buyer and seller are established in the commitment stage (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994). During the execution of the contract, the content of the contract mainly 
remains unchanged until the next negotiation phase (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Relational 
governance emerges from the values and agreed-upon processes found in the relationship and 
further develops within the relationship (Macneil, 1980; 1983). Thus, at a certain point in the 
life after the purchase, the contract has been established ex ante and relational governance 
continues to develop over time. The contract serves as an ex ante framework and is related to 
the structure of the exchange, while relational governance relates to the process of the 
exchange (Luo, 2002). In this study we develop hypotheses for business services exchanges 
related to the life after the purchase, during the process of the exchange. The hypothesized 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure IV-1: Business services exchange governance model 
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Performance outcomes of exchange governance   
While certain researchers claim that contracts may be detrimental to the development of 
relational behaviour, others state that contractual and relational governance are complements 
and should be considered simultaneously (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
Based on TCE and contract theory, the established contract limits the possibilities for 
opportunistic behaviour (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Explicit contracts formally state how parties 
to the contract should behave over time (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Moreover, the punishments 
specified in the contract reduce the short-time gains of opportunistic behaviour and heighten 
the gains from cooperative behaviour (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In a business service 
exchange, Ivens (2005) states that more formal and detailed contracts between buyer and 
seller increase the likelihood that relational behaviour is performed. Thus, well-specified 
contracts reduce the gains of short-term opportunism through incentives or punishments, 
thereby increasing the value of honouring more informal dealings such as relational 
governance (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Similarly, flexible contracts 
also increase the likelihood that relational behaviour is performed. Higher contract flexibility 
attenuates potential hazards such as the threats from uncertain future conditions and because 
                                                 
a
 SAS: Supplier Asset Specificity; BAS: Buyer Asset Specificity; EnvUnc: Environmental Uncertainty;  
BehUnc: Behavioural Uncertainty; Cdeta: Contract detail; Cflex: Contract flexibility;  
RelGov: Relational Governance; Perf: Performance; Rellength: Relationship length 
H2c(+) 
Cdeta 
 
RelGov Perf 
Rellength BehUnc 
BAS 
EnvUnc SAS H1a(+) 
H2a(+) 
H2b(+) 
H3a(+) 
H5a(+) 
H7(-) 
H4b(+) 
H3b(-) 
H6a(-) 
H6b(-) 
Cflex 
 
H1b(+) 
H4a(+) 
H5b(+) 
H8(+) 
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of these attenuated hazards, relational behaviour is enhanced (Luo, 2002). Therefore, we 
propose that both contract detail and contract flexibility will increase the occurrence of 
relational behaviour between the exchange partners.  
H1a:  Contract detail is positively related to relational governance. 
H1b:  Contract flexibility is positively related to relational governance. 
 
When both governance mechanisms are used simultaneously, advantage can be taken of their 
combined impact on business exchanges and performance outcomes (Brown et al., 2000; 
Weitz and Jap, 1995). While assuming a complementary link between contracts and relational 
governance (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), in this research study we focus 
on the different impact of each governance mechanism on performance: each has unique 
properties in stimulating the performance of business services exchanges (Luo, 2002). Taking 
into account the complementary relationship between both governance mechanisms, 
contractual and relational governance are both assumed to have a positive impact on 
performance outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), also in a business services setting. For 
contractual governance, the two dimensions are assumed to be positively related to 
performance outcomes. High levels of contract detail make it more difficult for the supplier to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour, resulting in higher performance outcomes of the exchange 
(Gainey and Klaas, 2003). As a flexible contract provides a framework that enables the 
exchange partners to easily modify the contract when needs are changing, flexible contracts 
are the key to improved outcomes (Harris et al., 1998). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2a:  Contract detail is positively related to performance outcomes. 
H2b:  Contract flexibility is positively related to performance outcomes. 
H2c:  Relational governance is positively related to performance outcomes. 
 
(ii) Economic antecedents of exchange governance 
TCE theory suggests that a higher degree of asset specificity, that is higher investments 
dedicated to a particular buyer and whose redeployment involves considerable switching 
costs, requires greater safeguards against opportunistic behaviour in the exchange (David and 
Han, 2004). Contracts have been established ex ante and can be considered as the first 
safeguard against opportunism. The higher the asset specificity, the more complex the 
established contracts (Dyer, 1997) and the more long-term contracts will be preferred (Aubert 
et al., 1996; Joskow, 1987). Complex contracts containing remedies for anticipated 
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contingencies (contract detail) and for unanticipated contingencies (contract flexibility) are 
crafted to better safeguard the investor of specific investments against opportunism (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). When asset specificity increases, transaction costs are presumed to 
increase (Williamson, 1985), but by establishing more complex contracts certain costs 
associated with asset specificity will be attenuated (Dyer, 1997). For example, more complex 
contracts eliminate or at least attenuate the need for profit bargaining related to transaction-
specific assets (Dyer, 1997). In the life before the purchase, firms may often recognize that 
asset specificity can make them vulnerable to opportunism and to limit this risk, they take 
proactive steps by establishing high levels of contractual governance (Gainey and Klaas, 
2003). However, when environmental uncertainty is high, it is hard to determine ex ante how 
to react to unforeseen changes and it will be harder to stipulate ex ante detailed formal 
agreements between exchange partners (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In other words, higher 
levels of environmental uncertainty increase the costs of establishing detailed contractual 
agreements. Faced with this environmental uncertainty, the exchange partners may prefer to 
remain flexible in the relationship (Gundlach and Achrol, 1993) and as such resist governance 
mechanisms that result in greater contract detail, while preferring more contract flexibility. 
Thus, contract detail will be a less effective mean to safeguard past and future specific 
investments and to deal with opportunism in highly uncertain environments. On the other 
hand, environmental uncertainty necessitates higher flexibility in contracts to deal with 
changing circumstances (Harris et al., 1998), especially when transaction specific investments 
have been made. Therefore, we hypothesize that environmental uncertainty has a negative 
moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset specificity and contract detail and 
a positive moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset specificity and contract 
flexibility.  
H3a:  Supplier asset specificity is positively related to contract detail. 
H3b:  Environmental uncertainty attenuates the positive effect of supplier asset 
specificity on contract detail (negative moderating effect)  
H4a: Supplier asset specificity is positively related to contract flexibility.  
H4b: Environmental uncertainty enhances the positive effect of supplier asset 
specificity on contract flexibility (positive moderating effect).  
 
Previous research has assumed a positive relationship between asset specificity and relational 
governance based on TCE theory: asset specificity increases switching costs and relational 
governance is enhanced as a safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Although contractual 
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governance is used as an ex-ante established safeguard against opportunism, additional 
mechanisms such as relational governance might be needed to protect the transaction-specific 
investments made after the purchase because of limited information processing and bounded 
rationality. However, with increasing levels of environmental uncertainty, bounded rationality 
plays a more profound role in the exchange setting. Contract detail is a less efficient 
governance mechanism to protect against opportunism caused by asset specificity in highly 
uncertain environments and therefore other governance mechanisms should be further 
enhanced. If relational governance is increased, adaptations to changes in the environment can 
be carried out more readily (Heide and John, 1990) and efficiencies for both exchange 
partners are enhanced (Claro et al., 2003). Therefore, we posit that environmental uncertainty 
has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset specificity and 
relational governance: in settings with high environmental uncertainty, supplier asset 
specificity further increases relational governance. 
H5a:  Supplier asset specificity is positively related to relational governance. 
H5b:  Environmental uncertainty enhances the positive effect of supplier asset 
specificity on relational governance (positive moderating effect). 
 
Next to supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty will 
also influence business services exchange governance. Behavioural uncertainty causes ex ante 
information asymmetry because of the inability to determine a party’s true characteristics 
prior to the exchange (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Therefore, when behavioural uncertainty 
increases, it might be harder to determine ex ante which monitoring practices should be 
incorporated in the contract or to stipulate ex ante contractual obligations for each exchange 
partner, especially in business services exchanges. More problems related to monitoring the 
exchange partner’s performance will arise because of their intangibility, simultaneity and 
people-oriented character (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Where 
greater uncertainty exists about the evaluation and monitoring of performance, parties must 
generally avoid details in the development of contracts (Gainey and Klaas, 2003). 
Behavioural uncertainty also causes ex-post difficulties in business services settings because 
of information asymmetry regarding task performance (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). When 
behavioural uncertainty increases and performance of the exchange partner is hard to 
evaluate, relational governance is difficult to develop (Heide and Miner, 1992). Behavioural 
uncertainty makes it unclear whether a bad service performance is caused by the other party 
or whether the cause is beyond the other party’s control. If you give the other party the benefit 
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of the doubt, the road to exploitation is open. If you consider it a fault of the other party, a 
spiral of joint retaliation is created (Heide and Miner, 1992). In either way, behavioural 
uncertainty has a negative impact on the exchange relationship. If behavioural uncertainty is 
high, parties can engage in opportunism without being caught or cooperative actions can be 
incorrectly sanctioned as opportunism, reducing incentive for cooperative actions and 
decreasing the level of relational governance (Carson et al., 2006). Similarly, high levels of 
behavioural uncertainty make it difficult to determine whether or not the stipulations in the 
contract have resulted in the requested performance. As a result, if behavioural uncertainty is 
high, it is hard to evaluate whether or not those contractual stipulations should be changed to 
fulfil the customers’ needs. If the delivered service is incorrectly evaluated as not fulfilling 
customers’ needs because of high behavioural uncertainty, the agreed stipulations in the 
contract could be changed in the wrong way, deteriorating the performance of subsequent 
service delivery. Higher levels of behavioural uncertainty complicate the use of contract 
flexibility, resulting in less flexibility incorporated in the ex ante established contract.  As a 
consequence, we hypothesize: 
H6a:  Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to contract detail. 
H6b:  Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to contract flexibility. 
H7:  Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to relational governance. 
 
Next to supplier asset specificity, specific investments can also be made by the other partner 
to the exchange, referred to as buyer asset specificity. Based on TCE theory, these 
investments serve as a credible commitment in the relationship and are supposed to protect 
the specific investments of the other exchange party (Williamson, 1983). Buyer asset 
specificity tends to lower the need for safeguards against opportunism (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995), due to the credible threat of losing the investments made (Joshi and 
Stump, 1999). Based on TCE theory, we propose in hypothesis 3 (contract detail) and 
hypothesis 4 (contract flexibility) that contractual agreements contain remedies for anticipated 
contingencies to safeguard against opportunism caused by supplier asset specificity (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Because the statements in the contract are established for each party to the 
exchange, not only the supplier’s but also the buyer’s specific investments made will be 
protected by the contract. For example, the longer the term of the contract, the more both 
supplier and buyer specific investments will be protected (Joskow, 1987). As a consequence, 
buyer asset specificity does not increase the need for contractual governance. On the other 
hand, Heide and John (1990) argue that specific assets do not have the characteristics of a 
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good safeguard against opportunism because these are valued more highly by the giver than 
the taker. Consequently, the effects of supplier and buyer asset specificity are both enhancing 
and not attenuating the need for exchange governance: specific investments of both buyer and 
supplier increase the level of relational governance (Heide and John, 1990). As neither 
exchange party is able to turn to another exchange relationship due to the specific 
investments, both parties are willing to develop relational governance to assure cooperation in 
the future (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Therefore, we propose: 
H8:  Buyer asset specificity is positively related to relational governance. 
 
4.05 Research Method 
(i) Data collection 
The research study was set up in cooperation with some major security services companies. 
Because business services differ on the level of tangibility and people-oriented character we 
chose to limit our investigation to buyers of a specific kind of services, that is security 
services, delivered by several suppliers to exclude possible effects of service-specific 
variables. Security services belong to facility services, an important part of the business 
services sector (Lehtonen and Salonen, 2005). In this business services setting, almost all 
relationships between buyer and supplier rely to some extent on both formal contracts and 
relational mechanism.  However, for both security suppliers and their buyers it is unclear how 
transaction characteristics can influence the contractual agreement and how this formal 
agreement can influence the course of the relationship in the life after the purchase. In this 
research, we investigate the governance of the relationship between the security services 
provider and the buying organization, taking into account both contractual and relational 
issues. The security services performed relate to the supervision and protection of (im)mobile 
goods belonging to the customer. Some typical examples of the security services delivered are 
reception services and access control. 
 
Before the questionnaires were sent to the buying organizations, a number of customers were 
interviewed to investigate the relevance of our research and the constructs incorporated. The 
interviewees were selected based on their experience with security services and several types 
of security services like reception services and access control were covered across the 
interviews. Next, a first draft of the questionnaire was developed and pre-tested within 
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another group of buying organizations. About 21 business customers filled in the 
questionnaire. Based on the analyses of the pre-test results, the questionnaire was adjusted 
when necessary. Finally, the questionnaire was sent to the manager responsible for the 
security services at the buying organizations. In total, about 464 surveys were sent. 
Completed surveys were received from 124 buying organizations (a response rate of 27%). 
Approximately half of the respondents’ firms belong to the manufacturing sector. The size of 
the buying organization is expressed as the number of staff in terms of full time equivalents 
(FTE). Analyses indicate that small (FTE<250), medium, and big (FTE>3000) companies are 
represented in this research study.  
 
(ii) Measures 
To test the hypotheses, a number of constructs were incorporated in the empirical study. The 
measures used are mainly derived for transaction cost and relational exchange theory, as 
described below. The measurement items, rated by the buying organization, are illustrated in 
the appendix (Appendix B). Table 1 gives an overview of the main constructs and their 
correlations. 
 
Table IV-1: Correlation Matrix 
a
 
b
 
 SAS BAS EnvUnc BehUnc Cdeta Cflex RelGov Perf
SAS 0.71
BAS 0.31** 0.71
EnvUnc -0.05 0.02 0.76
BehUnc -0.44** -0.04 0.03 0.80
Cdeta 0.31** 0.16 -0.10 -0.31** 0.91
Cflex 0.34** 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 0.41** 0.90
RelGov 0.52** 0.30** -0.17 -0.40** 0.53** 0.43** 0.80
Perf 0.52** 0.12 -0.10 -0.46** 0.37** 0.43** 0.66** 0.76
Mean 4.48 4.45 3.79 3.73 4.86 5.12 5.42 5.02
stdev 1.11 1.39 1.06 1.30 1.37 1.40 1.09 1.17  
 
Supplier asset specificity. In this research, the five items of supplier asset specificity (SAS) 
represent specific investments in physical, human and procedural aspects.  The scaling of 
supplier asset specificity is based on items previously used in the research of Buvik and 
                                                 
a
 Square root of AVE on diagonal 
b
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Gronhaug (2000), Stump and Heide (1996), and Claro, Hagelaar, and Omta (2003). The items 
(e.g., Our supplier has to a great extent adjusted the service offering to the procedures of our 
organization) were measured on seven-point rating scale ranging from one “completely 
disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. 
 
Buyer asset specificity. In this research, the scaling of buyer asset specificity (BAS) is based 
on items previously used in the research of Heide and John (1992) and Klein, Frazier, and 
Roth (1990). The six items of buyer asset specificity (e.g., Our organization has made 
significant investments in technology so that this supplier can deliver the requested service) 
were measured on seven-point rating scale ranging from one “completely disagree”, to seven 
“completely agree” and represent specific investments in physical, human, and procedural 
aspects. 
 
Environmental uncertainty. The scaling to measure environmental uncertainty (EnvUnc) is 
not uniform across research studies. In this research study, the scaling of environmental 
uncertainty is based on three items reflecting the unpredictability of the market, technology 
(Buvik and Gronhaug, 2000), and price (Pilling et al., 1994). These items (e.g., Market 
conditions of our supplier are very unstable) were measured on seven-point rating scale 
ranging from one “completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. 
 
Behavioural uncertainty. The scaling of behavioural uncertainty (BehUnc) is based on the 
research of Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000). In this research, behavioural uncertainty is 
measured in terms of four items and these items (e.g., Some aspects of the supplier’s service 
delivery are difficult to evaluate objectively) were rated on seven-point rating scale ranging 
from one “completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. 
 
Contractual governance. In this research, contractual governance consists of contract detail 
and contract flexibility. The scaling of contract detail (Cdeta) is based on the research of 
Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000). The three items (e.g., With this supplier we have a 
specific, well-detailed formal agreement) were measured on seven-point rating scale ranging 
from one “completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. The scaling of contract 
flexibility (Cflex) is based on the research of Harris, Giunipero, and Hult (1998). The two 
items (e.g., The written, formal agreement with this supplier can be easily adapted to 
changing circumstances) were measured on seven-point rating scale ranging from one 
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“completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. Both the convergent and discriminant 
aspects of the two-dimensional contractual governance construct have been validated in 
previous research (Luo, 2002). 
  
Relational governance. Relational governance (RelGov) is conceptualized using the 
relational exchange norm theory of Macneil (1980). The scaling of relational governance is 
based on the research of Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron (2005). The nine items reflect the 
relational norms of solidarity, harmonization of conflict, flexibility and information exchange. 
The items (e.g., It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that 
may affect the other party) were measured on seven-point rating scale ranging from one 
“completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. 
 
Performance. Customer-based evaluation of exchange performance in services (Perf) 
generally includes multiple facets such as overall customer satisfaction, willingness to 
recommend, and future purchase intentions such as likelihood to renew the contract and 
likelihood to increase patronage (Ferguson et al., 2005). The scaling of performance is based 
on items previously used in research of Cannon and Perreault (1999), Eggert and Ulaga 
(2002), Bolton, Smith, and Wagner (2003), and Jones and Suh (2000). The five items (e.g., 
We will recommend this supplier to other purchasing managers) were measured on seven-
point rating scale ranging from one “completely disagree”, to seven “completely agree”. 
 
Control variables. Next to economic and social antecedents, a number of other characteristics 
of the buying situation can influence the buyer-supplier relationship. Previous research on 
buyer-supplier relationships in business markets has suggested the relationship length 
between exchange partners as control variable (Cannon et al., 2000; Claro et al., 2003; 
Ferguson et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this research, relationship length 
(Rellength) is measured as how long the buying organization has been a customer of the 
supplying organization expressed in number of years (open ended question). 
 
4.06 Analyses and Results 
To assess construct validity and test the hypotheses, Partial Least Squares (PLS) appeared the 
most appropriate technique based on the properties of the data at hand. PLS makes no 
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distributional assumptions and has lower sample size requirements than other structural 
equation modelling techniques (Chin, 1998). The program used for these analyses is 
SmartPLS Version 2.0.M3 developed by Ringle, Wende, and Will (2005) of the University of 
Hamburg (Germany). While PLS is the most appropriate technique for testing the hypotheses, 
this method is variance-based and prediction-oriented. As a consequence, no proper overall 
goodness-of-fit measures are reported (Hulland, 1999). Moreover, measurement error is not 
modelled and component loadings tend to be overestimated while path coefficients tend to be 
underestimated (Chin, 1998). PLS software estimates both factor loadings and structural paths 
simultaneously (Chin, 1998). We follow a two-step approach based on Hulland (1999). First, 
the measurement model is evaluated to assess construct validity. Then, the hypotheses are 
tested by evaluating the structural model.  
 
(i) Construct validity 
To assess the reliability and validity of the measurements used, the measurement model is 
evaluated in PLS. The adequacy of the measurement model is assessed by examining 
individual item reliabilities and by evaluating convergent and discriminant validity. First, 
individual item reliabilities are assessed by examining the factor loadings of all items on their 
respective constructs. As a rule of thumb, each factor loading should be greater than 0.707 in 
order to share more variance with the component score than with error variance, (Chin, 1998). 
However, loadings of 0.50 or 0.60 are also acceptable if additional indicators exist in the 
block for comparison basis (Chin, 1998). In our research, only one item, loading on the 
construct of environmental uncertainty (i.e., environmental uncertainty related to technology – 
item envunc3), had to be removed because of low factor loading (loading of 0.21). All the 
other items have a significant factor loading on their respective construct and thus 
demonstrate a good level of item reliability, as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Next, composite reliability and average variance extracted are computed to assess convergent 
validity of the different constructs. Composite reliability (CR) is similar to Cronbach’s alpha 
and can be computed using the internal consistency measure developed by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981). In this study, CR of each construct is between 0.72 and 0.94, thus above the 
threshold value of 0.70 suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 2). Average variance 
extracted (AVE) of a construct is the average variance shared between that construct and its 
items. Based on Fornell and Larcker (1981), AVE should be higher than 0.50, indicating that 
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at least 50% of measurement variance is captured by the construct. In this study, AVE of each 
construct is between 0.50 and 0.82, thus equal to or above the threshold value of 0.50 (Table 
2). 
 
Table IV-2: Assessment of measurement model 
SAS sas1 0.72
sas2 0.79
sas3 0.71
sas4 0.51
sas5 0.78
BAS bas1 0.67
bas2 0.71
bas3 0.79
bas4 0.63
bas5 0.77
bas6 0.70
EnvUnc envunc1 0.94
envunc2 0.53
BehUnc behunc1 0.93
behunc2 0.95
behunc3 0.71
behunc4 0.56
Cdeta condeta1 0.93
condeta2 0.93
condeta3 0.86
Cflex conflex1 0.88
conflex2 0.92
RelGov relgov1 0.88
relgov2 0.90
relgov3 0.63
relgov4 0.78
relgov5 0.80
relgov6 0.79
relgov7 0.86
relgov8 0.78
relgov9 0.79
Perf perf1 0.89
perf2 0.85
perf3 0.80
perf4 0.52
perf5 0.66
Construct Items Loading
Composite 
Reliability
Cronbach 
alpha
Average Variance 
Extracted
0.83 0.76 0.50
0.86 0.82 0.51
0.72 --- 0.58
0.87 0.81 0.64
0.87 0.81 0.57
0.90
0.93 0.89 0.82
0.94 0.93 0.64
--- 0.81
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Finally, discriminant validity of the different constructs is examined by means of AVE as 
suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). This test compares the correlation between any two 
constructs and the root-squared AVE of these two constructs. To have discriminant validity, 
the correlation should be smaller than the average of the two root-squared AVEs, indicating 
that the variance shared between any two constructs is lower than the AVE by the constructs. 
The results of the discriminant validity analysis are displayed in Table 1 with the correlations 
below the diagonal and the square roots of AVE on the diagonal. In this study, there is no 
correlation between any two latent constructs larger than or even equal to the square root of 
AVEs. Consequently, discriminant validity is supported and confidence is gained that all 
constructs in the model are indeed measuring different concepts. 
 
(ii) Hypotheses testing 
After assuring the reliability and validity of the constructs incorporated in the model, the 
hypotheses are tested by evaluating the structural model in PLS. To investigate the interaction 
effect of environmental uncertainty in PLS, we use the methodology assessed by Monte Carlo 
simulations (Chin et al., 2003). First, the indicator values are standardized and then product 
indicators are created by multiplying the indicators from the predictor and moderator 
variables. These product indicators reflect the latent interaction variable (Chin et al., 2003). 
The assessed relationships and their path coefficient with corresponding significance are 
reported in Table 3. We report one-tailed p-values for a priori directional hypotheses below. 
The R² values (variance explained) of the dependent constructs are fairly high with values of 
0.32 for contract detail, 0.33 for contract flexibility, 0.46 for relational governance, and 0.54 
for performance outcomes. 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) states that in business services exchanges the level of contractual 
governance is positively related to the level of relational governance. The analyses reveal 
different results for the two dimensions of contractual governance: contract detail and contract 
flexibility. The impact of contract detail on relational governance is positive and significant 
(=0.16; p<0.01) (H1a), but contract flexibility is not significantly related to relational 
governance (p>0.05) (H1b). Thus, we find support for H1a, but no support for H1b. 
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Table IV-3: Hypotheses testing 
a
 
                     Path Coefficient Hypotheses
         Cdeta -> RelGov 0.16** H1a supported
         Cflex -> RelGov 0.13 H1b not supported
           Cdeta -> Perf 0.04 H2a not supported
           Cflex -> Perf 0.16** H2b supported
          RelGov -> Perf 0.62*** H2c supported
          SAS -> Cdeta 0.24*** H3a supported
         EnvUnc -> Cdeta -0.21*
 SAS * EnvUnc -> Cdeta 0.33
          SAS -> Cflex 0.30*** H4a supported
         EnvUnc -> Cflex -0.11
 SAS * EnvUnc -> Cflex 0.36***
SAS -> RelGov 0.29** H5a supported
        EnvUnc -> RelGov -0.15
SAS * EnvUnc -> RelGov -0.08
         BehUnc -> Cdeta -0.21** H6a supported
         BehUnc -> Cflex 0.01
    BAS * BehUnc -> Cflex 0.27***
        BehUnc -> RelGov -0.20** H7 supported
             BAS -> Cdeta 0.12
             BAS -> Cflex -0.01
            BAS -> RelGov 0.13*
       Rellength -> Perf 0.16**
H3b not supported
H4b supported
H5b not supported
H8 supported
H6b partially supported
 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) states that both the level of contractual governance (a, b) and the 
level of relational governance (c) are positively related to performance outcomes. Again, we 
find discrepant results for the two dimensions of contractual governance. Contract flexibility 
has a significant and positive impact on performance (=0.16; p<0.01) (H2b), while contract 
detail is not significantly related to performance (p>0.05) (H2a). On the other hand, relational 
governance is positively related to performance outcomes (=0.62; p<0.001) (H2c). Thus, we 
find support for H2b and H2c, but no support for H2a.  
 
The third hypothesis (H3) states a positive impact of supplier asset specificity on contract 
detail (a) and this positive impact will be attenuated with increasing levels of environmental 
uncertainty (negative moderating effect) (b). The analyses reveal that supplier asset specificity 
does have a positive and significant impact on contract detail (=0.24; p<0.001) (H3a). 
                                                 
a
 * p<0.05 (one-tailed); ** p<0.01 (one-tailed); *** p<0.001 (one tailed) 
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However, the interaction effect of supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty on 
contract detail is not significant (p>0.05) (H3b). Instead, environmental uncertainty has a 
direct negative impact on contract detail (= - 0.21; p<0.05). Thus, we find support for H3a, 
but no support for H3b. 
 
The fourth hypothesis (H4) states a positive impact of supplier asset specificity on contract 
flexibility (a) and this positive impact will be enhanced with increasing levels of 
environmental uncertainty (positive moderating effect) (b). The results reveal that supplier 
asset specificity has a positive and significant impact on contract flexibility (=0.30; p<0.001) 
(H4a). The interaction effect of supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty on 
contract flexibility is also significant and positive (=0.36; p<0.001) (H4b): supplier asset 
specificity has a more profound impact on contract flexibility in highly uncertain 
environments (Figure 2). Thus, we find support for H4a and for H4b. 
 
Figure IV-2: Interaction effect of supplier asset specificity and environmental 
uncertainty 
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The fifth hypothesis (H5) states that supplier asset specificity has a positive impact on 
relational governance (a) and this positive impact will be enhanced with increasing levels of 
Chapter IV 
 102 
environmental uncertainty (positive moderating effect) (b). The results indicate that supplier 
asset specificity is indeed positively and significantly related to relational governance 
(=0.29; p<0.01), providing support for H5a. However, neither environmental uncertainty 
(p>0.05) nor the interaction effect of supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty 
(p>0.05) has a significant impact on relational governance. In this study, H5b is not 
supported.  
 
The sixth hypothesis (H6) states that behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to 
contractual governance. Again, we find discrepant results for contract detail and contract 
flexibility. Behavioural uncertainty is negatively and significantly related to contract detail 
(= - 0.21; p<0.01) (H6a) but the relationship between behavioural uncertainty and contract 
flexibility is not significant (p>0.05) (H6b). On the other hand, the results indicate that the 
interaction effect between behavioural uncertainty and buyer asset specificity on contract 
flexibility is significant (=0.27; p<0.001). Behavioural uncertainty only has a negative 
impact on contract flexibility with low levels of buyer asset specificity. When the level of 
buyer asset specificity is high, behavioural uncertainty has no impact on contract flexibility 
(Figure 3). Thus, H6a is supported but H6b is only supported with low levels of buyer asset 
specificity. 
 
The last two hypothesis state that behavioural uncertainty has a negative impact on relational 
governance (H7) and that buyer asset specificity is positively related to relational governance 
(H8). The results indicate that behavioural uncertainty is negatively and significantly related 
to relational governance (= - 0.20; p<0.01) and buyer asset specificity has a significant 
impact on relational governance (=0.13; p<0.05), providing support for both H7 and H8. The 
results also indicate that relationship length is a significant control variable for performance in 
the model (=0.16; p<0.01). 
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Figure IV-3: Interaction effect of behavioural uncertainty and buyer asset specificity 
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4.07 Discussion 
The written, formal agreement between service supplier and buying organization plays an 
important role in the governance of business services exchanges. Contracts are not only used 
to establish business relationships (Roxenhall and Ghauri, 2004); these formal agreements 
also have an impact on the buyer-seller relationship after the sourcing decision by influencing 
service exchange governance and the performance outcomes. The results of this study are in 
accordance with the complementarity view on contracting and relational issues (Lazzarini et 
al., 2004): the establishment of the contract facilitates the development of relational 
governance and both contractual and relational governance have a positive impact on 
performance outcomes. However, considering contractual governance as a two-dimensional 
construct reveals a difference in the impact of contract detail and the impact of contract 
flexibility on business services exchange governance. The level of contract detail is only 
indirectly related to performance outcomes through a positive impact on relational 
governance. Contract detail relates to the detailed roles and obligations of the parties specified 
in the contract and these are at the basis of developing common values and norms. Because of 
the details on roles and obligations in the contract, relational governance is enhanced and 
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mediates the impact of contract detail on performance outcomes. On the other hand, the level 
of contract flexibility is unrelated to relational governance, but directly related to performance 
outcomes.  In this research study, contract flexibility means modification flexibility: the 
ability to adjust the terms of the agreement. When the terms of the contract can be adjusted to 
include additional needs or to better comply with current needs (high contract flexibility), the 
customer will evaluate the exchange in a more positive way as service delivery will better 
meet customer’s expectations.  
 
Transaction-specific investments made by the supplier, that is supplier asset specificity, 
directly influence both contractual and relational governance. Higher levels of supplier asset 
specificity relate to higher levels of relational governance, contract detail, and contract 
flexibility. Only the impact on the latter is positively moderated by environmental 
uncertainty: the impact of supplier asset specificity on contract flexibility will be higher with 
higher levels of environmental uncertainty. When environmental uncertainty increases, more 
flexibility in the contract is needed to include changes in the environment. More contract 
flexibility in highly uncertain environments also assures the supplier of continuity of the 
established relationship and as a consequence safeguards the specific investments made by the 
supplier against possible relationship termination because of changes in the environment.  
On the other hand, transaction-specific investments made by the buyer, that is buyer asset 
specificity, only have a direct impact on relational governance. Buyer asset specificity is not 
directly related to contractual governance. As assumed, safeguards for specific investments 
made by the supplier included in the contract will also protect the buyer against opportunistic 
behaviour when transaction-specific investments are made. In conclusion, both buyer asset 
specificity and supplier asset specificity positively influence relational governance, but only 
supplier asset specificity has a direct impact on contract detail and on contract flexibility, 
especially in highly uncertain environments.  
 
Because of the people-oriented and less tangible character of services, behavioural uncertainty 
is assumed to have a more profound impact in business services exchanges (Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). In this research study in a security services setting, 
behavioural uncertainty has a direct impact on both contractual and relational governance. As 
hypothesized, higher levels of behavioural uncertainty implies lower levels of contract detail 
and relational governance. However, the hypothesized negative impact of behavioural 
uncertainty on contract flexibility appeared not overall significant. The hypothesized negative 
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relationship between behavioural uncertainty and contract flexibility only holds for lower 
levels of buyer asset specificity. In-depth analyses indicate that buyer asset specificity has a 
positive moderating effect on the negative relationship between behavioural uncertainty and 
contract flexibility: with increased levels of buyer asset specificity, the negative impact 
becomes smaller. Increasing levels of behavioural uncertainty imply more problems with 
monitoring of the performance and with the evaluation of changes needed to improve 
performance. As a consequence, the supplying organization will prefer less contract flexibility 
to diminish possible misuse of the flexible contract. On the contrary, when buyer asset 
specificity is high, the buying organization will prefer more contract flexibility to assure that 
the contract can be changed when needed and as such safeguard its investments by 
maintaining the current relationship. This positive influence of buyer asset specificity will 
attenuate the negative impact of behavioural uncertainty on contract flexibility, thus resulting 
in a positive moderating effect of buyer asset specificity.  
While behavioural uncertainty influences both contractual and relational governance, 
environmental uncertainty only has an influence on contractual governance. The hypothesized 
moderating effect of environmental uncertainty on relational governance is not significant: 
higher levels of supplier asset specificity imply higher levels of relational governance 
irrespective of the level of environmental uncertainty. The impact of environmental 
uncertainty is different for the two dimensions of contractual governance. Environmental 
uncertainty has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between supplier asset 
specificity and contract flexibility but is directly and negatively related to contract detail, 
contrary to the moderating effect assumed in TCE theory. In highly uncertain environments, 
and apart from the level of supplier asset specificity, less detail on roles and obligations of the 
partners will be included in the contract because of increased bounded rationality. 
Environmental uncertainty increases the ex ante costs of establishing a contract and 
specifying the roles of each exchange partner, resulting in lower levels of detail in the 
contract. Whether or not contract detail is needed to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour 
caused by transaction-specific investments, higher environmental uncertainty will decrease 
the level of contract detail. When taking into account the full model, we remark that the level 
of contract detail can still increase in highly uncertain environments, because of the stronger 
and positive relationship between supplier asset specificity and contract detail. 
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(i) Limitations and directions for future research 
Although the model investigated in this research study incorporates a large number of related 
constructs, a number of other aspects could be incorporated in future research as well. 
Including social antecedents such as trust, in addition to economic antecedents, will further 
enhance our understanding of exchange governance in business services settings (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). Moreover, the impact of economic antecedents on exchange governance 
mechanisms can be influenced by interorganizational contingencies such as power 
asymmetries in the buyer-supplier relationships (Sheng, Brown, Nicholson and Poppo, 2006). 
Contract flexibility is here limited to modification flexibility, but termination flexibility is 
another part of contract flexibility (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). While the focus in 
this study is on contractual and relational governance mechanisms, other coordination 
mechanisms such as strategic alliances, (joint) ownership or network governance can 
influence the buyer-supplier interaction. In this research, performance is based on customer-
based evaluations of the service delivered, but more objective ways of measuring performance 
such as sales volume or profit should be included in future studies. Including data from both 
the supplier and buyer side, that is dyadic data, could provide more insight on the underlying 
reasons for certain relationships found. Moreover, as differences in transaction characteristics 
may affect the relationships under consideration (Gainey and Klaas, 2003; Williamson, 1996), 
the impact of contractual and relational governance on performance outcomes should be 
investigated in other business services segments such as consulting services or advertising. 
While in this research study business services exchange governance is investigated at a certain 
point in the life after the purchase, interfirm relationships should be considered as a 
developmental process in a longitudinal sense (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This also means 
that recursive relationships between the incorporated constructs can occur over time. 
 
(ii) Managerial implications 
In most business services settings, contracts are used to establish the buyer-seller relationship, 
but the initial agreements are not used to govern the relationship. This research study indicates 
that a well-established contract can improve the performance of the relationship both directly 
through contract flexibility and indirectly through the development of relational governance 
based on contract detail. This implies that when writing the contract, buying and selling 
organizations should place more emphasis on roles and obligations of both parties and on how 
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the agreement can be changed to incorporate additional needs or better fulfil current needs. 
Specifying detailed roles and obligations of both partners in the contract clearly 
communicates what each exchange partner is supposed to do and what they can expect from 
the other party during the relationship. In this environment, the development of common 
values and norms is encouraged and this enables the development of relationship governance. 
Allowing for flexibility in the contract assures both parties that the conditions of the 
relationship can be changed and avoids an early termination of the contract. A mutual 
willingness to build a long-lasting relationship is needed when one asks for contract 
flexibility. Contract flexibility also is a safeguard against opportunistic behaviour caused by 
transaction-specific investments. Finally, contract flexibility can directly improve customer-
based evaluations of performance as customer’s needs might be better fulfilled when certain 
changes are made in the contract.  
 
In business services settings, suppliers and buyers should consider contract detail and contract 
flexibility to protect their transaction-specific investments. As contract detail is influenced by 
just the supplying organization, the supplier might, based on previous experience, have more 
insight than the buyer in which specific investments will be needed for a specific service ex 
ante and how these can be protected against opportunism by specifying detailed roles and 
obligations in the contract. Consequently, contract detail can be established mainly by the 
supplying organization and might be more or less standardized without strongly customizing 
the details to a particular buying organization. Conversely, contract flexibility should not only 
consider the supplying organization, but also the buying organization, taking into account the 
transaction-specific investments made by that buyer. As a result, the buyer should participate 
more in determining the right level of flexibility in the contract. 
 
Another major problem to be dealt with by managers in governing business services 
exchanges is the occurrence of behavioural uncertainty. The difficulty to monitor and evaluate 
the service delivered and to render objective assessments makes it difficult for business 
services exchange partners to establish and develop both contractual and relational 
governance.  To encourage the development of relational governance and enhance the level of 
contract detail and contract flexibility, supplying organizations should decrease performance 
ambiguity from the point of view of the buying organization. Previous research studies have 
indicated that more trust between buyer and supplier can lead to less behavioural uncertainty 
(Gao et al., 2005). Other ways to decrease behavioural uncertainty are the establishment of 
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objective assessments of performance and then monitoring and reporting on performance 
achieved on those measures. However, in business services, establishing objective 
performance measures is not always obvious. Providing more information on what, how, 
when, and where the service is delivered can also decrease behavioural uncertainty from the 
point of view of the buyer.   
 
In Figure 4, we summarize our findings for governing business service transactions. This 
scheme can be used for further theoretical development as well as for managerial guidance. In 
this governance scheme we make two important assumptions. First, we assume that there is a 
certain level of (supplier) asset specificity in the buyer-seller relationship. This assumption is 
based on TCE theory. If there is no asset specificity, market governance is the preferred 
governing mechanism instead of contractual or relational governance (David and Han, 2004; 
Williamson, 1975). Second, we assume that there is a certain level of behavioural uncertainty 
in the buyer-seller relationship. Due to the intangible nature of services and the high 
involvement of people in the exchange, a certain degree of behavioural uncertainty seems to 
occur in many business services settings (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003).  
 
Based on the governance scheme illustrated in Figure 4, business service transactions with a 
certain level of supplier asset specificity and with a certain level of behavioural uncertainty 
should be governed by both relational and contractual mechanisms. When both environmental 
uncertainty and buyer asset specificity are low, suppliers and buyers should spend attention to 
contract detail, contract flexibility, and relational governance when supplier asset specificity 
increases or when behavioural uncertainty decreases. When environmental uncertainty 
increases, more emphasis should be placed on contract flexibility to deal with unanticipated 
changes in the environment. Establishing a detailed contract ex ante will be more difficult in 
high uncertainty environments and a flexible contract allows both parties to adjust the contract 
to those changes. On the other hand, when buyer asset specificity increases, more emphasis 
should be placed on relational governance. The buyer will be more willing to develop 
relational norms to safeguard the investments from opportunistic behaviour and enhanced 
relational governance will result in positive outcomes for both parties. In a situation with high 
levels of buyer asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, both relational governance 
and contract flexibility need to be emphasized. Finally, we remark that emphasizing a 
particular governance mechanism does not completely rule out the other governance 
mechanisms under consideration.  
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Figure IV-4: Business services exchange governance scheme 
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In conclusion, this study has some important implications for both theory and management. 
First, the results indicate that the formal contract is an important governance mechanism and 
should not be considered inferior to other governance mechanisms such as relational 
governance. This statement is especially true when the contract is viewed as a two-
dimensional construct.  Contract detail and contract flexibility each have their specific 
influence on the governance of the exchange. Contract detail and contract flexibility have 
different relationships with the economic antecedents of business service transactions, but 
both play their role in service exchange governance. Second, behavioural uncertainty appears 
very important in governing business services exchanges. The level of behavioural 
uncertainty in a particular service exchange strongly determines how the service transaction is 
governed. Third, not only the specific investments deployed by the supplier, but also those 
deployed by the buying firm can influence how contractual and relational governance relate to 
each other. This stresses the impact of the buying organization on the exchange governance 
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strategy. Fourth, this study provides a governance scheme for business services exchanges 
showing the potential for future research and managerial implications.  
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5.01 Abstract 
Frontline employee behaviour in services settings is generally considered to be linked with 
performance outcomes. However, few research studies have investigated the impact of both 
in-role and extra-role behaviour on performance related to productivity as well as quality. In 
this study, we address this research gap by investigating the impact of several dimensions of 
boundary-spanning behaviour, related to in-role and extra-role behaviour, on employee 
performed productivity and quality in a business services setting. Data from 1,174 frontline 
service employees is analyzed using structural equation modelling.  The results indicate that 
extra-role behaviour (or non role-prescribed behaviour) does have a direct impact on 
performance productivity while its impact on performance quality is mediated by in-role 
behaviour (role-prescribed behaviour). The study clearly points out that managers need to 
consider the differential impact of both in-role and extra-role behaviour on performance 
outcomes.  
 
5.02 Introduction 
Because of customer-employee interaction in services settings, both academia and managers 
agree that there exists a “linkage” between the behaviour of frontline service employees and 
customers’ evaluation of the service delivered (Schneider et al., 2005). Several researchers 
have identified two types of employee behaviour: extra-role behaviour and in-role or role-
prescribed behaviour (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; George, 1991; O'Reilly III and Chatman, 
1986; Werner, 1994). Research on these two types of behaviour is still prevalent during the 
last years (Bell and Menguc, 2002; Netemeyer et al., 2005; Piercy et al., 2006). In-role 
behaviour specifies the formal part of the employee’s job in the organization. Each task 
mentioned in the job description, for example addressing the customer in a friendly and polite 
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manner, belongs to in-role behaviour. Extra-role behaviour extends beyond formal role 
requirements (Van Dyne and LePine, 1998). Behaviour that is not or can not be described in a 
formal manner, such as communicating an opportunity for service improvement to co-workers 
or supervisor, is indicated as extra-role. Extra-role behaviour has also been referred to as 
organizational citizenship behaviour (Bateman and Organ, 1983; Bell and Menguc, 2002; 
Organ, 1988; Piercy et al., 2006) 
 
The antecedents of employee behaviour have been well explored (Bettencourt et al., 2001; 
Tepper et al., 2001). Some antecedents frequently mentioned in literature are mood (George, 
1991; Kelley and Hoffman, 1997), fairness (Bettencourt and Brown, 1997; George, 1991), 
role stressors (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003; MacKenzie et al., 1998), organizational 
commitment (Baruch et al., 2004) and job satisfaction (Bettencourt and Brown, 1997; 
Netemeyer et al., 1997). However, research studies on the impact of employee behaviour on 
performance outcomes have been less frequently reported and are mainly focused on the 
impact of organizational citizenship behaviour (Podsakoff et al., 2000). Most studies on extra-
role behaviour explore its antecedents (e.g., Netemeyer et al., 1997) or its impact on 
performance outcomes (e.g., MacKenzie et al., 1993), without incorporating in-role 
behaviour. However, to fully capture the impact of employee behaviour on performance 
outcomes, both extra-role and in-role behaviours and their interrelationship should be 
incorporated (Piercy et al., 2006). Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies, we put forward 
that, when investigating the impact of frontline employee behaviour, performance should 
incorporate quality as well as productivity measures (Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004; Singh, 
2000): performance should not be limited to a general measure of performance (Piercy et al., 
2006) or be tightly defined as customer’s evaluation of service delivery (Bettencourt and 
Brown, 1997).   
 
In general, both academia and managers agree that in-role behaviour has a positive influence 
on performance outcomes, and managerial practices to improve in-role behaviour are well-
known (Baruch et al., 2004). However, extra-role behaviour displayed by frontline service 
employees, its interaction with in-role behaviour, and the impact on performance outcomes 
are less well understood and not always properly managed. Nonetheless, from a managerial 
viewpoint, it is interesting to know whether or not extra-role behaviour has a significant 
impact on performance outcomes in services settings. If not, this type of employee behaviour 
should not be promoted by management. On the other hand, if extra-role behaviour appears to 
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have a relevant influence on performance outcomes in services settings, more insight on ways 
to support this type of employee behaviour is needed.  
 
The objective of this study is to address the concerns stated above by developing a model 
focused on the impact of both in-role and extra-role behaviour displayed by frontline 
employees on the performance productivity and quality in services settings. More specifically, 
we want to empirically investigate the interrelationships between different types of prosocial 
service behaviour or boundary-spanning behaviour displayed by frontline employees 
(classified as in-role or extra-role behaviour) and the impact on performed productivity and 
quality by these employees. We believe that researchers and managers are interested in the 
impact of different types of employee behaviour on performance. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study has yet empirically investigated the interrelationships between different 
types of boundary-spanning behaviour and their impact on individual performance outcomes 
including both productivity and quality. From a theoretical viewpoint, this study contributes 
to past research by extending the research on frontline employee behaviour: the focus is on 
the impact of different types of frontline employee behaviour, including both in-role and 
extra-role behaviour, on individual performance outcomes. Research is shifted from 
antecedents of frontline employee behaviour towards their consequences including both 
productivity and quality. From a managerial viewpoint, the results highlight those types of 
frontline employee behaviour (in-role versus extra-role) that do influence performance 
outcomes in services settings. As such, insight is gained into the management of frontline 
service employees and their behaviour. 
 
First, the concept of frontline service employee behaviour and its different types are 
discussed. The concept of individual employee performance and its productivity and quality 
dimension are also briefly considered. We then develop our theoretical model and introduce 
hypotheses. The empirical study with a sample of 1,174 frontline service employees is 
presented next. Based on the analyses, the proposed model and hypotheses are tested. Finally, 
the implications of our results are discussed.    
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5.03 Conceptual Background 
(i) Frontline service employee behaviour 
In this research study, we focus on in-role and extra-role behaviour, two types of prosocial 
organizational behaviour. Prosocial organizational behaviour is defined by Brief and 
Motowidlo (1986) as behaviour which is (a) performed by a member of an organization, (b) 
directed towards an individual, group or organization with whom he or she interacts during 
work, and (c) performed with the intention of benefiting the one towards which the behaviour 
is directed. This rather broad definition encompasses different kinds of behaviour. First, 
prosocial organizational behaviour can be split into in-role and extra-role behaviour (Brief 
and Motowidlo, 1986; George, 1991), the focus of this research study. A second distinction is 
the target at whom the behaviour is directed (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986): customer-oriented 
or employee-oriented behaviour (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). Third, employee behaviour can 
be either organizationally functional or dysfunctional (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986): behaviour 
does or does not contribute to the achievement of organizational objectives.  
 
Prosocial organizational behaviour has been adjusted to the specific setting of services by 
Bettencourt and Brown (1997; 2003), referred to as prosocial service behaviour or boundary-
spanning behaviour. This behaviour relates to the behaviour of customer-contact employees 
of service firms that derives from their unique position as boundary spanners of the firm 
(Bettencourt et al., 2001). Employees at the boundaries of the organization, in close contact 
with outsiders, have a strategic function: they are being placed between the external 
environment, including organization’s customers, and the internal organization (Aldrich and 
Herker, 1977). Based on the services marketing and management literature, three types of 
boundary-spanning behaviour are identified by Bettencourt and Brown (2003): service 
delivery behaviour, internal influence behaviour, and external representation behaviour. 
Service delivery behaviour refers to the behaviours that directly impact customers: serving 
customers in a conscientious, responsive, attentive and courteous manner (Bettencourt and 
Brown, 2003). This first type of boundary-spanning behaviour is clearly customer-oriented 
and is more likely to be considered relatively more in-role (Bettencourt et al., 2005). The 
second type of boundary-spanning behaviour, internal influence behaviour, reflects the 
individual initiative taken to communicate to the firm and co-workers in order to improve the 
service delivered (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). Internal influence behaviour is clearly 
employee-oriented and is also more likely to be considered relatively more extra-role 
Chapter V 
 123 
(Bettencourt et al., 2005). External representation behaviour represents the extent to which the 
frontline employee is a vocal advocate of the organization, its image and its assets to outsiders 
of that organization (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). This third type of boundary-spanning 
behaviour is directed at outsiders of the service organization, including customers, potential 
customers, and potential employees of that organization and is more likely to be considered 
relatively more extra-role (Bettencourt et al., 2005). As such, the three dimensions of 
boundary-spanning behaviour are each belonging to a specific type of prosocial organizational 
behaviour. Table 1 gives an overview of the dimensions of boundary-spanning behaviour and 
their specific characteristics.  
 
Table V-1: Boundary-spanning behaviour 
Boundary-Spanning Behaviour In-role versus Extra-role Directed at
Service Delivery Behaviour In-role Customers
Internal Influence Behaviour Extra-role Employees 
External Representation Behaviour Extra-role Outsiders
 
 
In this research study, we focus on the concept of boundary-spanning behaviour because both 
in-role and extra-role behaviour (Piercy et al., 2006) are incorporated. Moreover, the 
boundary-spanning construct is best tailored to the unique settings of service organizations 
(Bettencourt et al., 2001). Though this construct has been validated and its antecedents 
explored (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003; Bettencourt et al., 2005), further research is still 
required to investigate its impact on performance outcomes.   
 
(ii) Performance outcomes 
Researchers generally agree that the performance of frontline employees, especially in service 
firms, has a great significance for the organization’s effectiveness (Hartline and Ferrell, 1996; 
Singh, 2000). As the delivery of the service occurs in the service encounter, during the 
interaction between frontline employee and customer, performance of the frontline employee 
is critical to customer satisfaction (Crosby et al., 1990; van Dolen et al., 2004). High levels of 
employee performance are assumed to enhance customer satisfaction and loyalty and to 
decrease employee’s turnover intentions (Singh, 2000).  
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In services marketing literature, quality and productivity are considered as two related but 
distinct aspect of performance (de Jong et al., 2005; Singh, 2000). As indicated by Chase and 
Haynes (2000), quality and productivity should not be managed as separate processes and 
there does not need to be a trade-off between quality and productivity (Filiatrault et al., 1996). 
Without the inclusion of productivity parameters, little control over quality exists (Heskett et 
al., 1997). On the other hand, productivity can not be understood without considering quality 
(Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004). Performance productivity is often related to quantifiable output 
which can be verified objectively (de Jong et al., 2005): meeting quantifiable and measurable 
performance output indicators (Singh, 2000). Two important determinants of performance 
productivity for frontline service employees are contact output and backroom work (de Jong 
et al., 2005; Singh, 2000). Contact output is related to those activities in which customer 
contact occurs. Possible productivity measures are average speed of answering a telephone 
call or the time spent interacting with customers (Singh, 2000). Backroom functions refer to 
those activities without involvement or contact with customers. Examples of productivity 
measures are providing accurate and complete paperwork and demonstrating knowledge 
about company procedures and practices (Singh, 2000). Performance quality relates to how 
the service is delivered (Singh, 2000) and often concerns subjective measures on process-
oriented aspects (de Jong et al., 2005). Performance quality for frontline employees is 
associated with the interactional performance in frontline employee-customer exchanges. A 
unique aspect of performance quality in services settings is the emotional labour demanded 
from frontline employees in their interaction with customers, i.e. employees are required to 
display appropriate emotions (Singh, 2000). When interacting with customers, service 
employees are supposed to act in a way to build trust, demonstrate promptness and reliability, 
and give a sense of personal attention (Singh, 2000). As such, four determinants of 
performance quality are identified: trust, promptness, reliability and individualized attention 
(Singh, 2000). 
 
5.04 Hypotheses 
In general, prosocial behaviour is assumed to have a positive impact on performance 
outcomes. The research of Puffer (1987) suggests that prosocial behaviour indeed provides 
benefits to the organization and the study of Baruch and his colleagues (2004) empirically 
confirmed the positive association between prosocial behaviour and job performance. In this 
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research study, we also assume that the three dimensions of boundary-spanning behaviour – 
belonging each to a specific type of prosocial organizational behaviour (see Table 1) – will be 
positively related to performance productivity and quality. However, because of the specific 
characteristics of each boundary-spanning behaviour dimension, the link with performance 
outcomes will not be hypothesized identically across those dimensions.  
 
The first type of boundary-spanning behaviour, service delivery behaviour, is considered as 
in-role behaviour (Bettencourt et al., 2005). In-role behaviour is assumed to have a positive 
impact on both the productivity and quality dimensions of performance as role prescriptions 
relate to the performance guidelines for a particular service role. A dependable role 
performance indicates the achievement of some minimal level of quantity and quality of 
performance (Katz, 1964). The research of Piercy and colleagues (2006) is among the first 
studies to empirically confirm the positive impact of in-role behaviour on performance 
outcomes. Next to being role-prescribed, service delivery behaviour is also considered 
customer-oriented (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). When employee behaviour aims at helping 
the customer during the service delivery, employees are more likely to feel better about the 
outcome (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). Previous research has indicated the positive impact of 
customer-oriented behaviour on customer satisfaction (Bettencourt and Brown, 1997) and on 
service quality (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). The writing on the importance of customer 
service in popular and academic press also implicitly assumes the positive impact of role-
prescribed behaviour directed at customers on performance (George, 1991).  Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H1a:  Service delivery behaviour will have a positive impact on performance 
productivity.  
H1b:  Service delivery behaviour will have a positive impact on performance quality.  
 
The other two types of boundary-spanning behaviour -internal influence behaviour and 
external representation behaviour- are likely to be considered more extra-role (Bettencourt et 
al., 2005). Though these types of behaviour are not incorporated in the formal job 
prescription, these may provide benefits to the organization (Puffer, 1987).  
 
Internal influence behaviour relates to extra-role behaviour directed at co-workers 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). While previous research has not found a significant 
relationship between employee-oriented behaviour and performance outcomes such as 
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customer satisfaction (Bettencourt and Brown, 1997), we believe this is in part because it has 
not taken into account the potential mediating role of customer-oriented employee behaviour. 
We assume that the impact of internal influence behaviour on performance outcomes will be 
indirect through its influence on service delivery behaviour. Internal influence behaviour 
indicates that individual initiative is taken in communications to the firm and co-workers 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). These communications can deal with perceived 
environmental changes, newly developed or unfulfilled customer needs, and opportunities to 
improve service delivery (Aldrich and Herker, 1977). This type of behaviour increases the 
ability to perform the role-prescribed service delivery behaviour: best practices are spread 
throughout the firm, insight into potential efficiency increases are gained, and potential 
problems are detected earlier or even avoided. Consequently, the required service will be 
delivered in a more conscientious, dependable and responsive manner, enhancing the 
performed service delivery behaviour (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). Moreover, based on 
socialization research, employees who perform one type of helping behaviour (e.g., 
employee-oriented) are more likely to perform other types of helping behaviour (e.g., 
customer-oriented) (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). Empirical research has confirmed this 
positive relationship between employee-oriented and customer-oriented prosocial behaviour 
(Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). Furthermore, the research of Piercy and colleagues (2006) states 
that the impact of extra-role behaviour on performance outcomes is mediated by role-
prescribed behaviour. We propose that internal influence behaviour will only have a positive 
impact on performance outcomes because of its positive impact on service delivery behaviour. 
H2:  Internal influence behaviour will have a positive impact on service delivery 
behaviour. 
 
External representation behaviour relates to behaviour directed at outsiders of the organization 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 2003), including customers, potential customers, and potential 
employees. External representation behaviour supports the organizational image, enhances its 
social legitimacy, and makes the organization more visible (Aldrich and Herker, 1977). As 
such, the organization’s ability to attract and retain the best workforces increases, resulting in 
a more effective organizational functioning (Katz, 1964). Better skilled workforce -with 
enhanced technical and social skills- will be better able to deliver the service in a 
conscientious, dependable and responsive manner (Westbrook and Peterson, 1998), thus 
increasing service delivery behaviour. So the impact of external representation behaviour on 
performance productivity and quality will be mediated by service delivery behaviour. As the 
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research of Piercy and colleagues (2006) empirically confirmed, the impact of extra-role 
behaviour on performance outcomes is indirect, through the influence on in-role behaviour. In 
addition, we also assume a direct effect of external representation behaviour on performance.  
Next to the influence on (potential) employees, external representation behaviour relates to 
other outsiders of the organization as well, such as customers and potential customers 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). Previous research has suggested that customer-oriented 
prosocial behaviour has a direct positive influence on performance outcomes because people 
tend to evaluate performance outcomes more favourably when these are the result from 
behaviours with positive associations towards them (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997). When 
frontline service employees are vocal advocates of an organization and its services to 
outsiders of that organization, they will be more motivated to deliver high performance 
outcomes -both on productivity and quality- to keep up with the service level they are 
proclaiming. Previous research has empirically confirmed the direct impact of extra-role 
customer-oriented behaviour on performance outcomes such as customer satisfaction 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 1997). Therefore, in addition to the indirect effect of external 
representation behaviour on performance outcomes through service delivery behaviour, we 
also assume a direct influence of external representation behaviour on performance 
productivity and quality. Thus, service delivery behaviour will only partially mediate the 
influence of external representation behaviour on performance productivity and quality. 
H3a:  External representation behaviour will have a positive impact on service 
delivery behaviour. 
 H3b:  External representation behaviour will have a positive impact on performance 
productivity. 
H3c:  External representation behaviour will have a positive impact on performance 
quality. 
 
The above hypotheses and the resulting model on the impact of the types of boundary-
spanning behaviour on frontline service employees’ performance productivity and quality are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure V-1: Impact of boundary-spanning behaviour on performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Sample and procedure 
As the service employee often is the sole contact between company and customer, employee 
behaviour is especially important in services settings (Bettencourt et al., 2005; Netemeyer et 
al., 2005). Despite the growing importance of business services, a recent literature review of 
Johnston (2005) revealed that most papers in leading publications for service research are 
concerned with business-to-consumer services. As for research on employee behaviour, most 
studies are set in consumer settings such as retail banking (Bettencourt and Brown, 1997; 
Kelley and Hoffman, 1997) or sales (George, 1991). Research on employee behaviour in 
business services settings is rare and mainly focuses on selling organizations (Piercy et al., 
2006). Nonetheless, more research in other business services settings is needed as those 
organizations also have to deal with frontline employees spanning the boundary between 
buyer and supplier organizations, such as for the delivery of financial services (Bettencourt 
and Brown, 2003) or other. This research study was set up in cooperation with a major 
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security services company. Security services belong to facility services, an important part of 
the business services sector (Lehtonen and Salonen, 2005). The frontline employees 
incorporated in the study are the security agents performing the security services on the 
customer’s premises. As such, the security agents are the main interface between the 
supplying and buying organization and thus represent an important asset of the security 
services provider. The security services performed relate to the supervision and protection of 
(im)mobile goods belonging to the customer. Some typical examples of the security services 
delivered are reception services and access control.  
 
Before the questionnaires were sent to the security agents, about 10 employees were 
interviewed to investigate the relevance of our research question and the constructs 
incorporated. The interviewees were selected based on their experience with security services 
in general and with the employer organization in particular. The several types of security 
services like reception services and access control were covered across the interviews. Next, a 
first draft of the questionnaire was developed and pre-tested within another group of security 
agents. About 30 agents filled in the questionnaire in the presence of a research assistant. As 
such, uncertainties or remarks could be communicated immediately and detailed information 
was gathered. Based on the analyses of the pre-test results, the questionnaire was adjusted 
when necessary. Finally, the questionnaire was sent to two groups of security agents, each 
employed in another region within the same country. The package sent included an 
introductory letter assuring confidentiality and a postage-paid return envelope. In total, 3,666 
surveys were sent. Completed surveys were received from 1,174 security agents for a 
response rate of 32.02%. Table 2 gives an overview of the respondent profile. Approximately 
88% of the respondents were male. The median age was between 40 and 49 years. The 
median length of job experience was between 5 to 10 years. 
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Table V-2: Respondent profile 
Male 88.4% <20 years 0.5% < 2 years 15.1%
Female 11.6% 21-29 years 17.1% 2 to 5 years 21.5%
30-39 years 26.8% 5 to 10 years 22.9%
40-49 years 32.0% 10 to 15 years 16.8%
50-59 years 21.0% > 15 years 23.7%
60 or older 2.6%
AgeSex Job Experience
 
 
(ii) Measures 
Boundary-spanning behaviour. The operationalization of boundary-spanning behaviour is 
based on prior research developing and validating measures for the three types of behaviour 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 2003; Bettencourt et al., 2005). Three items are used to measure 
service delivery behaviour (e.g., I follow up on customer requests and problems in a timely 
manner), internal influence behaviour (e.g., I make constructive suggestions for improvement 
of the delivered security services), and external representation behaviour (e.g., I recommend 
this security company to outsiders as a great place to work). Based on the interviews and pre-
test, the wording of some items is adjusted to specific requirements for the security sector 
(Appendix C). The respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreements with the 
statements on a seven-point rating scale. As did Podsakoff, Ahearne and MacKenzie (1997), 
the measures of behaviour were acquired from the employees themselves rather than from 
their supervisors. Due to the nature of boundary-spanning behaviours, using only 
management ratings of boundary-spanning behaviour is not advised (Bettencourt et al., 2005). 
The results of management ratings might be more biased as management is limited in its 
knowledge of the degree to which an employee engages in these behaviours. Though the use 
of multiple informants, that is including both the ratings of employees and supervisors, is 
preferred (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003), the research setting made this impossible. In the 
security services company involved in the study, one supervisor can be responsible for over a 
hundred agents, making it an impossible task for the supervisor to distinctly rate each agent’s 
behaviour.  
 
Performance productivity and quality. Performance productivity and quality are measured by 
the Singh (2000) scale developed to provide self-ratings of performance. Performance 
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productivity consists of 8 items representing contact output (e.g., meeting your quotas and 
targets) and backroom work (e.g., providing accurate and complete paperwork). For the latter, 
one item was added compared to Singh’s (2000) operationalization. During the interviews 
with the security agents, accurate and timely communication between colleagues appears as 
an important aspect of performance in the back-office. Performance quality consists of 16 
items referring to the 4 dimensions as defined by Singh (2000): trust (e.g., taking the initiative 
to help your customers – within what is allowed – even when it is not part of your 
responsibility), promptness (e.g., immediately answering a call – by phone or otherwise), 
reliability (e.g., providing accurate and correct information to the customer) and 
individualized attention (e.g., listening attentively to understand the concerns of the 
customer). The respondents are asked to rate their performance level of each item, compared 
with an average security agent in their company, on a seven-point rating scale (Appendix C). 
Previous researchers have suggested that employee self-reports of performance are 
significantly correlated with judgments made by third parties like customers (Schneider et al., 
1996). Moreover, self-ratings have been found to correlate highly with manager ratings of 
employee performance (Churchill et al., 1985) and to be less biased than management’s 
ratings (Scullen et al., 2000). However, common method variance attributable to sources can 
bias results when only self-ratings are used (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, common 
method bias needs to be controlled for as this can provide a potential rival explanation for the 
observed pattern of correlations among constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
 
Control variables. Next to the respondents’ sex, age and job experience, another construct, 
that is role ambiguity, was included in the questionnaire to enable us to control for common 
method bias. Role ambiguity, referring to lack of information needed for an employee to 
effectively enact his or her role (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003; Rizzo et al., 1970), was 
measured based on the scale developed by Rizzo and colleagues (Rizzo et al., 1970). The 
respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreements with three statements (e.g., I know 
exactly what is expected of me in the job (reversed scaled)) on a seven-point rating scale 
(Appendix C). 
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5.05 Analyses and Results 
The analytical approach consists of two steps. First, the validity of the behaviour and 
performance constructs is assessed using a combination of exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analyses. One of the two sample groups is used for exploratory factor analysis (n=487; 
response rate of 29.66%), the other sample group (employed in another region within the 
same country) for confirmatory factor analyses (n=687; response rate of 33.94%). Second, the 
hypotheses are tested using the second sample group.  
 
(i) Validation of constructs 
To assess the dimensionality of the customer-oriented boundary-spanning behaviour and the 
performance constructs, exploratory factor analyses are performed using the first sample 
group. We opt for principal axis factoring as extraction method (Conway and Huffcutt, 2003) 
and an oblique rotation because the determinants are not supposed to be independent (Heck, 
1998). The exploratory factor analysis on the statements of boundary-spanning behaviour 
results in three factors in accordance with the boundary-spanning behaviours as defined by 
Bettencourt and Brown (2003): service delivery, internal influence, and external 
representation behaviour. To assess the dimensionality of the performance construct, 
performance productivity and performance quality are assessed separately. The exploratory 
factor analysis conducted for the performance productivity construct results in two 
dimensions in accordance with the two dimensions as indicated by Singh (2000): contact 
output and backroom work. For performance quality, the exploratory factor analysis also 
results in two dimensions. The first dimension corresponds with the trust dimension and the 
second dimension encompasses the promptness, reliability, and individualized attention 
dimension of performance quality as defined by Singh (2000).  
 
To assess the reliability and validity of boundary-spanning behaviour, performance 
productivity, and performance quality, a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted using the 
second sample group. After the deletion of two items with low reliability (Squared Multiple 
Correlation < 0.40) the seven-factor model provides an acceptable fit. Though the chi-square 
statistic is significant with chi-square value of 645.88 and 278 degrees of freedom, the other 
fit indices are acceptable: NFI is 0.97, CFI is 0.99, RMSEA is 0.03, SRMR is 0.04, and GFI is 
0.89. Based on the large and significant loadings of the items, the high Composite Reliability 
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(CR > 0.70) (see Table 3), and acceptable Average Variance Extracted (AVE  0.50), the 
reliability and convergent validity of the seven factors are acceptable. Discriminant validity is 
assessed by comparing the extracted variance of the construct with the shared variance 
between constructs: a construct should share more variance with its measures than it shares 
with other constructs. The square root of AVE should be higher than the correlation between 
the related constructs. In Table 3, the square root of AVE is indicated on the diagonal and the 
correlations are indicated below the diagonal. Table 3 indicates that the three types of 
boundary-spanning behaviour, the two dimensions of performance productivity, and the two 
dimensions of performance quality are meaningfully distinct and thus have discriminant 
validity.  
 
Table V-3: Correlations between constructs 
a
 
b
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Service Delivery Behaviour 0.70
2. Internal Influence Behaviour 0.37 0.80
3. External Representation Behaviour 0.37 0.35 0.86
4. Productivity Dimension 1 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.82
5. Productivity Dimension 2 0.49 0.38 0.37 0.61 0.73
6. Quality Dimension 1 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.36 0.82
7. Quality Dimension 2 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.56 0.61 0.59 0.87
8. Productivity 0.48 0.42 0.40 0.91 0.88 0.42 0.65 0.85
9. Quality 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.52 0.53 0.91 0.88 0.59 0.82
Mean 6.47 5.76 5.39 5.70 5.99 5.75 6.13 5.84 5.93
s.d. 0.64 1.20 1.41 1.00 0.86 1.22 1.05 0.84 1.02
Composite Reliability 0.75 0.84 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.80 0.96 0.83 0.80
 
 
To assess the dimensionality of performance, a second confirmatory factor analysis is 
performed based on the indicators and resulting factors of performance productivity and 
performance quality. The model with two higher-order dimensions, i.e. productivity and 
quality, provides a feasible fit despite the significant chi-square statistic (chi-square value of 
318.04 and 114 degrees of freedom): NFI is 0.98, CFI is 0.99, RMSEA is 0.03, SRMR is 
0.04, and GFI is 0.92. The factors of both productivity and quality have a high and significant 
loading on the higher-order dimensions of productivity and quality respectively. The higher-
order dimensions have an acceptable reliability and convergent validity (CR > 0.70; AVE > 
0.50). Performance productivity and performance quality also have discriminant validity as 
                                                 
a
 All correlations are significant (p < 0.01) 
b
 Square Root of AVE is mentioned on diagonal 
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the extracted variance of both constructs is higher than the shared variance between the two 
constructs (Table 3). Another indicator of discriminant validity between productivity and 
quality is the chi-square difference test between the unrestricted model and the restricted 
model in which the intercorrelation between productivity and quality is set to one (chi-square 
difference: 159.65; df(1); p<0.01).    
 
(ii) Model estimation and hypotheses testing 
To test the hypotheses, a structural model, as illustrated in Figure 1, is estimated while adding 
direct relationships from internal influence behaviour to performance productivity and to 
performance quality. Because all of the data are obtained from one data source, i.e. rating of 
frontline employees, common method variance needs to be controlled for to exclude potential 
rival explanations for observed patterns of correlations (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
partial correlation procedure as described by Podsakoff and colleagues (2003) is used. Though 
this methodology does not control for all possible causes of common method biases, it does 
account for its potential effects on the assessed relationships (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In the 
partial correlation procedure, a variable that on theoretical grounds should not be related to at 
least one other variable included in the study is used as marker variable. Any observed 
relationship between that variable and any of the variables in the study can then be assumed to 
be due to common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In this study, role ambiguity is 
used as a marker variable to partial out common method variance. Role ambiguity is not 
directly related to any of the three boundary-spanning behaviour dimensions as job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment fully mediate this effect (Bettencourt and Brown, 
2003). In previous research the impact of common method variance in organizational 
behaviour research has been assumed limited or even non-existing (Bettencourt et al., 2001; 
MacKenzie et al., 1991; 1993; Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 1994), and was thus not considered 
when discussing the empirical results. However, as common method variance can be in part 
responsible for the observed effects in a model without marker variable, we report the results 
of the structural model with marker variable to sort out possible effects of common method 
variance on the assessed relationships. 
 
The effect of different types of boundary-spanning behaviour on performance productivity 
and performance quality is estimated in one structural model. Despite the significant chi-
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square statistic, the model provides a feasible fit with an acceptable level for the reported fit 
indices (Table 4). 
 
Table V-4: Model estimation 
a
 
Service 
Delivery 
Behaviour
Performance 
Productivity
Performance       
Quality
Service Delivery Behaviour Beta --- 0.53
***
0.56
***
T-value 5.29 5.05
Internal Influence Behaviour Beta 0.34
***
0.16
**
0.02
T-value 4.26 2.65 0.40
External Representation Behaviour Beta 0.25
***
0.19
*
0.14
T-value 3.62 1.98 1.75
R² 0.36 0.50 0.41
Model Fit
Chi-square 853.08
df 357
RMSEA 0.04
NFI 0.97
CFI 0.98
SRMR 0.06
GFI 0.88
 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) states that service delivery behaviour will have a positive impact on 
(a) performance productivity and (b) performance quality. The results provide support for 
both H1a (t = 5.29; p<0.001) and H1b (t = 5.05; p<0.001). The second hypothesis (H2) states 
that internal influence behaviour will have a positive impact on service delivery behaviour. 
The results provide support for H2 (t = 4.26; p<0.001). Moreover, internal influence 
behaviour also has a direct positive impact on performance productivity (t = 2.65; p<0.01) but 
is not directly related to performance quality (t = 0.40; p>0.05). The third hypothesis (H3) 
states that external representation behaviour will (a) have a positive impact on service 
delivery behaviour, (b) have a positive direct impact on performance productivity, and (c) 
have a positive direct impact on performance quality. Thus, hypothesis 3 assumes that the 
                                                 
a
 * p < 0.05 
   ** p < 0.01 
   *** p < 0.001 
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positive impact of external representation behaviour on performance productivity and 
performance quality is only partially mediated by service delivery behaviour: external 
representation behaviour should have a positive impact on service delivery behaviour (H3a), 
on performance productivity (H3b), and on performance quality (H3c). The results provide 
support for H3a (t = 3.62; p<0.001) and H3b (t = 1.98; p<0.05). However, the results do not 
indicate a significant relationship between external representation behaviour and performance 
quality (t = 1.75; p>0.05), not supporting H3c. In the model, 36% of the variance in service 
delivery behaviour, 50% of the variance in performance productivity, and 41% of the variance 
in performance quality are explained.  
 
5.06 Discussion 
The results of this research study support our assumption that the behaviour of frontline 
service employees is of importance for business organizations outside the selling context and 
that the impact on performance outcomes differs across the different types of boundary-
spanning behaviour. In-role and extra-role behaviour do not influence performance outcomes 
in the same way: in-role behaviour, i.e. service delivery behaviour, has a more significant 
impact on employee performance outcomes than extra-role behaviour, i.e. internal influence 
behaviour and external representation behaviour. According to general consensus, in-role 
behaviour directly influences both performance productivity and performance quality. The 
results also indicate that extra-role behaviour is an antecedent of in-role behaviour, consistent 
with the research of Piercy and colleagues (2006). However, in contrast with the results of the 
latter, in-role behaviour is not a full mediator for the impact of extra-role behaviour on 
performance outcomes in our study. On the one hand, in-role behaviour does fully mediate the 
impact of extra-role behaviour on performance quality. Being a vocal advocate of an 
organization (external representation behaviour) and communicating internally (internal 
influence behaviour) will enhance performance quality only through delivering the service in 
a more conscientious, responsive and courteous manner (service delivery behaviour). On the 
other hand, in-role behaviour is only a partial mediator for the impact of extra-role behaviour 
on performance productivity in this study. Both types of extra-role behaviour -internal 
influence behaviour and external representation behaviour- have a direct influence on 
performance productivity. Because of external representation behaviour displayed by frontline 
service employees, the organization is able to attract and retain the best workforces, thus 
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increasing its opportunity to deliver enhanced performance productivity. Moreover, 
performance productivity is more quantifiable, measurable, and visible to employees than 
performance quality (Singh, 2000). Thus, individual initiative taken by the frontline employee 
to communicate to the firm and co-workers (internal influence behaviour) will plausibly be 
more focused on aspects related to performed productivity. In conclusion we remark that to 
fully estimate the impact of frontline employee behaviour on performance outcomes in 
business services settings, both in-role and extra-role behaviour should be incorporated. When 
only in-role behaviour is considered, the performed productivity of frontline employees will 
be underestimated as extra-role behaviour also directly influences performance productivity. 
When only extra-role behaviour is incorporated, the impact on performed quality of frontline 
employees will be underestimated as in-role behaviour fully mediates the effect of extra-role 
behaviour on performance quality.   
 
Previous studies have suggested that employee-oriented behaviour does not have a significant 
impact on service quality (Kelley and Hoffman, 1997) or customer satisfaction (Bettencourt 
and Brown, 1997). The results of our study on performance quality are thus consistent with 
previous research and further broaden the findings by indicating an indirect relationship 
between employee-oriented behaviour and performance quality because of the moderating 
effect of customer-oriented behaviour. Contrary to previous research in consumer settings 
(Bettencourt and Brown, 1997), external representation behaviour, supposed to be partly 
customer-oriented, does not have a direct impact on performance quality. However, in our 
study, services are delivered towards business organizations, and not consumers, making it 
rather implausible for frontline employees to have contact with those business customers 
outside their job environment. As such, external representation behaviour of frontline 
employees in business services settings is more oriented towards potential employees than 
towards potential customers. Consequently, when investigating extra-role behaviour of 
frontline service employees in business settings, not only employee-oriented behaviour 
displayed during the job (internal influence behaviour) should be considered; behaviour 
directed at (potential) employees off duty (external representation behaviour) can also affect 
performance outcomes. 
(i) Limitations and directions for future research 
As indicated by this study, employee behaviour plays a role in business organizations outside 
the selling context. However, in these settings, sales performance is not a feasible indicator to 
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measure performance outcomes. As illustrated in this study, indicators related only to quality 
do not offer a full overview of the relevant performance outcomes. Based on the research of 
Singh (2000), we included individual performed productivity and quality of the frontline 
service employee. Though employee performance is assumed to positively influence customer 
satisfaction (van Dolen et al., 2004) and organizational effectiveness (Hartline and Ferrell, 
1996), we did not investigate these relationships in our study. Future research could 
incorporate other indicators of performance outcomes such as organizational effectiveness or 
customer purchase intent (Netemeyer et al., 2005).   
 
The results of this research study also indicate the need for further research on boundary-
spanning behaviour and the customer- versus employee-oriented character of external 
representation behaviour in business services settings. More research is also needed on the 
interrelations between different types of boundary-spanning behaviour and their impact on 
performance outcomes, especially performance productivity. The impact of these 
interrelations on antecedent factors such as mood, justice, and job satisfaction and their 
occurrence in other business or consumer sectors should be further investigated.  In this 
research study, we focused on one specific business and one specific company to exclude the 
impact of differences in company policy or other. However, the research setting made it 
impossible to incorporate both employee and manager’s ratings. While the partial correlation 
procedure accounts for common method variance in the assessed relationships, this 
methodology could not control for all possible sources of common method variance. 
Therefore, the validity of our model should be further investigated in other circumstances. 
Furthermore, the association between boundary-spanning behaviour and noncompliant 
behaviour, i.e. behaviour with negative organizational outcomes (Puffer, 1987), is another 
research area awaiting to be further explored. 
   
(ii) Managerial implications 
Based on the linkage research (e.g. Schneider et al., 2005), management of service 
organizations should pay more attention to the internal organizational practices and employee 
perceptions that have an impact on performance outcomes (Pugh et al., 2002). In services 
settings, performance outcomes are often related to the service quality delivered. Productivity 
is often left out of consideration in spite of previous research studies such as those of Singh 
(2000), Grönroos and Ojasalo (2004), and others. However, this research study reveals that 
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considering only performance quality will overestimate performance outcomes of in-role 
behaviours and underestimate those of extra-role behaviours. Extra-role behaviour displayed 
by frontline service employees, i.e. internal influence behaviour and external representation 
behaviour, has a direct impact on performance productivity. Though in-role behaviour is an 
important type of employee behaviour, management in business services settings should try to 
encourage both in-role and extra-role behaviour of frontline employees to achieve enhanced 
performance productivity and quality. When managers focus only on promoting in-role 
behaviour of frontline service employees, potential performance increases are lost. Therefore, 
in services settings, managers should support extra-role as well as in-role behaviour. 
However, as the benefits of extra-role behaviour cannot be easily monitored (Puffer, 1987), 
stimulating extra-role behaviour might be more difficult than stimulating in-role behaviour. 
Moreover, in business services settings, not only extra-role behaviour directed at employees 
during the job influences performance outcomes but behaviour displayed by employees off 
duty also plays a role. When employees become real vocal advocates of the company, this 
must allow management to attract high-performing frontline employees. Isn’t this the start of 
organizational effectiveness?   
 
Chapter V 
 140 
5.07 References 
Aldrich, H. and Herker, D. (1977), "Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure", 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 217-230. 
Baruch, Y., O'Creevy, M. F., Hind, P. and Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2004), "Prosocial Behavior and 
Job Performance: Does the need for control and the need for achievement make a 
difference?" Social Behavior and Personality, Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 399-412. 
Bateman, T. S. and Organ, D. W. (1983), "Job Satisfaction and the Good Soldier: The 
Relationship between Affect and Employee "Citizenship"", Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 587-595. 
Bell, S. J. and Menguc, B. (2002), "The employee-organization relationship, organizational 
citizenship behaviors, and superior service quality", Journal of Retailing, Vol. 78 No. 
2, pp. 131-146. 
Bettencourt, L. A. and Brown, S. W. (1997), "Contact Employees: Relationships Among 
Workplace Fairness, Job Satisfaction and Prosocial Service Behaviors", Journal of 
Retailing, Vol. 73 No. 1, pp. 39-61. 
Bettencourt, L. A. and Brown, S. W. (2003), "Role Stressors and Customer-Oriented 
Boundary-Spanning Behaviors in Service Organizations", Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 394-408. 
Bettencourt, L. A., Brown, S. W. and MacKenzie, S. B. (2005), "Customer-oriented 
boundary-spanning behaviors: Test of a social exchange model of antecedents", 
Journal of Retailing, Vol. 81 No. 2, pp. 141-157. 
Bettencourt, L. A., Gwinner, K. P. and Meuter, M. L. (2001), "A Comparison of Attitude, 
Personality, and Knowledge Predictors of Service-Oriented Organizational Citizenship 
Behaviors", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 86 No. 1, pp. 29-41. 
Brief, A. P. and Motowidlo, S. J. (1986), "Prosocial Organizational Behaviors", Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 710-725. 
Chase, R. B. and Haynes, R. M. (2000), "Service operations management. A field guide", in 
Swartz, T. A. and Iacobucci, D. (Ed.), Service operations management. A field guide, 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 455-472. 
Churchill, G. A., Ford, N. M., Hartley, S. W. and Walker, O. C. J. (1985), "The determinants 
of salesperson performance: a meta-analysis", Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 22 
No. 2, pp. 103-118. 
Chapter V 
 141 
Conway, J. M. and Huffcutt, A. I. (2003), "A review and evaluation of exploratory factor 
analysis practices in organizational research", Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 
6 No. pp. 147-168. 
Crosby, L. A., Evans, K. R. and Cowles, D. (1990), "Relationship quality in services selling: 
an interpersonal influence perspective", Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 No. 3, pp. 68-
81. 
de Jong, A., de Ruyter, K. and Lemmink, J. (2005), "Service Climate in Self Managing 
Teams: Mapping the Linkage of Team Member Perceptions and Service Performance 
Outcomes in a Business-to-Business Setting", Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 
42 No. 8, pp. 1593-1620. 
Filiatrault, P., Harvey, J. and Chebat, J.-C. (1996), "Service quality and service productivity 
management practices", Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 243-
255. 
George, J. M. (1991), "State or Trait: Effects of Positive Mood on Prosocial Behaviors at 
Work", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 76 No. 2, pp. 299-307. 
Grönroos, C. and Ojasalo, K. (2004), "Service productivity: Towards a conceptualization of 
the transformation of inputs into economic results in services", Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 57 No. 4, pp. 414-423. 
Hartline, M. D. and Ferrell, O. C. (1996), "The management of customer-contact service 
employees: an empirical investigation", Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60 No. October, 
pp. 52-70. 
Heck, R. H. (1998), "Factor analysis: Exploratory and confirmatory approaches", in 
Marcoulidis, G. A. (Ed.), Factor analysis: Exploratory and confirmatory approaches, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 177-126. 
Heskett, J. L., Sasser, W. E. J. and Schlesinger, L. A. (1997), The service profit chain: How 
leading companies link profit and growth to loyalty, satisfaction, and value, The Free 
Press, New York. 
Johnston, R. (2005), "Service operations management: from the roots up", International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 25 No. 12, pp. 1298-1308. 
Katz, D. (1964), "The motivational basis of organizational behavior", Behavioral Science, 
Vol. 9 No. pp. 131-146. 
Kelley, S. W. and Hoffman, K. D. (1997), "An investigation of positive affect, prosocial 
behaviors and service quality", Journal of Retailing, Vol. 73 No. 3, pp. 407-427. 
Chapter V 
 142 
Lehtonen, T. J. T. and Salonen, A. I. (2005), "Procurement and relationship management 
trends in FM services", in Proceedings of Industrial Marketing and Purchasing 
Conference, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, pp.  
MacKenzie, S. B., Podsakoff, P. M. and Ahearne, M. (1998), "Some possible antecedents and 
consequences of in-role and extra-role salesperson performances", Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 62 No. 3, pp. 87-98. 
MacKenzie, S. B., Podsakoff, P. M. and Fetter, R. (1991), "Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior and Objective Productivity as Determinants of Managerial Evaluations of 
Salespersons' Performance", Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 123-150. 
MacKenzie, S. B., Podsakoff, P. M. and Fetter, R. (1993), "The Impact of Organizational 
Citizenship Behavior on Evaluations of Salesperson Performance", Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 57 No. 1, pp. 70-80. 
Netemeyer, R. G., Boles, J. S., McKee, D. O. and McMurrian, R. (1997), "An Investigation 
Into the Antecedents of Organizational Citizenship Behaviors in a Personal Selling 
Context", Journal of Marketing, Vol. 61 No. 3, pp. 85-98. 
Netemeyer, R. G., Maxham III, J. G. and Pullig, C. (2005), "Conflicts in the Work-Family 
Interface: Links to Job Stress, Customer Service Employee Performance, and 
Customer Purchase Intent", Journal of Marketing, Vol. 69 No. 2, pp. 130-143. 
O'Reilly III, C. and Chatman, J. (1986), "Organizational commitment and psychological 
attachment: The effects of compliance, identification, and internalization on prosocial 
behavior", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 71 No. 3, pp. 492-499. 
Organ, D. W. (1988), Organizational citizenship behavior: the good soldier syndrome, 
Lexington Books, Lexington MA. 
Piercy, N. F., Cravens, D. W., Lane, N. and Vorhies, D. W. (2006), "Driving Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors and Salesperson In-Role Behavior Performance: The Role of 
Management Control and Perceived Organizational Support", Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 244-262. 
Podsakoff, P. M., Ahearne, M. and MacKenzie, S. B. (1997), "Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior and the Quantity and Quality of Work Group Performance", Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Vol. 82 No. 2, pp. 262-270. 
Podsakoff, P. M. and MacKenzie, S. B. (1994), "Organizational Citizenship Behaviors and 
Sales Unit Effectiveness", Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 351-363. 
Chapter V 
 143 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y. and Podsakoff, N. P. (2003), "Common 
Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and 
Recommended Remedies", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 88 No. 5, pp. 879-
903. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Paine, J. B. and Bachrach, D. G. (2000), "Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors: A Critical Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
and Suggestions for Future Research", Journal of Management, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 
513-563. 
Puffer, S. M. (1987), "Prosocial behavior, noncompliant behavior and work performance 
among commission salespeople", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 72 No. 4, pp. 
615-621. 
Pugh, S. D., Dietz, J., Wiley, J. W. and Brooks, S. M. (2002), "Driving service effectiveness 
through employee-customer linkages", Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 16 
No. 4, pp. 73-84. 
Rizzo, J. R., House, R. J. and Lirtzman, S. I. (1970), "Role conflict and ambiguity in complex 
organizations", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 150-163. 
Schneider, B., Ashforth, S., Higgs, A. C. and Carr, L. (1996), "Design, validity and use of 
strategically focused employee attitude surveys", Personnel Psychology, Vol. 49 No. 
pp. 695-705. 
Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., Mayer, D. M., Saltz, J. L. and Niles-Jolly, K. (2005), 
"Understanding organizational-customer links in service settings", Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 48 No. 6, pp. 1017-1032. 
Scullen, S. E., Mount, M. K. and Goff, M. (2000), "Understanding the Latent Structure of Job 
Performance Ratings", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 85 No. 6, pp. 956-970. 
Singh, J. (2000), "Performance productivity and quality of frontline employees in service 
organizations", Journal of Marketing, Vol. 64 No. 2, pp. 15-34. 
Tepper, B. J., Lockhart, D. and Hoobler, J. (2001), "Justice, Citizenship, and Role Definition 
Effects", Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 86 No. 4, pp. 789-796. 
van Dolen, W., de Ruyter, K. and Lemmink, J. (2004), "An empirical assessment of the 
influence of customer emotions and contact employee performance on encounter and 
relationship satisfaction", Journal of Business Research, Vol. 57 No. 4, pp. 437-444. 
Van Dyne, L. and LePine, A. (1998), "Helping and Voice Extra-Role Behaviors: Evidence of 
Construct and Predictive Validity", Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41 No. 1, 
pp. 108-119. 
Chapter V 
 144 
Werner, J. M. (1994), "Dimensions that Make a Difference: Examining the Impact of In-Role 
and Extra-role Behaviors on Supervisory Ratings", Journal of Applied Psychology, 
Vol. 79 No. 1, pp. 98-107. 
Westbrook, K. W. and Peterson, R. M. (1998), "Business-to-Business selling determinants of 
quality", Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 51-62. 
Chapter VI 
 145 
Chapter VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate the exchange between a service supplier 
and a buying organization. More specifically, we want to examine how performance 
outcomes of buyer-seller interactions in business services settings can be enhanced by means 
of contractual and relational governance and frontline employee behaviour. In this chapter, 
the research results are briefly summarized. Next, several limitations are described and 
possibilities for future research are discussed. We also indicate some managerial implications 
arising from the research results. 
  
6.01 Research Overview 
In this dissertation, four research studies -three empirical studies and one conceptual study- 
are presented as a means of addressing five general research questions related to (i) the impact 
of purchased business services along the supply chain (study 1); (ii) the determining factors of 
business services exchange governance (study 2); (iii) the influence of certain determining 
factors on contractual and relational governance (study 3); (iv) the interplay between 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms and its impact on performance (study 3); 
(v) the impact of frontline employee behaviour on performance outcomes (study 4) in 
business services settings. 
 
The empirical research studies were carried out in the Belgian security services market. The 
first empirical study (study 1) was conducted among 201 business customers of an 
organization buying security services from a major security services supplier in Belgium.  In 
the second empirical study (study 3), 124 business customers buying security services from 
one or more security services suppliers in Belgium were incorporated. The third empirical 
study (study 4) was conducted among 1,174 security agents employed at one major security 
services supplier in Belgium. 
 
The main findings of this dissertation are discussed below in the context of the five research 
questions and a general conclusion is drawn. 
 
 
Chapter VI 
 146 
(i)  The impact of purchased business services along the supply chain 
In a first empirical study (Chapter 2), we investigate the impact of purchased business 
services by a service provider on downstream supply chain members. More specifically, we 
investigate the impact of purchased security services along the supply chain. The results 
indicate that services purchased from a supplier influence the satisfaction of the buying 
organization’s customers. The exchange between the supplier and the buyer affects the buying 
organization’s exchanges with end-customers and thus, that supplier becomes a member of 
the buying organization’s network (Ritter, 2000). Because of that relationship 
interconnectedness, the governance of the purchased services, i.e. security services, gains in 
importance. This relationship interconnectedness also holds for those end-customers 
considering the purchased services as less important. As such, not only relationships with 
suppliers delivering strategically valuable services can be an important source of competitive 
value (Ritter et al., 2004). The relationships with suppliers delivering support services to 
assist the company in its core business delivery should also be incorporated in the buying 
organization’s business network: the governance of the exchange between a security services 
supplier and a buying organization can affect the exchanges of the buying organization with 
other members of the business network. 
 
Next to the impact of purchased business services along the supply chain, there was an 
additional interesting finding in this study: the elements determining satisfaction depend on 
the position of the evaluator with regard to the position of the supplier in the supply chain. 
The more the supplier’s position in the supply chain is upstream compared to the evaluator’s 
position, the more ‘tangible’ (easier to judge) evidence will be used to evaluate the service 
delivery.  
 
(ii)  The determining factors of business services exchange governance 
The previous study indicated the importance of governing the exchange between a business 
service provider and a buying organization, particularly for security services. In the second 
study (Chapter 3), we give an overview of previous research studies that have investigated the 
exchange governance phenomenon by incorporating contractual and/or relational governance 
mechanisms in business settings. This overview reveals two important findings. First, few 
research studies have investigated the overall picture of exchange governance, i.e. 
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antecedents, contractual and relational governance, and performance outcomes. Second, 
limited attention is given to specific service characteristics and their impact on exchange 
governance.  
 
Based on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975; 1979), relationship exchange theory 
(Macneil, 1980) and the results of previous studies, we indicate several features of the service 
transaction – both economic and social – which have an influence on exchange governance in 
business services settings. In relationship exchange theory, trust is considered as a non-
economic or social factor which helps explain exchange governance (Joshi and Stump, 1999): 
it is the most encompassing determinant of relational governance (Claro et al., 2003; Macneil, 
1980). Based on transaction cost theory, asset specificity and uncertainty are the most 
frequently cited economic antecedents of exchange governance (David and Han, 2004).  
 
Service exchanges differ from good exchanges as the former are more people-oriented and 
less tangible. Because of these specific service characteristics, manufacturing and services 
firms respond differently to determinants of exchange governance such as asset specificity 
and uncertainty (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003).  First, because of the intangible nature of 
services, asset specificity consists of more than just physical and human transaction-specific 
investments; procedural asset specificity related to customized workflow and processes 
should also be considered (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Second, according to transaction 
cost theory, uncertainty is assumed to just have a moderating effect on exchange governance 
(David and Han, 2004). Environmental uncertainty, related to the unpredictability of the 
environment, is proposed to only influence exchange governance when a certain level of asset 
specificity occurs. As services are more people-oriented, behavioural uncertainty, related to 
the unpredictability of the exchange partner’s behaviour, will have a stronger influence on 
exchange governance in services settings than in manufacturing settings (Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003): behavioural uncertainty is proposed to influence business services exchange 
governance apart from the level of asset specificity.  
 
(iii)  The influence of certain determining factors on contractual and relational 
governance in business services exchanges 
In the third study (Chapter 4), exchange governance mechanisms in the security services 
sector are investigated more in detail. We focus on those features of the transaction that are 
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affected by specific service characteristics, i.e. asset specificity and uncertainty, as identified 
in the previous study. We investigate how these features influence the governance of security 
services exchanges. In this study, we also distinguish between two dimensions of contract 
structure: contract detail and contract flexibility (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002). Contract detail 
refers to the level of detail by which roles and obligations of the parties are specified; contract 
flexibility relates to the degree to which guidelines for handling unanticipated contingencies 
are incorporated in the contract (Luo, 2002). High level of contractual governance requires 
high levels on both contract detail and contract flexibility (Luo, 2002). In the third study, we 
thus investigate how asset specificity and uncertainty influence contract detail, contract 
flexibility, and relational governance in exchanges between security services suppliers and 
buying organizations. Figure 1 gives an overview of the impact of asset specificity and 
uncertainty on contractual governance and Figure 2 illustrates the impact of these antecedents 
on relational governance. 
 
Asset specificity relates to transaction-specific investments in physical, human or procedural 
aspects deployed by supplier or buyer, respectively referred to as supplier asset specificity or 
buyer asset specificity. The results indicate that higher levels of supplier asset specificity 
relate to higher levels of relational governance, contract detail, and contract flexibility. Higher 
levels of buyer asset specificity only relate to higher levels of relational governance, and not 
directly to higher levels of contractual governance. Thus, specific investments made by the 
supplier are safeguarded by the contract and these safeguards also protect the buyer against 
opportunistic behaviour when transaction-specific investments are made.  
 
Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to both contractual governance and relational 
governance, while environmental uncertainty is only related to contractual governance. The 
impact of the latter differs for the two dimensions of contractual governance: environmental 
uncertainty is directly and negatively related to contract detail, but it has a positive 
moderating effect on contract flexibility. When the unpredictability of the environment is 
high, higher levels of supplier asset specificity result in higher levels of contract flexibility to 
be able to adjust the contract to changing circumstances and better safeguard the specific 
investments made.  
The impact of behavioural uncertainty on contract flexibility is not straightforward: the study 
indicates a positive moderating effect of buyer asset specificity. Only with low levels of buyer 
asset specificity has behavioural uncertainty a negative impact on contract flexibility. When 
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the buyer makes more specific investments, the negative impact of behavioural uncertainty on 
contract flexibility is neutralized because the buying organization prefers more contract 
flexibility to assure the continuity of the relationship and as such safeguard the specific 
investments made.  
 
Figure VI-1: Impact of asset specificity and uncertainty on contractual governance 
  
 
Figure VI-2: Impact of asset specificity and uncertainty on relational governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iv)  The interplay between contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
and its impact on performance in business services settings 
In that same study (Chapter 4), we also investigate how contractual and relational governance 
of security services exchanges are interrelated and how both governance mechanisms have an 
influence on the performance of the buyer-seller relationship. Again we identify the two 
dimensions of contractual governance, i.e. contract detail and contract flexibility. 
Performance is defined as customer-based evaluations of exchange performance, including 
satisfaction, willingness to recommend, and future purchase intentions. 
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The results indicate that the contract is an important governance mechanism and not inferior 
to other governance mechanisms such as relational governance. In accordance with the 
complementarity view on contracting and relational issues (Lazzarini et al., 2004), the 
contract facilitates the development of relational governance between buyer and seller and 
both governance mechanisms have a positive impact on performance outcomes. However, a 
discrepancy in the results on contract detail and contract flexibility is found. Contract detail is 
only directly related to relational governance, while contract flexibility is only directly related 
to performance outcomes. Detailed specification of the roles and obligations of both partners 
(high contract detail) helps to develop mutual agreed norms and values in the relationship and 
the expectation that the other partner will act as agreed upon. On the other hand, when the 
terms of the contract can be adjusted to include additional needs or to better comply with 
current needs (high contract flexibility), the buying organization will evaluate the exchange in 
a more positive way as service delivery will better meet their expectations.  
 
(v)  The impact of frontline employee behaviour on performance outcomes in 
business services settings  
As frontline employees play a key role in services exchanges, we do not limit our study on 
business services exchanges to the impact of governance mechanism, but we also incorporate 
the influence of frontline employees in the relationship. In a last study (Chapter 5), we 
investigate how different types of frontline employee behaviour influence the productivity and 
quality performed by the employee.  
 
The results confirm the general acknowledged linkage between behaviour of frontline service 
employees and performance outcomes (Schneider et al., 2005), but the different types of 
frontline employee behaviour do not influence performance in the same way. According to 
general consensus, in-role behaviour directly influences both performance productivity and 
performance quality. Extra-role behaviour is an antecedent of in-role behaviour and, in line 
with previous research studies (Piercy et al., 2006), in-role behaviour mediates the impact of 
extra-role behaviour on performance quality. Contrary to previous research studies (Piercy et 
al., 2006), extra-role behaviour is directly related to performance productivity: in-role 
behaviour is only a partial mediator for the relationship between extra-role behaviour and 
performance productivity. Certain types of frontline employee behaviour such as 
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communicating opportunities for service improvement are not only related to in-role 
behaviour, but these types of behaviour also directly influence the performed productivity.  
 
(vi)  General conclusion 
In this dissertation, the main focus is on business services management: we investigate how 
business services exchanges should be managed to enhance performance outcomes. The 
studies included in this dissertation add valuable contributions from both a theoretical and a 
practical point of view. On the basis of the results presented in this dissertation, we provide 
empirical support for the relevance of security services in the current business economy. To 
investigate the governance of these security services exchanges -or even business services 
exchanges in general- the specific characteristics of the services delivered should be 
considered. The results of this dissertation also indicate that, to obtain a clear insight into the 
phenomenon of business services exchanges and their performance outcomes, an overall 
picture should be taken into account. For example, not only downstream supply chain 
members, but also those organizations with a more upstream position in the supply chain 
should be included. Moreover, especially for support services, the exchange governance 
mechanisms as well as frontline employee behaviour should be incorporated. Frontline 
employee behaviour should relate to both in-role and extra-role behaviour. Exchange 
governance mechanisms should incorporate both contractual and relational governance, and 
contractual governance should relate to the level of detail as well as the level of flexibility. 
Research studies on business services exchanges should thus be more multidisciplinary. 
Another major contribution of this dissertation is the setting in which the research studies are 
performed. Although support services are an important part of business services (Lehtonen 
and Salonen, 2005) and the security services sector has been growing over the past years, few 
research studies have focused on that particular setting. Our research results confirm the 
importance of support services, and more specifically security services, in business networks 
and the studies also offer practical suggestions for managing security services exchanges on 
both an organizational and employee level.  
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6.02 Limitations and Future Research 
The results of this dissertation are subject to a number of limitations, of which several hold a 
possibility for future research. 
 
The studies in this dissertation have ‘performance’ as dependent variable. In each study, 
different respondents (end-customer, buyer, employee) are involved and performance is each 
time defined from a different viewpoint. In the first study, performance is defined as the 
transaction-specific satisfaction from the end-customer. In the second and third study, 
performance is defined as customer-based evaluation of exchange performance (including 
overall satisfaction, willingness to recommend, and future purchase intentions), the customer 
being the buying organization. In the fourth study, performance is defined as performed 
productivity and quality from the employees’ point of view. Due to the lack of uniform 
measurement of performance, research results can not be compared. Future research should 
use a more general measure of performance and also incorporate some objective performance 
indicators such as turnover, margin, volume or number of complaints.  
 
In this dissertation, the focus is on firm-to-firm relationships and the impact of frontline 
employees on performance outcomes. Although not the scope of this study, it could be 
valuable to incorporate other governance mechanisms such as interpersonal relationships 
between key people of both supplying and buying organizations (Haytko, 2004). Future 
research could also further investigate the interplay between governance mechanisms and 
frontline employee behaviour. Extra-role behaviour such as communication among boundary-
spanning personnel produces common agreement on norms (Hutt et al., 2000) and could thus 
enhance relational governance. On the other hand, role-prescribed behaviour might be 
determined by the level of contract detail and the specified roles and obligations of both 
parties. To investigate the interplay between governance mechanisms and frontline employee 
behaviour, more exploratory, qualitative research is needed as the different exchange 
governance mechanisms could be an antecedent or an outcome of frontline employee 
behaviour. 
 
In the empirical studies in this dissertation, a static approach is used: the business service 
exchange is investigated at a certain point in the life after the purchase. Future research should 
incorporate a more dynamic approach by considering interfirm relationships as a 
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developmental process (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Longitudinal research is needed to 
further investigate possible recursive relationships that can occur between for example 
exchange governance mechanisms and features of the service transaction, performance 
outcomes and frontline employee behaviour, and the evaluation of downstream supply chain 
members and upstream exchange governance.  
 
Another possibility for future research is investigating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
specific tools developed for the governance of business services exchanges. Service level 
agreements for example are written agreements between a service provider and a buying 
organization in which communication and relationship management play an important role 
(Vandaele and Gemmel, 2004): certain aspects of contractual and relational governance are 
thus merged into one specific tool. These agreements have been frequently used in 
information services exchanges and recently, other services sectors are starting to use this tool 
as well.  More academic research is needed to investigate how service level agreements 
should be established and how these agreements can affect performance outcomes in business 
services settings.  
 
The three empirical studies are performed in the security services sector in Belgium. Although 
the inclusion of several major security services suppliers (in study 3) enhances the validity of 
our results for the Belgian security services sector, response rates between 18% and 32% 
suggest being careful with generalizing the study results. The collection of dyadic data (e.g., 
from both the supplier’s and the buyer’s side) or data from multiple respondents (e.g., 
employee, buying organization, end-customer) within one research study might give more 
detailed information on some of the relationships found. Further research in other business 
services sectors, and support services settings, is also needed to improve external validity. 
More research on interesting results out of this dissertation such as the relevance of contract 
detail and contract flexibility in other settings could provide valuable insights for business 
services exchanges governance.  
 
6.03 Managerial Implications 
A first important managerial implication is the relevance of support services suppliers, more 
specifically security suppliers, in an organization’s business network (Chapter 2). Although 
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support services might not seem strategically valuable at first sight – as these services just 
assist the company in its core business delivery – these services can influence downstream 
supply chain members. Selection and evaluation of the support services supplier should 
therefore be carried out carefully, taking into account the impact of that supplier along the 
supply chain. The establishment of a performance measurement system or the development of 
long-term relationships can help the buying organization to better manage the interaction with 
support services suppliers. Changes in upstream interactions, such as replacing the current 
support services supplier, can affect the other relationships within the organization’s business 
network in either a positive or a negative way.  
 
The results of the second and third study (Chapter 3 and 4) indicate several managerial 
implications on how business services exchanges should be governed. First, a contract or 
formal, written agreement should be established for a particular buyer-seller interaction and 
this should also be used to govern the relationship. During the ongoing interaction, a contract 
established ex ante facilitates the development of relational governance and improves the 
customer’s evaluation of the service delivery during the life after the purchase. The level of 
detail and the level of flexibility in the contract depend on the specific features of the service 
transaction under consideration. The level of contract detail should be mainly determined by 
the supplier and depends on the anticipated amount of specific supplier investments needed 
for the service to be delivered. Then again, when environmental or behavioural uncertainty 
are high, it will be more difficult to stipulate ex ante the roles and obligations of both parties. 
The level of contract flexibility should also depend on the anticipated amount of specific 
supplier investments needed and when environmental uncertainty is high, higher levels of 
flexibility should be used to safeguard the investments made. The level of contract flexibility 
should also take into account the amount of specific investments made by the buyer. When 
there are few such investments, the level of contract flexibility should be low when 
behavioural uncertainty increases to avoid misuse related to unnecessary changing of the 
contract. Higher specific investments made by the buyer will decrease the possibility of that 
misuse, as the stakes of the buyer have increased. Thus, the negative impact of behavioural 
uncertainty on contract flexibility can be neutralized by the specific investments made by the 
buyer. 
 
Next to the establishment of the contract, relational governance should be developed during 
the ongoing buyer-seller interaction in the live after the purchase because of its positive 
Chapter VI 
 155 
impact on the customer’s evaluation of the service delivery. A detailed contract with specific 
roles and obligations for each partner will encourage the development of common values and 
norms because each exchange partner knows what to do and what to expect. The development 
of relational governance is not only dependent on the level of contract detail; several features 
of the service transaction also play a role.  When supplier and/or buyer make specific 
investments in a particular buyer-supplier relationship, the investing party will be more 
willing to develop relational governance as an additional safeguard for the investments made. 
Then again, when behavioural uncertainty is high, it will be more difficult to develop 
common values and norms because of the unpredictability of the exchange partner’s 
behaviour. 
 
The results of the fourth study (Chapter 5) indicate that in business services exchanges not 
only the governance of the exchange influences the performance outcomes, but the way the 
service is delivered and the behaviour of frontline employees also plays a role. Organizations 
purchasing business services should not just govern the exchange with the external services 
supplier, but also pay attention to the employees delivering the services. As support services 
are mainly delivered at the premises of the buying firm, the latter should try to encourage both 
in-role and extra-role behaviour of the supplier’s frontline employees, also because of the 
impact of purchased support services along the supply chain. The buying organization could 
for example communicate to the supplier and its frontline employees which type of role-
prescribed behaviour is needed to fulfil the needs of the buying organization’s customers. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Measurement items used in Chapter II 
 
Satisfaction with security services supplier 
All items were measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “completely unsatisfied”, to 
7 “completely satisfied”.  
 
Transaction-specific satisfaction  
“Please indicate the extent to which you are satisfied with the services delivered by security 
company on the premises of business company during the last quarter of 2003. 
1. The accessibility and ability to contact the security services supplier. 
2. The expertise and knowledge of the security agents. 
3. The direct contact with the security agents. 
4. The visibility of the security agents at the business company’s premises. 
5. The reliability of the security services supplier. 
6. The way in which complaints are handled by the security services supplier. 
 
Overall satisfaction 
1. In general, how satisfied are you with the services delivered by security company on the 
premises of business company? 
 
 
Importance attached to service 
The item was measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “completely unimportant”, to 
7 “completely important”.  
1. How important do you consider the delivered services by security company? 
 
 
Satisfaction with exhibition services supplier 
All items were measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “completely unsatisfied”, to 
7 “completely satisfied”.  
 
Transaction-specific satisfaction  
“Please indicate the extent to which you are satisfied with the general services delivered by 
business company (and not just related to security) during the last quarter of 2003. 
1. The accessibility and ability to contact the business company. 
2. The expertise and knowledge of the business company’s personnel. 
3. The direct contact with the business company’s personnel. 
4. The reliability of the business company. 
5. The way in which complaints are handled by the business company. 
 
Overall satisfaction 
1. In general, how satisfied are you with the services delivered by business company? 
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Appendix B: Measurement items used in Chapter IV 
 
All items were measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “completely disagree, to 7 
“completely agree”.a 
 
Supplier asset specificity (SAS) 
1. Our supplier has carried out considerable adjustments to the delivered service in order to 
meet the requirements from our organization. 
2. Our supplier has to a great extent invested in specific resources in order to adjust to our 
service requirements. 
3. Our supplier has to a great extent adjusted the service offering to the procedures of our 
organization. 
4. Our supplier has invested a substantial amount of time and money to train and qualify their 
personnel in order to deliver the requested service.  
5. Our supplier has invested to a great extent in the adequate knowledge and skills needed for 
the requested service to be delivered.  
 
Buyer asset specificity (BAS) 
1. Our organization has made significant investments in tooling and equipment dedicated to 
our relationship with this supplier. 
2. Our organization has adapted specific procedures to this supplier to enable an efficient 
service delivery.  
3. Our organization has made significant investments in technology so that this supplier can 
deliver the requested service. 
4. To be effective, a service employee has to get to know our organization and its procedures 
before he can perform the requested service. 
5. Our organization has to a great extent invested time and money in training and qualifying 
this supplier’s personnel. 
6. If our organization decided to work with another supplier, we would be wasting a lot of 
investments that we have made to work with this supplier.  
 
Environmental uncertainty (EnvUnc) 
1. Market conditions of our supplier are very unstable.  
2. Prices of the delivered services fluctuate heavily between suppliers. 
3. The technology used in this service delivery alters quickly.
b
  
 
Behavioral uncertainty (BehUnc) 
1. For this type of service delivery, it is easy to evaluate whether the promised service has 
been delivered. (-) 
2. The delivered performance can be easily measured for this type of service. (-) 
3. Some aspects of this supplier’s service delivery are difficult to evaluate objectively. 
4. For this type of services, standards can be easily defined. (-) 
 
                                                 
a
 (-): reversed scaled item 
b
 Item was removed during scale purification 
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Contract detail (Cdeta) 
1. With this supplier, we have a specific, well-detailed formal agreement. 
2. We have formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties. 
3. We have detailed contractual agreements with this supplier. 
 
Contract flexibility (Cflex) 
1. The written agreement with this supplier can be easily adapted to changing circumstances. 
2. Our organization considers the written agreement with this supplier as flexible.  
 
Relational Governance (RelGov) 
1. Both parties are committed to the preservation of good working relationships with each 
other. 
2. Both parties make much trouble to maintain a cooperative relationship with each other. 
3. In case of conflict, both parties are motivated to review the history and all the facts of an 
issue. 
4. Both parties try to arrive at a mutual settlement among themselves in case of dispute. 
5. In this relationship, both parties provide relevant information to the other party on time. 
6. It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the 
other party. 
7. Both parties are flexible in their response to requests made by the other party. 
8. The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with 
changing circumstances. 
9. Both parties are open to each other’s request to improve the agreement. 
 
Performance (Perf) 
1. Overall, we are very satisfied with this supplier. 
2. Our organization is not completely pleased with this supplier. (-) 
3. We will recommend this supplier to other purchasing managers. 
4. Our organization has the intention to continue /renew the current relationship with this 
supplier. 
5. Our organization has the intention to expand the current relationship with this supplier.  
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Appendix C: Measurement items used in Chapter V 
 
Boundary spanning behaviour 
“Please indicate for each statement the extent to which you agree with this description as 
being characteristic of you.” The items were measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 
“completely disagree, to 7 “completely agree”. 
 
Service delivery behaviour 
1. I follow up on customer requests and problems in a timely manner. 
2. Regardless of circumstances, I behave exceptionally courteous and respectful to customers. 
3. I follow through in a conscientious manner on promises I have made to customers. 
 
Internal influence behaviour 
1. I make constructive suggestions for improvement of the delivered security services.  
2. I share creative solutions to customer problems with my supervisor or other colleagues.  
3. I encourage co-workers to contribute ideas and suggestions for service improvement. 
 
External representation behaviour 
1. I recommend this security company to outsiders as a great place to work. 
2. I make sure that outsiders adopt a positive attitude towards this security company.  
3. I stress the good things about this security company to others. 
 
 
Role ambiguity 
a
 
The items were measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “completely disagree, to 7 
“completely agree”. 
1. I have clear, planned goals and objectives for my job. (-) 
2. I know exactly what my responsibilities are when performing the job. (-) 
3. I know exactly what is expected of me in the job. (-) 
 
 
Performance 
“Please indicate for each statement to what extent your performance level is inferior or 
superior, compared with an average security agent of the company.” The items were measured 
on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 “inferior performance”, to 7 “superior performance”. 
 
Productivity 
1. Overall customer contact. 
2. Meeting your quotas and targets. 
3. Overall performance in reaching objectives. 
4. Following the company’s suggested procedures and processes. 
5. Providing accurate and complete paperwork. 
6. Timely and accurate communicating to colleagues. 
7. Overall knowledge of company and customer policies and procedures. 
8. Keeping abreast of your company’s policies. 
 
                                                 
a
 (-): reversed scaled item 
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Quality 
1. Taking the initiative to help your customers -within what is allowed- even when it is not 
part of your responsibility. 
2. Taking the time to make an additional effort for your customers -within what is allowed- on 
top of the daily routine. 
3. Overall developing customer trust and confidence in your service. 
4. Responding promptly to customer requests, despite your busy workload. 
5. Immediately answering a call -by phone or otherwise. 
6. Consistently following up on promises made by yourself, colleagues or the company to the 
customer. 
7. Following up on a certain assignment until completion. 
8. Consistently providing prompt service to your customers. 
9. Consistently resolving customer concerns. 
10. Providing accurate and correct information to the customer. 
11. Making sure colleagues follow through with customer requests. 
12. Telling the customers the straight facts instead of telling them what they want to hear. 
13. Overall performing your job dependably and accurately. 
14. Listening attentively to understand the concerns of the customer. 
15. Working out solutions to the customer’s questions or concerns. 
16. Providing individualized attention to the customer’s concerns. 
  
 
